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The focus of this thesis is on the following issues related to fiscal policy: 
sustainability of fiscal deficits, validity of the tax smoothing hypothesis, and 
macroeconomic impact of government expenditure policies. We propose new 
methodological approaches to the issues of the fiscal sustainability and the tax 
smoothing hypothesis. The fiscal sustainability and the tax smoothing hypotheses are, 
then, tested using fiscal data of selected developed countries. As for developing 
countries, fiscal policy issues are not indeed fiscal sustainability or tax smoothing but 
how to contain fiscal deficits and effects of such deficit reduction measurers. 
Simulation experiments are, therefore, carried out on economic effects of deficit 
reduction policies in a developing country context taking Sri Lanka as the case.     
We examine the sustainability of the U.S. federal government budgetary 
policies by extending existing present value borrowing constraint model. Using 
rational expectations to allow for full information in the present value borrowing 
constraint, the sustainability of the U.S. budget deficits is examined in a longer time 
horizon that includes 75 years. Results emerge in favour of the sustainability of the 
U.S. federal fiscal deficits. The model developed here is rich enough explaining very 
divergent movements in the debt series without any artificially defined structural 
breaks or regime shifts.    
We propose a new theoretical and empirical framework for the tax smoothing 
hypothesis. For this first we derive a linear relationship between the optimal tax rate 
and the permanent component of the government expenditure rate. Using this linear 
relationship between the optimal tax rate and the permanent government expenditure 




 valid if the tax rate at time t and the permanent government expenditure rate at time   
t-1 are cointegrated with a vector (1 1). The general conclusion of this study 
depending on the degree of the cointegration and results of an error correction model 
is that countries in the sample follow a weak form of tax smoothing.      
In the next two chapters, we examine the macroeconomic impact of 
government spending policies in Sri Lanka. For this, a macroeconometric model is 
constructed for Sri Lanka. The model is simulated to trace-out the impact of decreases 
in government consumption, investment and interest payment spending. Simulation 
results reveal that while government consumption and transfer payment spending cuts 
leave many macro variables unchanged, government investment expenditure cuts 
have significant impact on them. It is found that lowered government investment 
spending results in a severe economic recession. While low government consumption 
expenditure and transfer payments decrease fiscal deficit markedly, low government 
investment spending triggers a recession and results in higher fiscal deficits in 
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1.1 Background of the Study 
The financial stress of the public sector is one of the major recent economic issues 
in both developed and developing countries. Over the last three decades, there has 
been a tendency for large fiscal deficits to appear. Recurrent and high deficits result in 
excessive accumulation of government debts. Deficits and debt accumulation raise a 
number of issues on government budgetary policies. One issue is the sustainability of 
fiscal deficits, and another is whether countries follow optimal fiscal policy criteria 
such as tax smoothing.  There are also concerns on whether fiscal deficits and deficit 
reduction policies have real effect on the economy. It is argued that in the absence of 
Ricardian equivalence fiscal deficits have large impact on the macroeconomy as they 
disturb the private sector decision-making process. 1  Further, fiscal deficits cause 
intergenerational burdens since most of the excess expenditures are financed by 
issuing debt. As Romer (2006, p.568) notes, budget deficits reduce growth and could 
lead to a crisis if they are highly persistent and too large. A large volume of research 
papers have emerged discussing these various aspects of budgetary policies of the 
government. 
The management of the government budgetary policies has varied over time. 
Before the Keynesian economics emerged, the fiscal conduct was mainly governed by 
                                                 
1 The Ricardian equivalence theorem states that only the quantity of government expenditure, not the 
division of financing government expenditure between taxes and bonds, affects the economy. This is 
true if agents accurately foresee future tax liabilities implicit in deficit financing. Since agents know 
that their future tax liabilities are exactly equal to the return from bond holding, this policy does not 
affect the agents’ wealth thus consumption and investment (see Romer (2006, p. 568)). This view is 
originally proposed by David Ricardo and elaborated later by Robert Barro (see Barro (1974)). Seater 
(1993) provides an extensive survey of literature on the Ricardian equivalence theorem.  
 1
 the principle of fiscal responsibility proposed by Adam Smith. From Adam Smith’s 
point of view, no difference is found between budgetary accounts of a family and of 
the government. He, therefore, advises policymakers to maintain government revenue 
and spending accounts in balance (see Buchanan and Wagner (2000)). The 
government should not spend without imposing taxes. It should not shift the present 
fiscal burdens to future generations by bond financing excess spending in favour of 
the current generation. The policy rule was to run a balanced budget. If not, the 
government budget should be in surpluses. Deficits were tolerated only in 
extraordinary times such as wars or recessions. Surpluses attained in normal periods 
should be sizable to cushion unexpected deficits. In consequence, the debt stock 
increased only in extraordinary times (see for discussion Burkhead (1954), Buchanan 
(1958), Buchanan and Wagnar (1967)).  
The publication of Keynes’ The General Theory of Employment, Interest and 
Money in 1936 had a profound influence on the fiscal policy conduct. Keynes 
proposed that budgetary conduct of the government is totally different from that of 
individuals or firms. A policy measure that is folly in the conduct of a family budget 
may be prudence in the conduct of the budget of a nation (Keynes (1936), see also 
Buchanan and Wagnar (2000)). In Keynesian economics a key role is assigned to the 
government budget as it was used to achieve more important macroeconomic 
objectives such as growth and economic stabilization at full employment level (Pierce 
(1971)). Large deficits, thereby the accumulation of debt, are not worrisome if excess 
expenditures are used to enhance the production capacity and for the stabilization of 
the economy. In addition, Keynesianism pointed out that deficits do not matter if they 
are financed by debts within the nation (Dalton (1954), Feldstein (1995)). These ideas 
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 result in recurrent and large budget deficits as policymakers were no longer obliged to 
balance the budget.  
However, this unbalanced budget rule has often led policymakers to make 
seemingly irresponsible expenditure decisions (see Feldstein (1995)). Unconstrained 
spending rules paved the way for various rent-seeking activities too. It is learnt that in 
a non-Ricardian world, fiscal deficits drive up interest rates and crowd-out private 
investment and result in an erosion of the longer term productivity growth (see for 
recent work Mühleisen (2004), Adam and Bevan (2005)). Feldstein (1995) noted that 
deficits also create a massive deadweight loss to the economy.  
As governments understood the consequences of large fiscal deficits, recent 
trend has been to narrow down the gap between government spending and revenue. In 
many countries, fiscal deficits have fallen sharply from their high figures in the 1990s 
(Auerbach (2003), Adam and Bevan (2005)). One reason for the tightening fiscal 
policy in recent years was the high accumulation of debt in the past (Bohn (1998)). 
Another reason, particularly in developed countries, was the rejection of Keynesian 
view that deficits are benign. Because of its contemporaneous effects and 
intergenerational burdens, many prefer to reduce (or eliminate) fiscal deficits by 
lowering government expenditure (Feldstein (1995)). On the other hand, declining 
fiscal deficits in many developing countries are a result of policy targets set by 
international funding agencies to qualify for further financing. As recent foreign 
funding is associated with policy packages aimed at downsizing the government and 
deregulating towards free market economy, deficits tend to decline. However, it is 
evident that governments regularly create fiscal deficits aiming to garner political 
gains. Fiscal deficits are, therefore, hard to defy and, as a result, the accumulation of 
 3
 debt is inevitable. To reiterate, this kind of fiscal policy obviously paves the way for 
many macroeconomic concerns.  
 
1.2 Statement of the Research Problems 
One issue that this thesis addresses is the sustainability of the fiscal deficits in 
the long-run. We examine this issue to assess whether the current budgetary policy 
would ultimately lead the government into insolvency. Another issue that is taken up 
in this thesis is the validity of the tax smoothing hypothesis. Given that deficits are 
cyclical and taxation creates an excess burden, we examine whether governments 
follow a tax smoothing pattern in order to spread out the tax burden over time. Third, 
we question whether different components of government expenditure affect the 
aggregate economy differently.  
The objectives of this study are three-fold; 
1. Offer a new methodology to assess fiscal sustainability  
2. Offer a new test procedure for testing the tax smoothing hypothesis  
3. Assess the macroeconomic impact of various deficit reduction methods. We 
do this exercise for Sri Lanka, a less developed country stuck in a prolonged 
civil war. For Sri Lanka, both fiscal sustainability and tax smoothing are far 
from reality. Chronic deficit is the major problem regarding government 
budgetary policies. How to reduce the deficit is a main concern. For this, we 
construct a macroeconometric model. Another objective is to use this model 
in the future.2        
 
                                                 
2 The model developed here for Sri Lanka is expected to use in various policy simulation experiments 
in the future.  
 4
 1.3 Outline of the Thesis   
This thesis contains six chapters including the introductory chapter, 
bibliography and three appendices. The outline of the thesis is as follows. 
Chapter 2 addresses the issue of sustainability of fiscal deficits. We first 
extend the existing present value borrowing constraint model by incorporating 
rational expectations to allow for large information set to assess the discounted sum of 
expected future primary surpluses. Then, we use the U.S. federal government 
budgetary data over a long period of time to test the fiscal sustainability hypothesis. 
Results emerge in favour of the sustainability hypothesis despite very divergent 
movements in deficits and debt series over the examined lengthy sample period. 
Chapter 3 is on the tax smoothing hypothesis. We propose a new theoretical 
and empirical testing framework for the tax smoothing hypothesis. We show that the 
optimal tax rate is linearly dependent on the permanent component of the government 
expenditure rate. Based on this relationship and random walk in the tax rate, we 
propose that tax smoothing is valid if tax rate at time t and permanent government 
expenditure rate at time t-1 are cointegrated over time. The proposition is put into test 
empirically using data of six OECD countries for the period 1950s to the present. 
Results come into sight in favour of weak form of tax smoothing for all the cases. 
In Chapter 4, a medium scale macroeconometric model is developed for Sri 
Lanka to carry out policy simulation experiments. Our model differs from existing 
models for Sri Lanka due to many reasons. Theoretical consistency is maintained 
throughout the model. Both aggregate demand and aggregate supply decisions are 
adequately modeled. Since our prime objective is to examine the effect of fiscal 
deficit reduction measures, an extensive treatment is given to government budgetary 
 5
 operations. The model allows for short-term fluctuations of variables around their 
long-term relationship as it is estimated in an error correction format. The model 
appears well-suited for policy simulation experiments as it performs very well in both 
static and dynamic simulation methods.  
Chapter 5 of the thesis examines the macroeconomic impact of reductions in 
various components of government expenditure. The model developed in Chapter 4 is 
used for the policy simulation experiments. The impact of government consumption, 
transfer payments and investment expenditure cuts on main economic aggregates and 
the fiscal deficit is examined by tracing-out short-term and long-term expenditure 
multipliers. Results reveal that while falls in government consumption and transfer 
payment expenditures leave many macro variables unchanged, government 
investment expenditure cuts have significant negative impact on the economy. As a 
result of consumption and transfer payments expenditure cuts the fiscal deficit falls 
significantly both in the short-run and in the long-run. Despite the short-term negative 
impact, fiscal deficit rises in the long-run if government’s investment spending is 
lowered. This long-term positive effect on fiscal deficit is due to an economic 
contraction.  
Chapter 6 highlights the main results of the thesis. It also provides some policy 
implications and prospects for future research.  
Rest of the thesis gives Bibliography and appendices. Appendices provide 
derivations of equations used in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, cointegration and error 
correction methodology and details of construction of data for some variables used in 





ON THE SUSTAINABILITY OF FISCAL DEFICITS: 
THE UNITED STATES EXPERIENCE  
 
2.1 Introduction 
In many developed and developing countries fiscal balance has showed 
marked deteriorations during the past few decades leaving governments with 
persistent deficits. Because governments mainly stick to a policy of bond-financing of 
deficits, large and persistent deficits cause sharp increases in the stock of public debt. 
An important issue of running continuous fiscal deficits and excessive accumulation 
of debt is that how long a government could continue such a policy unchecked 
(Hamilton and Flavin (1986)). The issue, in general, concerns the sustainability of 
recurrent deficits.  
Large and persistent fiscal deficits may have many macroeconomic 
consequences. In the Keynesian model, deficits are likely to have real effects and 
distributional impact by increasing current consumption and reducing future wealth 
(Barro (1974)). This is true under the assumption that an increase in government debt 
implies an increase in perceived household wealth. It raises current consumption and 
thus, reduces capital accumulation and output growth. On the other hand, public debt 
competed with private debt for available funds drives up interest rates crowding-out 
private investment. Again this has a deleterious effect on the long-term economic 
growth (Seater (1993)). In the Diamond overlapping-generations model (see Diamond 
(1965)) where agents have finite lifetimes with no bequest motives, and taxes are non 
lump-sum, deficits have real effects as some of future tax burdens of a bond issue lie 
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 on individuals who are not alive when the bond is issued. Thus, it reduces wealth of 
some individuals and thus of the economy (see for example Modigliani (1961), 
Mundell (1971), Blinder and Solow (1973), Barsky, Mankiw, and Zeldes (1986), 
Bernheim (1987), Bernheim and Bagwell (1988)).3 Continuous deficits also involve 
departure from optimal policy of tax smoothing. Under the tax smoothing hypothesis 
deficits are chosen optimally to minimize the present value of distortion costs of 
taxation (Barro (1979), Romer (2006, p.573)). Large deficits require the expected 
future tax rate to be higher than the current tax rate if the intertemporal budget 
constraint of the government is valid. Thus, the deviation from tax smoothing means 
that the government creates an unnecessarily high distortion costs by imposing high 
tax rates to finance its excess spending.  
Provided that the economy is non-Ricardian, costs of deficit are obviously 
high if it is unsustainable.4  An unsustainable fiscal policy cannot continue to the 
indefinite future as it leads to a crisis. A crisis laden fiscal policy may involve sharp 
contractions in the size of the government, thus, a large fall in aggregate demand. This 
would ultimately lead to defaults in public liabilities which would in turn lower 
government spending and escalate economic recessions. An example is the debt crisis 
in early 1980s: A huge accumulation of debt as a result of large and recurrent fiscal 
deficits led many countries into debt crisis and defaults. Subsequently, the defaulted 
countries endured severe economic hardships as creditors (private and official) 
                                                 
3 There is, however, no consensus that this assertion is always true. In a Ricardian economy in which 
agents foresee that public debt has to be retired eventually and thus the government has to adjust 
expenditure accordingly, deficits have no real effects (see for example Barro (1974), Poterba and 
Summers (1987)).  
 
4 For a detailed discussion on the economic costs of sustainable and unsustainable fiscal deficits, see 
Romer (2001, pp. 573-576, 2006, pp. 603-607). 
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 refrained from refinancing them. Thus, what is important here for better 
macroeconomic management is to maintain the government budgetary operations 
within the limits of its intertemporal budget constraint.  
In this chapter, we examine the sustainability of the United States (U.S.) 
federal government’s fiscal policy. The escalating fiscal deficit of the U.S. federal 
government in recent decades has brought to surface the old fears of its sustainability. 
Any perceived unsustainability of the fiscal deficit combined with the current account 
deficit which has reached staggering heights in recent years may severely affect the 
reserve currency status of the U.S. dollar and may bring about a destabilizing effect 
on the world economy. Given this scenario it is worth examining how the past 
experience on fiscal operations shed light on the sustainability issue. In a seminal 
paper, Hamilton and Flavin (1986) addressed this issue drawing evidence from the 
1960-1984 period and reached a conclusion in support of the solvency of the U.S. 
government. The objective of our exercise here is to extend the Hamilton-Flavin 
methodology to incorporate rational expectations on future primary surpluses and 
examine the issue over a much longer time span that covers dynamically very 
different deficit episodes.   
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. A discussion on the methods of 
assessing fiscal sustainability is given in Section 2.2. In Section 2.3, we present the 
basic analytical framework of the present value borrowing constraint approach. 
Section 2.4 discusses some limitations of existing models that have examined the 
issue of fiscal sustainability in the U.S. and elsewhere within the framework of the 
present value borrowing constraint. In Section 2.5, we use a rational expectations 
formulation to accommodate for non-stationary behaviours in the debt process and 
 9
 present a more flexible model to test the present value borrowing constraint. Issues of 
the sample period and data are given in Section 2.6. Section 2.7 highlights the salient 
features of the U.S. debt and fiscal balance series that span over 75 years. In Section 
2.8, we test the present value borrowing constraint using data over this long time span 
that has recorded very different dynamics of the debt process. It should be noted that 
our model captures all the important turning points of the debt series very well. 
Overall, the results emerge in support of the solvency, perhaps the super-solvency, of 
the U.S. federal government in the long run. 
 
2.2 Methods of Assessing Fiscal Sustainability  
There are two broad conceptual approaches to assessing fiscal sustainability: 
the accounting approach and the present value borrowing constraint approach.5 In 
addition to these main approaches, this section briefly discusses the implications of 
the Ricardian equivalence theorem, bona-fide fiscal policies, strategic default models 
of government debt, Modigliani-Miller type results for fiscal policy on the issue of 
fiscal sustainability. 
The accounting approach uses few indicators, mainly debt-income ratio (or the 
debt ratio), to examine how far the present fiscal policy departs from a sustainable one. 
Consequently, a primary deficit which is defined as the excess spending excluding 
interest payments on existing debt over revenue (including money financing or 
seignorage) is treated as sustainable if it generates a constant debt ratio.6 Buiter (1985) 
notes that a sustainable fiscal policy needs to maintain the debt ratio at its current 
level. For Pasinetti (1998) and Goldstein (2003), a sustainable fiscal policy is the one 
                                                 
5 Cuddington (1997) and Chalk and Hemming (2000) provide excellent surveys of the literature. 
6 Seignorage is defined as government revenue from printing money (Romer (2006, p.538)).  
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 that generates a stable debt ratio overtime. Blanchard et al. (1990) note that fiscal 
policy is sustainable if the debt ratio eventually converges to its initial level. As for 
the accounting approach, sustainability is essentially about whether a government is 
heading towards an excessive accumulation of debt under the current policy. However, 
this method is often questioned on the lack of a proper threshold criterion for the debt 
ratio in evaluating the fiscal sustainability. In particular, this threshold value of debt 
ratio should depend on the fundamentals and the requirements of the economy.  
In contrast, the present value borrowing constraint approach provides a solid 
theoretical base for testing the sustainability hypothesis. It implies that fiscal policy is 
sustainable when it is expected to generate sufficient net revenues in the future to 
repay the accumulated debt and interest expenses. That is, fiscal policy is sustainable 
if it can be maintained into the indefinite future without leading the government into 
insolvency. Public sector is solvent when the present discounted value of future 
primary surpluses is at least equal to the outstanding stock of debt. On the contrary, 
the policy is said to be unsustainable when the government will forever finance its 
interest payments by issuing new debts. In the case of individuals’ budget constraint, 
Ponzi schemes are ruled out as they are infeasible: No one would be willing to lend a 
person who is trying to roll over debt continually.7 Similarly, fiscal sustainability 
requires deficit/surplus policies to be subject to its intertemporal budget constraint. As 
Ponzi schemes are not possible in a dynamically efficient economy where the real rate 
of interest is higher than the output growth rate, this implies that the present deficits 
should be offset by surpluses in the future. 8  Though there may be short-term 
                                                 
7 A Ponzi game is a state where there are incentives for an economic agent to finance its excess 
expenses including interest payments on existing debt by issuing new debt. 
 
8 The point is elaborated in Section 2.2. 
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 deviations from it, the constraint cannot be breached in the long run. Empirical 
evidence on the violation of the present value constraint indicates the unsustainability 
of the policy.9 Hamilton and Flavin (1986) initially use this method to evaluate fiscal 
sustainability. 
In the Ricardian equivalence view if future tax liabilities implicit in deficit 
financing are accurately foreseen, the behaviour of the agents will be exactly the same 
as if the budget is balanced continually. Since deficits have to be eventually retired, 
the policy is sustainable so long as it does not violate non-negativity of individuals’ 
consumption (see Barro (1974)).  
Assuming bonds created by the government are potential stores of value and 
they are used by households in paying taxes and by the government in making 
transfers in a complete and transaction costless market, Balasko and Shell (1981) 
show that Ponzi-type schemes are possible to an extent in an infinite-horizon 
overlapping-generations model. Treating all forms of government bonds as money, 
they find that the policy is bona-fide if the price of money is positive in all periods. If 
long-run interest rates exceed the long-run output growth rate, the bona-fide monetary 
(in fact, fiscal) policies entail long-run money stock of zero. Balasko and Shell (1981) 
noted that a policy that allows money supply to grow faster than the real growth rate 
asymptotically is not Pareto optimal. Though it is not straightforward, this implies that 
if debt grows at a higher rate than the output growth rate the policy is not sustainable 
as Ponzi schemes are feasible in such situation.  
                                                                                                                                            
  
9  A detailed discussion on the intertemporal budget constraint and the present value borrowing 
constraint is given in the next section.  
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 In strategic default models of government (foreign) debt, in which the level of 
debt may be determined by the borrower’s demand for credit or by a credit ceiling 
imposed by the lender, the government may have increased incentives to default when 
the debt stock is large. If the penalty for defaults is just the expulsion from foreign 
capital market, a country can borrow on an uninterrupted basis until period t with no 
further intention of borrowing thereafter (see for example Eaton and Gersovitz (1981), 
Bulow and Rogoff (1989)). Thus, the issue of debt sustainability depends on 
incentives for the government not to repudiate its debts.  
Wallace (1981) shows that there is a Modigliani-Miller type result for fiscal 
and monetary policies.10 If there is an equilibrium with certain properties for one path 
of portfolio for the government, then the above equilibrium is an equilibrium for a 
large class of portfolios of the government provided that only lump-sum taxes are 
adjusted to hold fiscal policy constant. That is, alternative paths of government 
portfolio consistent with a single path of fiscal policy can be irrelevant. Irrelevance 
here means that both the equilibrium consumption allocation and the path of price 
level are independent of the path of government portfolio. Though this thesis has no 
direct implications on fiscal sustainability, the indeterminacy on government’s 
portfolios could make the issue of sustainability unclear.  
 With no proper criteria in the accounting approach and no direct implication 
on the sustainability in other approaches such as the Ricardian view, bona-fide fiscal 
policies, strategic default models and Modigliani-Miller type models, we reckon that 
the present value borrowing constraint approach provides a solid theoretical base for 
fiscal sustainability that could be tested appealing to past budgetary policies of the 
                                                 
10 The Modigliani-Miller theorem shows that alternative corporate liability structures are irrelevant (see 
Modigliani and Miller (1958)).  
 
 13
 government. Obviously fiscal sustainability is a concern on past deficits/surpluses 
policies of the government. And the present value borrowing constraint approach 
enables testing the issue with the application of advanced econometric knowledge and 
techniques. For these reasons, we follow and extend the present value borrowing 
constraint approach in testing the fiscal sustainability of the U.S. federal government. 
 
2.3 The Analytical Framework  
Following the work of Hamilton and Flavin (1986) we assume that the 
government issues only one kind of bond , the aggregate debt, and its marginal 
cost is given by r , the real interest rate. We invoke rational expectations here to set 
the future real interest rate to its conditional mean (see also Hansen, Roberts, and 
Sargent (1991), Roberts (1991)). Although the conditional expectation of real interest 
rate, 
tD
1( )t tE r I+ , is a random variable because of the changing information set tI , by 
taking iterated expectations we can write ( ) rIrEErE ttIt t == ++ )()( 11 . This implies that 
the mean of the conditional expectations of real interest rate is a constant. This 
condition is empirically valid if the rate of real interest is a stationary (I(0)) process. 
Since a unit root in the U.S. real interest rate is rejected, it is reasonable to assume that 
the unconditional mean of real interest rate is constant at its period average.11 We 
further assume that the government’s borrowing begins with a given initial condition 
at time t and ends in the period 1t N+ −  where N is an integer greater than one. 
Agents who lend the government in each period believe that the government will run 
                                                 
11 We found that ADF unit root test reject a unit root in the U.S. real interest rate at the 1% level of 
significance. The ADF unit root test static with a constant and two period lagged effect in the 
regression is -4.942 for the period 1932-2004. The ADF critical value at the 1% significance level is -
3.52. See Table 2.3.  
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 sufficient primary surpluses in the future, up to t+N, to offset its initial debt. The 
government’s instantaneous budget constraint takes the following form: 
1(1 )t t tD r D S−= + −         (2.1) 
where 0ttt GTS −=  is the primary surplus,  is government revenue and is non-




( ) ( ) ttt SrDrD 111 11 −−− +++=        (2.2)  















)( )1()1( .     (2.3) 
Taking expectation conditional on information set at time t, the limiting value of Dt 
can be written as 
*
t tD A S= + t          (2.4) 
where ( )lim [(1 ) ]N tt N t NE r D
− −
→∞= + ( )*
1
[ 1 ]it t t i
i
S E r S
∞ −,  A +
=
= +∑ .12
In (2.4), the current debt stock is equal to the expected present-value of the debt stock 
in the limit ( tA ) plus the discounted sum of the expected future primary surpluses 
( ). If the no-Ponzi-game (NPG) condition holds, i.e., *tS tA is a non-positive constant, 
then the debt stock at time t must be matched by the present-value of expected future 
primary surpluses. If the NPG condition holds in strict equality, , the 
government is solvent. If
0tA =
tA  is a negative constant, then the government is in a state of 
super-solvency.  
                                                 
12 See Appendix I for the derivation of intertemporal budget constraint with constant and variable real 
interest rates.  
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 Ponzi schemes are possible in an overlapping-generations model in an infinite 
horizon economy. In such environments, there would be some imposed reallocation of 
resources which make no individual worse-off while making at least one individual 
better-off (Samuelson (1958)). Shell (1971) notes that this result is an outcome of the 
“double infinity” of traders and commodities in the model. In such environments 
making the future generations to pay tax liabilities, the government can issue debt at 
one period and roll it over forever (see Shell (1971), Romer (2006, p.563)). For the 
feasibility of this scheme, it is required that the real rate of interest to be less than the 
growth rate of the economy. Since governments issue debt to repay the principal and 
interest on the initial debt, the debt stock grows at the rate of real interest. As the real 
interest rate is less than the output growth rate, this policy yields a consistently falling 
debt ratio and thus there is no fear of continuing the policy. However, such a policy 
violates the conventional budget constraint as the value of discounted debt is a 
positive constant in the limit. It is also argued that when uncertainty is present in 
decision making, Ponzi schemes may be feasible even if the economy is dynamically 
efficient. This is because with uncertainty the realized rate of return on government 
debt may be less than the economy’s growth rate (see Bohn (1995), Ball, Elmendorf, 
and Mankiw (1998), Blanchard and Weil (2001)).   
In reality the government is also unable to run Ponzi schemes as of individuals 
because of dynamically efficient nature of the economy. Suppose the limit value of 
the present discounted debt is strictly positive ( tA > 0). If there a finite number of 
agents in the economy, tA > 0 means that the present value of at least one agent’s 
wealth in the limit is strictly positive. This is, however, not an equilibrium point as the 
agent can increase his utility by slightly increasing his spending. As Ponzi schemes 
 16
 are ruled out in dynamically efficient economies, the government must satisfy the 
traditional present-value borrowing constraint (see O’Connell and Zeldes (1988), 
Romer (2006, p.564)).  
 
2.4 Previous Studies 
Hamilton and Flavin (1986) expressed (2.4) in the following form for 
empirical testing:  
( ) *0 1 ttD A r S= + + t                                                                       (2.5) 
where   ( )0 lim [ 1 ]NN t NA E r D−→∞= +  and tr)1( +  is deterministic bubble term.        
If 0A is treated as a constant, then the present value borrowing constraint holds if 
. Hamilton and Flavin tested this condition in three ways. The first test resorts 
to examining the stationarity of 
0 0A ≤
tD  and  in (2.5). Hamilton and Flavin argued that 
stationarity of both these series necessarily implies that 
*
tS
0A = 0. They found that tD  
and  to be stationary over the period 1960-1984 and concluded that tS 0A = 0. Here 
they relied on the condition that stationarity of  implies stationarity of . In the 
second and third tests Hamilton and Flavin assumed adaptive and partial-rational 




tD  on (1 )
tr+  and current and lagged values 
of . The estimated AtS 0 coefficient turned out to be negative and insignificantly 
different from zero and confirmed their former conclusion.  
Though it has many applications (see Smith and Zin (1991) for an application 
to Canadian data), several questions arise in relation to the Hamilton-Flavin testing 
procedure. First, the stationarity of the debt series depends on the value of the real 
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 interest rate. If   (Hamilton and Flavin use r = 0.0112) 0r > tD  becomes a non-
stationary process (see (2.1)). The fact that the observed tD  was stationary over 1960-
1984 indicates that rt was negative for sufficient number of periods. Second, when the 
discount factor is close to unity (0.9889 in the Hamilton-Flavin study), the  process 
becomes virtually a unit root process unless the sample size is extremely large 
(perhaps 500 years or more).
*
tS
 13  So the use of current and lagged values of stationary 
process does not capture the dynamics of the  process. Third, if  is stationary 





t, a trending variable, tends towards zero as t 
becomes large. Therefore the coefficient of (1+r)t is bound to be zero by construction. 
Wilcox (1989) offers a much simpler method for testing the present value 
borrowing constraint. First, he relaxes the assumption of fixed r, and defines a 
variable  discount factor by ( )∏ += −=10 11ti it rq , 0 1.q = 14  He multiplies (2.1) through 
by and discounts the variables from period t back to period zero and iterates the 
outcome forward for N periods and takes expectation to arrive at: 
tq
t t tD A S′ ′= + ′ N,   limt N t tA E D→∞ +′ = ′                          (2.6) 
where ′ indicates the discounted values using the variable discount rate qt. Then 
Wilcox shifts the test of the NPG condition from tA′  to tD′ . Wilcox argued that the 
series tA′  can be non-stochastic if and only if expectations of the limit value of debt 
are the same in each period. A non-stochastic tA′  implies that the expected tD′  in the 
                                                 
S⎤⎦
13 Engle and West (2004) have also pointed this out in relation to exchange rate expectations. 
 
14 As derived in Appendix I, with non-constant conditional expectations of r, equation (2.4) becomes, 
 .                     ( ) ( )1 1
1
lim 1/ 1 1/ 1
NN N
t N t t i t N t t i t ii i
i
D E r D E r→∞ + + + += ==
⎡ ⎤ ⎡= + + +⎣ ⎦ ⎣∑∏ ∏
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 limit does not change upon the arrival of new information. If expectations of tD′  in 
the limit change with new information, tA′  becomes stochastic. Then, from (2.6) it is 
obvious that the path of tA′  is determined by the path of tD′ : if tD′  is stationary, tA′  is 
constant, and if tD′  is non-stationary, then, tA′  is not a constant. Therefore, a zero-
mean stationary tD′ series satisfies the present value borrowing constraint. Using the 
Hamilton-Flavin sample, Wilcox computed tD′ series and found it to be non-stationary 
with a positive unconditional mean. This implies that the discounted debt series grows 
over time and the limit value of the debt increases continuously. Wilcox, therefore, 
concluded that the U.S. federal fiscal policy was unsustainable.  
Corsetti and Rubini (1991) use Wilcox’s approach to test the fiscal 
sustainability by allowing a positive drift and a time trend in tD′  series. In a sample of 
OECD countries, they find mix results over the fiscal sustainability. However, their 
results on the U.S. confirm the Wilcox finding. Buiter and Patel (1992), Baglioni and 
Cherubini (1991) and Gerson and Nellor (1997), using Wilcox’s method, test the 
sustainability of fiscal policy in a developing country context applying it to India, 
Turkey and the Philippines respectively. Uctum and Wickens (2000) used a similar 
method to analyze the U.K. fiscal data.  
Wilcox’s procedure is attractively simple. However, it raises several concerns. 
First, Wilcox’s method is to make a backward formulation. A government standing at 
time t discounts its debt  to some initial year t=0 using an observed qtD t. In reality a 
government faced with a debt stock  at time t does not discount this back to a year 
in the distant past to assess whether the discounted  in the limit is zero or not. The 




 stock, . It should be noted that although (2.6), rather the expression in Footnote 13, 
is derived from the accounting identity (2.1), as a behavioural relationship it is 
qualitatively different from (2.4). An important question to ask is, is it meaningful to 
derive the expected present-value of future surpluses or the discounted values of 
future debts using variable discount rates which are unknown? Governments and 
economic agents are more likely to engage in a scenario analysis by computing 
several present-values of projected surpluses by using a range of discount rates that 
are set to decline over time in a systematic way. If that were the case, the assumption 
of constant conditional expectation on interest rate is plausible.  
tD
Second, Wilcox focused on tA′  of (2.6) and argued that series should have 
a zero-mean in the limit for the present-value constraint to hold. This limit value 
approaching zero is true by construction. Since the discount factor has to approach 




15 But what is important to note is that the expected limit value in (2.6) 
is zero regardless of the I(0) or I(1) nature of the  series. For instance, consider the 
case where  is I(1) and hence  
tD
tD
t tD a uΔ = + ,  




D D at u== + +∑   
the limiting expected value of tD′  is 
                                                 
15 However, it should be noted that the discount factor approaches zero if and only if r is a positive 
constant.  
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where the initial value, D0, is assumed given and .  0r >
For fiscal sustainability what is important is how fast the discounted debt 
series approaches zero. Given the observed interest rates, it would be extremely 
difficult to construct an tA′  series that would converge to zero within the time span of 
the recorded data series. For instance, a huge debt burden over 25 years may be 
sufficient to cripple a government even though the discounted debt becomes zero after 
200 years. Another point to note is that the constructed discounted debt series 
involves a scaling effect. The level of debt is likely to increase with the size of the 
budget that in turn increases with the size of the economy. Without removing this 
scale effect it would be difficult to see the series tD′  converging to zero. Wilcox’s 
method may be better implemented if debt is taken as a ratio of GNP to remove the 
scaling effect.  
Trehan and Walsh (1988, 1991), Hakkio and Rush (1991) and Haug (1991) 
focused on a condition that revenue minus expenditure inclusive of interest payment 
must be stationary for the present value borrowing constraint to hold. This requires 
that the revenue and expenditure series to be cointegrated with a vector (1 -1). The 
intuition here is that the budget is balanced in the long-run despite short-term deficits 
or surpluses. Tanner and Liu (1994), Quintos (1995), Haug (1995), Martin (2000), 
Cipollini (2001) and Jha and Sharma (2004) extended this method allowing for 
structural break(s). Nonetheless, the cointegration between revenue and expenditure 
series with a vector (1 -1) is embedded in the stationarity of the surplus series. Bohn 
(1995, 2006) argued that the deterministic intertemporal budget constraint is 
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 inappropriate and tests on stationarity and cointegration restrictions are invalid when 
the interest rate is stochastic.16  Hansen, Roberts, and Sargent (1991) and Roberts 
(1991), however, show that the validity of the deterministic intertemporal budget 
constraint only requires the conditional expectation of the interest rate to be constant 
over time. The interest rate could be time varying ex post. Ahmed and Rogers (1995) 
argue that under some plausible assumptions cointegration tests on the present value 
borrowing constraint are valid even in a stochastic environment. 
Some recent studies employ Markov-switching approach to describe the non-
linearities present in the discounted Dt series (see Bajo-Rubio, Diaz-Roldand, and 
Esteve (2004), Davig (2005)). Nonetheless, this univariate regime-switching method 
does not account for the non-linearity in the budget variables. The trending patterns of 
the discounted debt series could be a result of non-stationarity in fundamental 
variables such as income, G0, T and other relevant variables. It is also important to 
emphasize that structural breaks and non-linearities in a single series do not 
necessarily amount to a breakdown in a causal relationship (see Hoover (2001) for an 
excellent exposition of this point).  
In another line of argument, Kremers (1989) argued that if fiscal policy yields 
a stock of debt in real terms that grows asymptotically at an average rate smaller than 
the interest rate, the policy operates within the present value borrowing constraint 
since the present-value of debt converges to zero as N becomes large.17 However, 
government borrowing would not be restricted by the present value borrowing 
                                                 
16 Bohn (1995) and Ahmed and Rogers (1995) test the fiscal sustainability with uncertain marginal cost 
of borrowings. In place of the real rate of interest, they use marginal rate of substitution of consumption. 
 
17 Note that the paths of debt and primary balance associated with this policy may involve taxes that 
grow faster than the taxing capacity of the economy. This violates the government’s collateral for 
future borrowings. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that taxes are limited to a fraction of income. 
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 constraint if the equilibrium is dynamically inefficient. 18  If there is no sufficient 
evidence on the dynamic inefficiency of the U.S. economy (see Abel et al. (1989)), 
Ponzi financing of fiscal deficits is ruled out in the long-run. For McCallum (1984), 
fiscal sustainability does not reject the government’s ability to run a permanent deficit 
inclusive of interest payments. A permanent deficit exclusive of interest payments, 
however, violates the present value borrowing constraint and hence is not sustainable 
in the long run. 19  Bohn (1998a) suggested that fiscal policy is sustainable if the 
primary surplus positively responds to the changes in debt-income ratio as it provides 
direct evidence for corrective fiscal policy actions. Based on this line of argument he 
concluded that the U.S. fiscal policy has historically been sustainable. Since changes 
in spending or taxes are necessary if the current fiscal policy does not satisfy the 
intertemporal budget constraint, Auerbach (1997) proposes a measure of the size of 
the expected fiscal imbalance. Given the projected paths of government revenue, 
income, spending and interest rates Auerbach criterion quantifies the required tax hike 
(or spending cut) in order for the intertemporal budget constraint to be satisfied. 
Applying this framework for the U.S. federal budget, Auerbach et al. (2003) conclude 
that the current U.S fiscal policies are quite far from satisfying the intertemporal 
budget constraint. Thus, the current U.S. fiscal policy requires significant changes to 
achieve fiscal sustainability. In a political-economy model, Velasco (2000) shows that 
due to the common pool nature of government resources fiscal deficits emerge 
                                                 
18 An economy is dynamically inefficient if the rate of return on capital is less than the growth rate of 
output.  
 
19 McCallum (1984) considered the theoretical validity of the monetarist hypothesis ‘a constant fiscal 
deficit can be maintained permanent if it is financed by the issue of bonds rather than money’. He 
showed that the monetarist claim is invalid if the deficit is defined exclusive of interest payment.  
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 regardless of the intertemporal budget balance. Therefore, government debts tend to 
be excessively high in the long-run. 
Given the implications of these various approaches on fiscal sustainability, an 
advantage of focusing on the full equation in (2.6), which is derived from the 
intertemporal budget constraint of the government, is that it may remain intact by 
structural breaks and regime switches. It also depends on the fundamental budget 
variables and thus takes care of the scaling effect on the level of debt. In this context, 
the Hamilton-Flavin regression may perform better over a longer time span since it 
can accommodate non-stationary series in a cointegrating framework. 
 
2.5 Methodology of the Present Study  
We examine whether the present value borrowing constraint holds or not 
directly as in the Hamilton-Flavin model (2.6). However, the discussion in the 
previous section highlights the need of a more flexible model structure to account for 
non-stationary movements of the debt series . We have already noted that when the 
discount rate is close to unity the expected present value of primary surplus, , may 
behave like a unit root process in observed samples. If  also shares a similar 
behavior it is still possible for the present value borrowing constraint to hold if and 







tS 0 0A ≤ .   
Since  is unobserved, we adapt the rational expectations formulation 
developed by Hansen and Sargent (1980) to relate  to observed variables (see also 






 that the policymakers form expectations on the discounted sum of future surpluses 
using all the relevant information available to them at time t as given below. 
*
tS =                                 (2.7) (
0 0
k k
t t k t t k t k
k k
E S E Z wρ ρ∞ ∞+ +
= =
= +∑ ∑ )+
where ( )r+= 11ρ , t tZ a X′= , a is an (n×1) vector of constants and X is an (n×1) 
vector of relevant informational variables known both to the government and the 
public, and wt is an unsystematic informational variable only known to the 
government with the property 0t t kE w + = . The information set Xt may include both 
stationary and non-stationary variables that are implicit and explicit in future budget 
deficits/surpluses. Zt, a linear combination of variables in the vector X, is stationary 
but it shares the same near unit-root behavior that  is likely to possess in observed 
samples. Assuming that 
*
tS
tZ has the following infinite-order moving average 
representation  
tt eLZ )(β=  
 where et is a white-noise disturbance term and using the Wiener-Kolmogorov 
prediction formula to get  
∑ −+ = tkjjktt eLZE β    ( , 1,..., )j k k= + ∞   
and then using the autoregressive representation ( ) tL Z etφ =  and assuming 1<ρ  in 






t t k k t
k j k j
E Z L Zρ φ ρ ρ φ−∞ − −+
= = = +
k j j⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞= +⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦∑ ∑ ∑ .                               (2.8) 
                                                 
20 For details of the derivation, see Appendix I. 
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 Since the non-linear parameter structure in this formulation is not in our interest,  










t t k j t
k j
jE Zρ λ λ−∞ +
= =
⎡ ⎤= +⎢⎣ ⎦∑ ∑ L Z⎥       (2.9) 
By replacing tZ  with  and redefining the parameters and substituting the result to 
(2.4), we write the model for testing the present value borrowing constraint as 
ta X′
( )0 1 2 1 1 11 ...tt t t rD A r X X Xt p tβ β β− − − +′ ′ ′= + + + + + + ε                           (2.10) 
where  is a constant, 0A β  is an )1( ×n vector of coefficients, X is an vector of 
relevant variables and 
)1( ×n
tε  is a well behaved disturbance term.21  
Model (2.10) entails a couple of advantages over the previous formulations. 
First, it is grounded on a larger information set that policymakers and economic 
agents are likely to use at time t to make projections about future surpluses. This large 
information set would also enable endogenous effects of variables determining St and 
Dt series. Second, without incorporating structural breaks or regime-shifts artificially 
it can accommodate non-stationary movements of Dt that do not violate the present 
value borrowing constraint. Non-stationary movements of Dt could be well explained 
by (2.10) as it provides a cointegration framework between Dt and other fundamental 
budget variables.  However, if there are breaks or regime shifts that disturb estimated 
parameters significantly one has to incorporate these factors to the proposed model for 
better results.  
   
 
                                                 
21 A description of variables in vector X and coefficients in vector β is given in Section 2.8 following 
the data adjustment procedure given in Table 2.2.  
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 2.6 Sample and Data 
In this study, we use the U.S. federal budgetary data (annual) for the period 
1929-2004 because it covers very divergent deficit episodes and trends in the debt 
series (see Figure 2.1). Data on interest bearing gross public debt, expenditure, 
interest payments on the existing debt, base money stock, stocks of foreign liquid 
assets are obtained from the Federal Reserve Archival System for Economic Research 
(FRASER). Annual observations of GDP and implicit GDP deflator are from the 
National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA). Data of the unemployment rate are 
from the U.S. Bureau of Labour Statistics. Real values of relevant variables are given 
in 2000 prices. 
 
2.7 Trends in Deficit and Debt of the U.S. Federal Government 
This section discusses the salient features of the U.S. federal fiscal operations 
from 1930 to 2004. Table 1 provides details of revenue, spending, interest payments 
on past debt, overall and primary balance and interest bearing gross public debt as a 
percent of GDP. We construct net stock of interest bearing public debt stock.22 The 
primary balance has been adjusted in line with the net stock of public debt. We made 
these adjustments to the gross debt and officially reported surplus series following the 
comments made by Eisner and Peiper (1984) and Eisner (1989). They noted that 
official measures of federal debt and budget deficits/surpluses are misleading because 
                                                 
22 However, many studies use market value rather than par value of debt. Market value reflects the 
amount of debt that has to be financed by taxes if debt were to be paid off (in part) in a given period. 
Seater (1981), Butkewicz (1983), Cox and Hirschhorn (1983), Cox (1985) are some painstaking 
attempts to calculate market values of the U.S. government debt. However, to quote Hamilton and 
Flavin (1986) “[a]t the end of fiscal year 1974, outstanding government debt [of the U.S.] was trading 
at a market value of only 95 percent of its par value”. Thus, we reckon that the difference between 
market and par values of debt is trivial. Because of the difficulty in computing market value, we stick 
to the use of par values in the analysis. Nonetheless, this will not have significant impact on the main 
analysis and conclusions of this chapter.    
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 they do not account for other relevant accounts of the government. Gross public debt 
figures ignore the accumulation of financial and real assets which have contributed to 
an increase in government net-worth. Moreover, the official measures of 
surplus/deficit need to account for the changes in government financial assets to be 
consistent with the changes in the real net debt.  
 
Table 2.1 
Fiscal Summary of the U.S. Federal Government (as a % of GDP) 
Year  Revenue    Spending Interest      Fiscal deficit / surplus   Gross 
      paymenta      Overall       Primaryb debtc 
1930    4.58        3.77  0.72        0.81             1.53 17.29 
1935    5.18        9.56  1.12      -4.38            -3.26 40.38 
1940    6.31        9.37  1.02      -3.06            -2.03 43.85 
1945  20.26      41.55  1.57    -21.29          -19.79        123.58 
1950  13.45      14.50  1.94      -1.06              0.88 86.66  
1955  15.79      16.51  1.45      -0.72              0.72 67.05 
1960  17.57      17.52  1.58       0.06              1.63 54.48 
1965  16.24      16.47  1.45      -0.22              1.22 44.01 
1970  18.62      18.93  1.76      -0.27              1.49 37.29 
1975  17.15      19.91  1.89      -2.76             -0.87 35.14 
1980  19.00      21.46  2.00      -2.46             -0.46 33.30 
1985  17.66      22.77  3.14      -5.12             -1.98 46.05 
1990  18.23      22.20  3.22      -4.07             -0.86 57.93 
1995  18.48      20.46  3.18      -1.98              1.20 67.11 
2000  20.63      18.22  2.27       2.41              4.68 57.23 
2004  16.03      19.55  1.37      -3.51             -2.15 62.71 
Source: Author’s calculation based on FRASER and NIPA data.  
Notes: (a) interest payments on government debt; (b) revenue minus non-interest expenditure; (c) 
interest bearing gross public debt. 
 
 
The adjustment method is illustrated in Table 2.1. We subtract the stock of 
high powered money and the stock of government foreign financial assets from gross 
debt to obtain net stock of debt. The government’s foreign financial assets here 
include the stocks of gold, SDR, reserves at the IMF and convertible foreign 
currencies. The high powered money and foreign financial assets are used as an 
approximation to the financial assets of the government. The primary balance is 
adjusted by accounting for changes in high powered money and changes in foreign 
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 financial assets. The adjustments made here, to some extent, are similar to those made 
by Hamilton and Flavin (1986).  
 
Table 2.2 
Computation of Net Debt and Adjusted Primary Balance-2004 
                             U.S. dollar 
          Series                     billions 
          Net debt      
Interest bearing gross federal debt                            7354.7  
(-)   Currency plus deposits at fed (High-powered money H)                 -  744.0 
(-)   Stock of gold, SDR, reserve position at IMF  
       and convertible foreign currencies (FA)             -    83.5 
(=)  Net stock of debt (at current prices)                                        6527.2 
( ) by implicit GDP price deflator                                                 ÷ ÷ 1.082 
(=)  Real net stock of debt (at 2000 prices)                                                6031.4 
   
         Adjusted primary balance 
             Government revenue                    1880.1 
(-)   Non-interest government expenditure                                    - 2132.0  
(=)  Primary balance                   -251.9 
(+)  Seignorage (change in H)                         +    37.3 
(+)  Change in FA                +    -2.5 
(=)  Adjusted primary balance (at current prices)                            -217.1 
( ) by implicit GDP price deflator               ÷ ÷  1.082 
(=)  Real adjusted primary balance (at 2000 prices)                             -200.6 
 
Note: The sum of H and FA (foreign liquid assets) is used as a proxy for the financial assets 
of the government.  




Figure 2.1 plots the both unadjusted and adjusted data series. It is worth 
reporting some observations from these data series. Figure 2.1b shows that though 
there is a level difference, the time paths of both gross and net debt are quite similar. 
Figure 2.1(a) shows that though the adjusted primary balance is often higher than the 
unadjusted one, they also follow the same pattern over time. Between 1929 and 1942 
the net debt stock was quite small (negative in some periods) (see Figure 2.1(b)). As a 
result of wartime (World War II) high deficits, the debt stock rose to a staggering 124 
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 percent of GDP in 1945. The overlap of the primary and overall fiscal balance until 
mid 1940s show that interest payments on existing debt was not excessive. After the 
war, deficits declined quickly and surpluses emerged. As a result, the debt stock 
remained roughly constant until the early 1970s and the debt ratio fell significantly 
from its wartime high to about 30 percent of GDP in the 1970s (see Table 2.1). 
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However, from the mid 1970s, the federal fiscal policy operations show a 
dramatic change giving rise to fiscal deficits and increasing debt and debt ratios. This 
fiscal erosion is known as the effect of high spending policy of the U.S. 
government.23 Although these large deficits are reckoned to be an outcome of high 
spending policies, it is apparent from the overall balance as opposed to the primary 
                                                 
23 Large deficits that occurred in the 1980s are often viewed as an outcome of increased spending. As 
Romer (2001, p. 550) noted, desire to restrain the spending of future policy makers led the Reagan 
administration to follow high spending policies, and to incur large deficits. 
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 balance in Figure 2.1 that the main cause of the high deficits was the increase in 
interest payments. This was a period of slow economic growth, high unemployment 
and higher oil prices with unavoidable high government spending and interest bills. 
Large deficits and the increasing debt stock during the 1970s and 1980s forced policy 
makers to contain the budgetary operations to avoid further deterioration. Corrective 
measures, such as expenditure cuts and large tax hikes that were implemented in the 
early 1990s turned primary fiscal balance to a large surplus and slowed down the 
growth rate of debt. But these large surpluses plunged again since 2001 as seen in 
Table 2.1 primarily due to a massive tax cut program.  
 
2.8 Empirical Results  
The minimal variable set used to predict the discounted present-value of 
expected primary surplus  and thereby D)( *tS t includes tax revenue (T), non-interest 
government expenditure (G0), changes in high-powered money (H) and changes in 
foreign financial assets of the government (FA).  Thus, these four variables, (T, G0, 
ΔH, ΔFA), are the direct determinants of the adjusted primary balance (see Table 2.2). 
We use M1 component of money in place of H and also the levels of M1 and FA 
instead of their differences because of their better predictive performance in the model. 
We use the unemployment rate (Ut) too, as in many other studies (see for example 
Barro (1979), Roubini and Sachs (1986)) to capture the business cycle effects on the 
primary surplus and debt. U is found to be a better predictor of debt than the GDP 
growth rate. The last variable that used to predict future surpluses is the real interest 
rate (rt). Apart from the impact channelled through real money stock, the real rate of 
interest has a significant impact on the fiscal balance in many ways. A high rt results 
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 in increased interest payments on existing debt leading to large fiscal deficits and to 
further borrowings. As new government borrowings crowd-out the private economy, 
this will lead to lower tax revenue and increased primary deficit driving up the public 
debt stock. Thus, vector X in (2.10) includes ( ). The first four 
variables are in real terms. 
tttttt rUFAMGT ,,,1,,
0
Breaking-up X and collecting current and lagged parameters and variables, we 
write (2.10) for empirical testing as follows: 
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑+++++=
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The intuition of (2.11b) and (2.11c) are straightforward as higher T and G0 have 
positive and negative effects on the primary balance and thus, negative and positive 
effects on net stock of debt respectively. Purely from technical point of view, changes 
in M1 and FA would have negative impact on D as they have positive effects on the 
adjusted primary surplus (see Table 2.2). However, as M1 represents (a part of) 
financial wealth of the economy, (2.11d) could be positive. This is because higher M1 
may increase the demand for government’s bond. Other things being constant this 
increases the supply of bonds. Though the government finances deficits by drawing 
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 down FA in the short-run, incentives for such policy in the long-run are minimal or nil. 
This is because such a policy would lead the government for critiques purely on 
political grounds. Instead, if rates of return on these foreign financial assets are higher 
than the cost of government borrowings it is worth financing deficits by issuing more 
debts. Thus, (2.11e) could also be positive. Because magnitudes of the expected short-
term negative and long-term positive effects of M1 and FA on D are unknown priori, 
we set (2.11d) and (2.11e) as ambiguous. As it reflects the business cycle effect (by 
decreasing T and by increasing G0), high unemployment rate would increase fiscal 
deficits and debt. Thus, (2.11f) is positive. The long-term effect of real interest rate on 
D, (2.11g), is expected to be positive. This is true as rt has a positive effect on D 
series because high r drives up interest payments leading to further borrowings which 
crowd-out the economy. The fall in T results in high deficits and thus high D stock.   
The average of  over the sample period is used to compute  in (2.11a). 
We define  as the nominal interest rate minus the expected inflation rate. The 
nominal interest rate is the average rate (average over the interest rates paid on 
various debt instruments) that approximates the total interest payments on the stock of 
public debt. The inflation rate is computed from the implicit GDP price deflator. The 
average of the real rate over 1929-2004 provides r=0.007. A non-linear LS estimate 
of r from model (2.11a) provides an estimate of 0.011, which is not very different 




The validity of the present value borrowing constraint can be examined by 
regressing (2.11a). Provided that (2.11b) through (2.11g) and the model significance 
and robustness diagnostic criteria are satisfied, a non-positive estimate of A0 is the 
requirement for the borrowing constraint to be valid. If 00 =A , the limit value of the 
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 discounted debt is zero and therefore the government is solvent. A negative limit 
value for discounted debt, that is 00 <A  , implies the super-solvency of the 
government. In both the cases 00 =A  and 00 <A , the fiscal sustainability holds as 
these results complied with the intertemporal budget constraint of the government. In 
contrast, if , the government runs a Ponzi game so that the limit value of 




ADF Test Results for a Unit Root in Variables in (2.11a) 
Series       Dt      Tt      G0t        M1t        FAt        Ut           rt
ADF test statistic 1.371  0.505   0.359    -1.068    -1.806   -3.922    -4.942 
Note: The number of lags included in the ADF regression is 2. ADF test critical values for the 
regression with a constant and T=72 are -2.90 at 5 percent and -3.52 at 1 percent significance levels.  
  
 
The ADF test for unit roots with a constant in the regression (see Table 2.3) 
indicates that Ut and rt are stationary while Dt, Tt, , M10tG t and FAt are I(1).
24  
However, given the low power of the ADF test against near-unit-root alternatives, it is 
difficult to ascertain whether these series are non-stationary due to unit roots or some 
other reasons. Despite this difficulty a residual based ADF test from a static 
regression (i.e., p=0 in (2.11a)) strongly supports the stationarity of the residuals.25 
                                                 
24 First differenced series of Dt, Tt, , M1
0
tG t and FAt are found to be stationary. Therefore, these series 
are integrated of order one or I(1). 
 
25 Since (2.11a) contains I(1) variables and the error term of this equation )(ε is I(0), (2.11a) is a 
cointegrating regression. As is well known, the ordinary least squares (OLS) parameter estimates in a 
cointegraing regression are super-consistent. However, the estimated standard deviations and variances 
do not follow usual distributions unless the right hand side variables are independent and the errors 
have no autocorrelation. Therefore, standard t- and F- tests are generally inappropriate (see for example 
Enders (2004, p. 342), Sims, Stock and Watson (1990)). It is possible to calculate appropriate 
asymptotic standard errors for a static regression involving non-stationary variables (see Hayashi (2000, 
pp. 656-657)). Although t and F statistics do not follow t and F distributions in a static model, they 
follow relevant distributions in a dynamic model (see Pesaran and Shin (1998)). As we obtain the 
cointegrating solution from a dynamic model, the reported t and F statistics have standard distributions.             
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 Our primary focus, however, is on the dynamic specification in (2.11a). Figure 2.2 
plots the actual and predicted values from (2.11a) by setting p=2 (p is the lag length) 
for all variables. The predicted values pick up the major turning points of the debt 
series remarkably well. We observe that by increasing p the model-fit could be 
improved and the residual autocorrelation could be reduced. To conserve degrees of 
freedom, the lagged dependent variable is, however, added to the information set X. 
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Table 2.4 presents the results of two regressions, Model 1 with a constant term 
added to (2.11a) and Model 2 without. As given in (2.10) the theoretical model does 
not allow for an implicit constant term in the present value borrowing constraint. 
However, it is an empirical fact that the absence of a constant term may lead to 
incorrect regression specification. Thus, we estimate the model with and without a 
constant term. The goodness of fit of models is examined by the regression standard 
errors (Sigma), the R2 square value and the plot of actual and fitted series. The best-
fitting model is chosen by the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). Diagnostic tests 
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 are conducted for serial autocorrelation (AR F test), conditional heteroscedasticity 
(ARCH F test), normal errors (Normality Chi2 test), heteroscedasticity (hetero F test) 
and regression specification (RESET F test). The stability of estimated parameters 
over time is examined by the plot of recursive estimates of coefficients. Both models 




OLS Regression Results of Equation (2.11a): (Dep. Variable: Net Debt) 
Explanatory                 Model 1                                              Model 2                     
Variable             Est. coef.    Suma       F probb            Est. coef.      Suma      F probb  
Constant -262.74                        0.556     ---              ---            --- 
(1+r)t           -371.99                        0.461            -646.63                       0.001     
Tt    -0.871                        -0.832     
Tt-1       0.000       -0.934       0.000  -0.031      -0.867       0.000 
Tt-2      -0.063                -0.004            
Gt     1.319                    1.329                 
Gt-1        0.123        1.334       0.000   0.120       1.356       0.000 
Gt-2      -0.108                -0.093                
M1t     0.277                   0.369                  
M1t-1        -1.125        0.633       0.003  -1.238       0.724       0.000 
M1t-2     1.481                    1.593                 
FAt    -2.516                -2.604               
FAt-1     3.363        1.231       0.000   3.521       1.109       0.000  
FAt-2     0.384                  0.192                
Ut    -5.521                         -6.431               
Ut-1     6.225      16.019       0.005   6.269     16.476       0.000    
Ut-2   15.315                             16.638          
rt   17.177                       17.609         
rt-1       3.877      26.529       0.000   4.617     27.438       0.000 
rt-2         5.475               5.212          
Dt-1     0.699                   0.689                
Dt-2     0.215        0.914       0.000       0.213       0.902       0.000  
   
Sigma    57.646                57.285 
R2     0.999        ---        
AIC     8.352      8.332         
AR F     1.800  (0.176)c    2.225 (0.119)                    
ARCH F            0.069  (0.793)     0.029 (0.863)         
Hetero F    0.763  (0.735)     1.016 (0.532)        
Normality Chi2    0.703  (0.703)     0.796 (0.672)          
RESET F    4.131  (0.047)     4.263 (0.044) 
Notes: (a) the sum of contemporaneous and lagged coefficients; (b) p-values of F test on each variable; 




In Model 1, both the constant term and 0A estimates are statistically 
insignificant.26  Figures 2.3a and 2.3b plot the recursive estimates of the constant term 
and 0A . The constant term, though insignificant, has remained mostly positive. 0A , on 
the other hand, has remained negative and significant except towards the end of the 
sample period. The mirror-image behavior of the two estimates seems to result from 
co linearity between the constant term and (1 )tr+ . Although (1 =  is a 
trending variable, in relation to other variables in the model it is pretty much a 
constant and seems to become collinear with the constant term. Dropping the constant 
term leads to statistically significant negative estimates of 
)tr+ 1.007t
0A  as seen in Figure 2.3c. 
These estimates are also highly stable. The AIC also favours Model 2. Figure 2.3d 
shows the actual and fitted values from Model 2. The fit is impressive as the fitted 
values follow actual series very closely. Therefore, the analysis and conclusions of 
this study are established on the Model 2 estimates. 
The discussion in the previous paragraph shows that 0A  is statistically 
different from zero and takes a very stable negative value. We observe that the 
negativeness of 0A   is robust to variations in the information set (e.g., replacing T 
with GDP and real interest rate with the nominal rate and inflation rate) though it may 
become statistically insignificant some times. This renders strong support for the 
present value borrowing constraint hypothesis and the solvency, perhaps super-
solvency, of the U.S. federal government. Hamilton and Falvin (1986) arrived at this 
conclusion from a period when the debt stock was stationary. Our results show that 
                                                 
26  To re-iterate, the present value borrowing constraint requires the constant term to be zero and 
. 00 ≤A
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 the apparent non-stationarity of the debt stock observed during the last few decades 
does not necessarily lead to the rejection of the solvency hypothesis.  
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       Figure 2.3: Recursive Estimates (With Confidence Intervals) and Actual and Fitted Net Debt 
 
 
It is worth examining how the variables in the information set bring about the 
above result. The high autoregressive coefficients of the lagged Dt terms indicates 
high persistence of the debt stock. Unlike private debt, it is not unusual for public debt 
to show such persistence because of their long-term maturity nature. Given this 
persistence it would be informative to examine the time profile of the impulse 
response effects of the predictor variables on the debt stock.  Figure 2.4 plots these 
impulse response effects over 50 years.  
As expected, a dollar increase in taxes and government expenditure exerts 
their negative and positive effects on the debt stock, each effect steadily decreasing 
towards zero. As illustrated in Figure 4.1a and 4.1b, the effects of T and G0 on D do 
not necessarily seem to be symmetric. Wald test on the restriction that the sum of tax 
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 coefficients in Model 2 is unity does not lead to a rejection of the restriction whereas 
the same test on the non-interest expenditure components leads to a rejection. It 
appears that debt created by an increase in G0 cannot be fully offset by an equal 
increase in taxes, after controlling for the interest effect. 
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        Figure 2.4: Impulse Response Effects of Each Variable on the Debt Stock 
 
 
Unlike T and G0 the expected effect of M1 and FA on D is ambiguous. 
However, since ΔM1 and ΔFA are expected to have a positive effect on the adjusted 
primary balance and a negative effect on net debt, purely from a technical point of 
view, the initial effect of M1 and FA is to be negative. This is evident in Figure 2.4. 
Subsequently, however, a dollar increase in M1 or FA tend to increase the debt stock 
though these effects taper off much faster than the T and G0 effects. A government 
could finance a certain amount of expenditure by seignorage, therefore, the immediate 
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 effect of M1 on debt is negative. But a higher M1, which in turn increases the amount 
of financial assets of the economy, may increase the demand for government bonds. 
Given other things being constant, high demand leads to an increased supply of 
government bonds. Thus, the long-run effect of M1 on D could be positive. Figure 
4.1c illustrates these effects. And for a government, the costs of financing deficit by 
drawing down FA may be higher than the interest cost of new debts in practice. To 
reiterate, a government that runs down FA continually is open to criticisms purely on 
political grounds. Therefore, a government may not rely on financing deficit by 
running down FA frequently. In fact if the gains from holding FA are higher than the 
interest cost of debt, governments would tend to borrow more as FA increases. 
Despite the short-term negative effect, the long-term effect of FA on D could, 
therefore, be positive. Figure 4.1d illustrates these effects. The positive effects of U 
and r on D are reflected in Figure 2.4e and Figure 2.4f respectively. Business cycle 
and interest rate effects on net debt stock are persistent as it takes nearly 40 years 
them to tapers off to zero.     
 
2.9 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we consider whether the U.S. federal fiscal operations satisfy 
the present value borrowing constraint using data over a longer time horizon 
stretching from 1929 to 2004. We argue that tests based on the full intertemporal 
budget equation are more desirable than tests based on debt or surplus series alone. 
By allowing for rational expectations on future surpluses the Hamilton-Flavin (1986) 
methodology is extended to accommodate non-stationary movements of the debt 
stock. This formulation leads us to replace the present value of expected future 
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 surpluses with a set of observed variables. This is a flexible framework that can 
accommodate both stationary and non-stationary variables and take care of any 
scaling effects and structural breaks or regime shifts present in the debt series. 
 Based on the current and lagged values of taxes, non-interest government 
expenditure, M1, government foreign financial assets, the unemployment rate, and the 
real interest rate as predictors of future surpluses, our model predicts the U.S. net debt 
stock extremely well over very different fiscal episodes. An important implication of 
this result is that when incorporated for full information of the budget surplus/deficits, 
we do not have to rely on artificially defined dummy variables or regime-switching 
approaches to describe the divergent movements in the debt series.  
The coefficients of variables that are used to represent the adjusted primary 
balance have expected sign and are significant. The model provides highly stable 
recursive estimates on the main coefficient 0A  that tests the validity of the present 
value borrowing constraint. The results are found to be robust for the changes in the 
information set. The conclusion that emerges from the exercise is that the U.S. federal 
budgetary policy does not violate the present value borrowing constraint. That is, the 
U.S. government is solvent, or super-solvent, in the long-run, despite the presence of 










TAX SMOOTHING HYPOTHESIS REVISITED:  
EXPERINCE OF SOME OECD ECONOMIES   
 
3.1 Introduction  
The theory of optimal taxation encompasses a range of models that focus on 
different aspects of the tax system. Our focus here is on a model in which the 
government objective is to raise a given amount of tax revenue with a less burden to 
the private economy. Given that taxes are distortionary but necessary to raise a certain 
amount of revenue, policymakers often concern about how taxes are optimally 
adjusted in different periods. If distortionary costs of taxation is higher the higher the 
tax rate, the tax smoothing hypothesis suggest that it is optimal to have a constant 
planned tax rate. The intuition behind a constant planned tax rate is to spread the 
present value of the deadweight loss of taxation over time.  
In this study, we show that the expected tax rate depends only on the 
permanent component of the government expenditure rate. Based on this result, we 
propose a new method for testing the tax smoothing hypothesis: Tax smoothing is 
valid if the tax rate at time t and the permanent expenditure rate observed at time t-1 
are cointegrated with a one-to-one positive relationship. Nonetheless, we propose the 
cases of strong and weak versions of tax smoothing and no tax smoothing depending 
on the degree of cointegration and implications of a vector error correction model 
(VECM). We found that the tax rate follows a random walk in all the cases examined. 
But conintegration and ECM conditions on tax smoothing support only the weak 
version of the tax smoothing hypothesis.   
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 The remainder of the chapter is organized in the following manner. Section 3.2 
discusses the tax smoothing hypothesis and previous empirical tests on it. Section 3.3 
develops a new method of testing tax smoothing hypothesis. In this new framework, 
we show that the optimal tax rate and the permanent expenditure rate are linearly 
correlated. This section also elaborates testable implications of the tax smoothing 
hypothesis under a cointegrating framework of the tax rate and the permanent 
expenditure rate. Based on the linear correlation between the optimal tax and 
permanent expenditure rates and random walk in the tax rate, an appropriate way to 
test the tax smoothing hypothesis is to estimate the tax rate at time t on the permanent 
expenditure rate at time t-1. Moreover, we formulate an ECM for the tax rate that 
would enable testing several hypotheses on tax smoothing. Section 3.4 gives the 
details of sample and data. Section 3.5 presents the methods used to derive the 
permanent component of the government expenditure rate. We obtain the unit root 
component of the expenditure rate by Beveridge-Nelson univariate detrending method. 
A smooth series of government expenditure rate is obtained by the Kalman filter. 
Section 3.6 provides empirical results on random walk in the tax rate and the tax 
smoothing hypothesis. Section 3.7 concludes. 
 
3.2 Tax Smoothing Hypothesis and Previous Studies  
  Barro (1979, 1981) initiated the tax smoothing hypothesis. He assumed that, in 
the present value borrowing constraint of the government, exogenously given non-
interest government expenditure and initial debt determine the time path of 
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 government tax revenue.27 Barro (1979) accepted the Ricardian equivalence theorem 
as a valid first-order proposition. However, in the absence of a first-best system of 
lump-sum taxes, taxation would have resource misallocation costs (deadweight loss). 
This deadweight loss of taxation (Z) is assumed to be a positive function of tax 
receipts (T) and a negative function of tax base (Y). The relationship between Z and T, 
Y holds only contemporaneously. The contemporaneous relationship is valid under the 
assumption of Ricardian equivalence. If the Ricardian equivalence theorem is valid, 
issues such as shifting of tax burden to future generations, crowding-out of private 
investment and output are excluded from the analysis. Nonetheless, in an environment 
where the Ricardian equivalence theorem does not hold, the relationship would 
become more complex as any distortions due to past taxation will affect the allocation 
of resources in the current period which would affect the future path of the state 
variable (see Chari and Kehoe (1999), Golosov, Kocherlakota, and Tsyvinsky (2003)). 
Thus, departures from tax smoothing, in turn, implies departures from the Ricardian 
equivalence. Barro (1979) assumed the homogeneity condition too in the deadweight 
loss function. That is, a doubling of T and Y doubles Z. Though it keeps the model 
simple, this assumption is, however, not essential for the derivation of tax smoothing 
outcome (see Ghosh (1995)). With the help of these assumptions, Barro (1979) 
specified Z as follows: 
)(),( ttttt fTYTFZ τ==                                                                                 (3.1) 
                                                 
27 There are arguments against the exogeneity assumption of government expenditure. In reality, 
government purchases could be endogenous as they are affected by their costs and benefits (see Romer 
(2006, p. 578)). If government expenditures are endogenous, the Ricardian equivalence theorem is 
invalid and so does the tax smoothing hypothesis. 
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 where τ is average tax rate .)/( tt YT 28 In (3.1), the deadweight loss of taxation is an 
increasing and a convex function of the tax rate. The government objective is, then, to 
minimize the present value of Z ,  
∑∞= −+1 )()1(t ttt Tfr τ  ,                                                                            (3.2) 
subject to a present value borrowing constraint of the government, 
 ∑ ∑∞= ∞= −− +=++1 100 )1()1(t t tttt TrDGr  ,                                              (3.3) 
where G0 is non-interest government expenditure, D0 is initial debt and r is real 
interest rate paid on public debt. The iterated expectation of real interest rate 
conditional on information sets is constant over time.  
In this constrained optimization problem, ((3.2) and (3.3)), the government 
need to choose a tax rate at each period in order to minimize the present value of 
deadweight loss with a given present value borrowing constraint. The first order 
conditions for the above optimization problem require marginal deadweight loss of 
taxation has to be the same in all periods because of simultaneity in tax revenue and 
the deadweight loss. This implies that the planned tax rate is constant over time.29 
When uncertainty is present, this implies that expectations of the current tax rate 
should equal to the tax rate observed in the previous period. In other words, the tax 
rate follows a random walk (Barro (1981)).  
                                                 
28 In fact, the optimal tax rule applies to the (average) marginal tax rate, the change in tax revenue with 
respect to the change in tax base. However, if tax categories are proportional, the average and marginal 
tax rates are approximately the same. Sahasakul (1986) noted that most of the U.S. federal tax 
categories could be approximated as proportional.  
      
29 Pigou (1947), Kydland and Prescott (1977, 1980), Barro (1979) and Turnovsky and Brock (1980) 
revealed that the Ramsey tax rule (Ramsey (1927)) could also be applied to derive a criterion for the 
optimal taxation if many goods being taxed are interpreted as a single aggregate consumption good. If 
taxable goods are given by the level of income (GNP) in which price elasticity is uniform over time, 




 If the expected tax rate is constant, the level of taxes in each period is 
determined byY  and so as to maintain the present-value borrowing constraint. If Y 
is constant over time, the constancy in 
0G
τ  implies a constant T too. If G0 is also 
constant, from the intertemporal budget constraint, we have a balanced budget, 
.0
0
11 rDGT += 30  That is government tax revenue is sufficient to meet interest 
payments on past debt and non-interest expenditures.  
If Y and G0 are growing at constant rates such that )1(01 μ+= YY  
and )1(00
0
1 γ+= GG , a constant τ  implies that T is also growing at the same rate as of 
Y. If conditional expectations on growth rates of Y and G0 are given by μ  and γ , 
setting r<< μγ  Barro derived the expected tax revenue at time zero as 
 [ ]0000 )/()1())1/()(( DrGrT +−++−= γγμμ .  
This implies that tax revenue is positively related to the growth rate of permanent 
non-interest government expenditure while it is negatively related to the growth rate 
of permanent income.  
If time paths of G0 and Y in some periods depart temporarily from their trend 
growth by irregular (+ or -) factors υ  and ξ  respectively, one period ahead G0 and Y 
are given by )1()1( 00
0
1 γυ ++= GG  and )1()1( 01 μξ ++= YY . Setting μγ =  (that is, T 
and G0 are growing at the same trend growth rate of Y) and assuming a two period 
case, Barro arrived at  
[ ]βμυμμα )1()()1(( 000001 ++−++= GDrGT                                          (3.4) 
where [ ]nr))1/()1(()1(/)1( ++−++= μξξξα   and [ ]kr)1/()1(1 ++−= μβ .  
                                                 
30 In this case the initial debt is not amortized.  
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 As Barro (1979) noted, in (3.4) )1(00 μ+G  is the permanent component of non-interest 
expenditure, 0)( Dr μ− is the interest payments net of output growth, )1(00 μυ +G is 
temporary non-interest expenditure and α  is the factor that accounts for the impact of 
transitory income (in which n gives the duration of the transitory departure of Y). The 
integer k in β is the duration of the transitory departure of G0. Equation (3.4) bears 
the following implications:  
(i) Purely transitory expenditure has no effect on current taxation (if 
, 0→k β =0). If actual spending departs from its trend for a long 
period (if ∞→k , β =1 when r<μ ), then the transitory 
expenditure has a positive impact on current taxation31, and  
(ii) If the changes in income are purely transitory (if ), their 
effect on taxes is given by 
0→n
).1( ξα +=  If the transitory deviations of 
output last long, (if ∞→n ), α  approaches unity. This implies that 
current taxes are a decreasing function of the anticipated duration of 
transitory income.   
According to Barro (1981), an interesting way to test these theoretical 
implications would be to examine the constancy in the planned tax rate over time. 
This has the meaning that changes in tax rate should be unpredictable as they reflect 
only new information on the time path of government expenditure, output, and other 
variables. This led to random walk tests in tax rate to examine the tax smoothing 
hypothesis. However, a random walk in τ  does not necessarily imply tax smoothing. 
Tax rate can follow a random walk and is not yet determined by the rate of permanent 
                                                 




 expenditure. It is also possible for many tax rates satisfy the random walk property 
but only one of them is consistent with the intertemporal budget constraint of the 
government (Huang and Lin (1993)). For Ghosh (1995) there are at least two reasons 
worth going beyond the random walk tests in tax smoothing models. First, it is often 
difficult to reject a unit root in many economic time series in finite samples. Second, 
testing random walk may not be a conclusive test on tax smoothing because a random 
walk in τ  may have other explanations. For instance, τ  could follow a random walk 
if it is determined by a random economic or political decision-making process.32   
Sahasakul (1986) used the random walk hypothesis of τ to obtain a 
relationship between the optimal τ  and the permanent component of the expenditure 
rate.  He divides the following instantaneous borrowing constraint of the government  
ttttt TGDrD −++= − 01)1(                                                                      (3.5) 
through by  to obtain it in ratio form as    tY
  ( ) tttttt gdrd τμ −+′−+= − 011                                                                    (3.6)                        
where ,  and ttt YDd /= ttt YGg /00 = tμ′  is the growth rate of output.33  
Using random assumption together with the condition of constant r and μ , Sahasakul 










− ∑ ′−+′−+′−+′−= μμμμτ  .                     (3.7) 
                                                 
32 Some argue that the logic of tax smoothing implies the issue of contingent government debt (see 
Lucas and Stokey (1983)). With fully contingent debt, the government can maintain an unchanged tax 
rates across all possible states (Bohn (1990, 1998b)). The analysis of tax smoothing can be extended to 
include capital accumulation. See Kydland and Prescott (1977), Chari and Kehoe (1999) and Golosov, 
Kocherlakota, and Tsyvinsky (2003) for more on optimal tax policies in an economy with capital.  
 




YY )( 1−−=′μ  which is 










 The first term on the r.h.s. of (3.7) is interest payments net of output growth. 
Sahasakul defined the second part involving future expectations as the permanent 
component of .  0tg
The formulation in (3.7) renders several considerations. First, though 
Sahasakul defined μ′ as the output growth from period t-1 to period t, (3.6) exists if 
and only if the growth rate of output is defined as tttt YYY /)( 1−−=′μ  which is rather 
an unusual definition. To elaborate it, we rewrite the first term on the r.h.s. of (3.6) as 
]1)/()/[(/)1(/)1( 1111 +−+=+ −−−− tttttttt YYYYYDrYDr .  
This expression yields  
1111 )1()1)(1(]1/)([)1( −−−− ′−′−+=′−+=+−−+ tttttt drrdrYYYdr μμμ .  
To arrive at (3.7), Sahasakul assumed that 0>′− μr and .0=′μr  The former is 
relevant as it gives the condition of dynamic efficiency but the latter is unrealistic for 
any non-zero value for r and μ′ . Further, the interpretation of the second part on the 
r.h.s. of (3.7) is rather vague as the discount factor is given by )1( μ′−+ r . If the 
standard definition of the output growth rate is used, the discount factor is given by 
)1/()1( r++ μ  when the variables are in ratio form. 
Another issue related to the Sahasakul’s study involves the derivation of the 
permanent component of the expenditure rate. He obtained it by collecting permanent 
non-defence and defence spending rates. The permanent non-defence spending rate is 
derived by accounting for (i) crowding-out of non-defence purchases by defence 
purchases during war times, (ii) increase in transfer payments following wars, and (iii) 
fluctuations due to falls in the unemployment rate during war times. Nonetheless, 
Sahasakul did not account for other factors apart from wars that could cause transitory 
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 fluctuations in the government expenditure rate. Moreover, he did not provide details 
on the computation of the permanent defence spending rate. 
Sahasakul tested the tax smoothing hypothesis by regressing marginal tτ , in 
fact the weighted average of all categories of federal marginal tax rates, on the 
permanent component of expenditure rate ( ), temporary component of expenditure 













Due to the difficulty in measuring permanent expenditure and income, some 
studies focus on the other aspects of the tax smoothing hypothesis. These studies 
mainly examine whether the fiscal deficit is informative about future changes in 
government expenditure. Huang and Lin (1993) using the random walk assumption in 
the tax rate obtained a log-linear version of the optimal budget surplus series as  
( )⎥⎦⎤⎢⎣⎡∑ ΔΩ−Δ= ∞= +−+1 10 loglogi itititt YGES σ  
where σ and Ω  are constants whose magnitudes are less than one. The above 
equation reflects a linear relation between budget surplus and forecasts of future 
growth rates of government expenditure and output. This equation bears the following 
implication on the movements of budget surpluses. The government runs a large 
budget surplus at present if it anticipates high expenditure or low income in the future. 
If the government expenditures are expected to grow at a slower rate than the current 
rate, the optimal policy is to run high current deficits as surpluses are expected in the 
                                                 
34  As Sahasakul (1986) himself noted following a referee’s comments, the significance of the 
deterministic time trend in the tax rate implies that the permanent component of expenditure rate was 
not adequately measured.  
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 future. However, if temporary government expenditure occurs in the future periods as 
well, this kind of policy does not lead to an optimal policy as deficits are inevitable. 
Ghosh (1995), Olekalns (1997), Serletis and Schorn (1999) and Cashin, Haque, 
and Olekalns (2002) also tested the information content of the fiscal deficit in a 
different framework.35 Their constrained optimization problem is to  
















where B and R are discount factors. 36  In this formulation B is given as the 
government’s subjective discount factor37 and )1/()1( rR ++= μ is given as the social 
discount factor. The solution to the above optimization problem yields the optimal τ  
at time t as  
])()1[( 1 0 ti itt
i
t drgERR μλτ −+∑−= ∞= +                                                    (3.8) 
where )]1/())/(1[( RRBR −−=λ .  
They define the budget surplus in ratio form as 
 tttt drgs )(
0 μτ −−−= .                                                                         (3.9) 
Assuming B = R in (3.8) and substituting it into (3.9), an optimal surplus is derived as 
 .                                                                                     (3.10) ∑ Δ= + )( 0* ittit gERs
                                                 
35 In this formulation, they allowed for a possibility of tax tilting. Tax tilting refers to the shifting of tax 
burden either towards or away from the present. In this framework, the government decision to follow 
a tax tilting or tax smoothing behavior depends largely on its subjective discount factor B.  
  
36 Following Roubini (1988) and Bohn (1990), Ghosh (1995) assumed that current deadweight loss of 
taxation is proportional to the square of the average tax rate. Further, they used the following 
instantaneous budget constraint (in ratio form)  .)1()1( 01 tttt gdrd τμ −++=+ +
 
37 As Ghosh (1995) notes, the above discount rate reflects the time preference of the government.  
 51
 This optimal surplus explains that under tax smoothing, budget surplus should absorb 
the anticipated changes in . If the government expects an increase in future G0g 0, it 
should immediately raise T expecting to lower them when G0 is actually high. But this 
view also contradicts the actual behavior of the government. In general, the 
government raises T with the realization that G0 is high and therefore deficits are 
widening. No elected government would respond to anticipated future expenditure 
hikes by raising taxes at present.  
Empirically, Ghosh and others obtained  in a bivariate vector autoregression 
(VAR) model involving and . Then, the time paths of  and  are compared 
to arrive at a conclusion on the tax smoothing hypothesis. If tax smoothing is valid, 
the difference between  and  should be trivial. If differs largely from , the 
government is more likely following a tax tilting behaviour (see Cashin, Haque, and 
Olekalns (2002)). But, , by construction, shares the characteristics of as the 
former is obtained in a regression that includes the latter. Methods proposed by Huang 
and Lin, Ghosh and others also do not provide a direct way to test the tax smoothing 
hypothesis. In the next section, we propose a new model which enables a direct test 












3.3 A New Model of Tax Smoothing  
As in many other studies discussed above, we assume that the time path of 
government expenditure is exogenously given and taxation necessarily involves a 
deadweight loss to the private economy. Further, we assume that this deadweight loss 
of taxation is an increasing and convex function of the tax rate. Following Roubini 
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 (1988), Bohn (1990) and Ghosh (1995), we define the deadweight loss of taxation per 
unit of output in the following form:  
( ) 22ttz ττ =  .                                                                                               (3.11) 
This quadratic form of the deadweight loss function assures that ( ) 0>′ tz τ  and 
( ) .0>′′ tz τ In a stochastic environment, the deadweight loss of taxation is determined 
by expectations of future tax rates. Since a single tax rate is applied to the whole 
economy, (3.11) is multiplied by  to obtain the total deadweight loss of taxation as  tY
 ( ) ( ) ttttt YYzZ 2)( 2τττ ==  .                                                            (3.12) 
Further, we assume that the government chooses an optimal tax rate by minimizing an 
intertemporal deadweight loss function of taxation subject to an intertemporal budget 
constraint. As in Chapter 2, taking iterated expectations we can set the real interest 
rate to a constant value. This again requires real interest rate to be a stationary series 
over time. Then, the constrained optimization problem that the government faces in 
choosing an optimal tax rate can be written as  







21)1(21 τ                                                                 (3.13) 













where E is expectation operator and is the initial debt.1−tD
38 Variables Y, G0, D and T 
are in real terms. Instead of in levels, the optimization problem can be arranged in 
ratio form dividing t+i period deadweight loss function and budget constraint by 
and collecting resulting ratio form equations over time. The first order condition itY +
                                                 




 w.r.t. τ for the resulting constrained optimization problem yields the following 
standard result39  
titE ττ =+ ,   for all i = 1,2,…    .                                                                 (3.15) 
Equation (3.15) shows that τ  follows a martingale sequence: No information other 
than the current τ  has significant power in predicting futureτ . That is, the current tax 
rate is the optimal forecast of future tax rates. As noted earlier, it is often viewed that 
the random walk in the tax rate does not necessarily imply the tax smoothing nature of 
fiscal policy. Because of the issues in random walk tests as noted earlier, it is 
important to derive a direct test on the tax smoothing hypothesis. For this, we divide 
(3.5) through by  and rearrange to obtain  tY
( )10 11 +++ +−= tttt gdd τω ,                                                                              (3.16) 
where ( )ρμω t+= 1 , )1/(1 r+=ρ and 11 /)( −−−= tttt YYYμ .  
By appealing to rational expectations, and by taking iterated expectations, we set the 
future growth rate of output to a constant value (μ ). This assumption requires the 
growth rate of output to be a stationary series. This condition is quite plausible 
empirically as the growth rate of output fluctuates around a constant, the long-run 
growth rate, μ. 40  Then, by iterating (3.16) forward for N-1 period and taking 
expectations, we obtain the intertemporal budget constraint of the government in ratio 











t gEEd ωτω .                                                                       (3.17) 
                                                 
39 Appendix II presents the full derivation.  
 
40 For example, the U.S. GDP growth rate fluctuates around the mean value of 0.035 for the period 
1950-2004.  
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 In (3.17), government borrowings rule out the continual bond financing of 
deficits. This condition, which is known as the no-Ponzi game (NPG) condition, 
assures that the mean of the present discounted debt is zero in the limit 
( 0lim =+∞→ NtNN dω ).41 Plugging (3.15) into (3.17) and assuming that 1<ω  (that is 
r<μ , the condition which assures the dynamic efficiency), we obtain the optimal tax 







tt gEd ωωωωωτ .                                               (3.18) 
In order to derive an expression for the expected future non-interest spending 
rate in (3.18), we assume that is growing at a constant rate0G γ , the average growth 
rate. The assumption is again consistent with rational expectations as it can be 
supported by the constant conditional expectation and law if iterative expectation 
conditions. The actual time path of G0 deviates from its trend by an unpredictable 
plus/minus transitory factor. Then, one period ahead and Y  values take the form  0G
( )( ) 010 1 11 ttt GG ++ ++= ϑγ     and   ( )( ) ttt YY 11 11 ++ ++= ξμ                                (3.19) 
where tϑ  and tξ are transitory growth rates of G0 and Y. We assume that tϑ  and tξ  are 
zero-mean mutually uncorrelated white noise processes.42  Expressing over Y , i 































γ .                                                                    (3.20) 
                                                 
41 A detailed discussion on Ponzi schemes is given in Chapter 2.  
 
42  Note that after obtaining the long-run average growth rate we can easily derive the transitory growth 
rate from the above expressions. Thus, for example,  can be decomposed into permanent and 
transitory components as 
tY
1)1( −+ tYμ  and 1)1( −+ tt Yμξ .  
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  Upon taking expectations of (3.20) conditional on the information set at time t, we 
obtain the permanent non-interest expenditure rate at time t+i as follows: 43  
( ) ( )[ 00 11 tiitt ggE μγ ++=+ ] .                                                                        (3.21) 







tt gd λωωωωτ                                                     (3.22) 
where ργλ )1( += . Assuming 10 << λ (that is, r<γ ),44 (3.22) is solved to arrive at 
[ ] 0/)1()/)1(()/)1(( ttt gd λλωωωωτ −−+−= .                                         (3.23) 
Substituting ( )ρμω += 1 , ( )r+= 11ρ  and ργλ )1( +=  back into (3.23), we obtain 


















−=   .                                                         (3.24) 
The first term on the r.h.s. of (3.24) is the interest payments on the debt stock 
(net of output growth) expressed as a ratio of output. The second term represents the 
permanent non-interest government expenditure rate adjusted by the ratio 
( ) /(r r )μ γ− − . In the steady-state where γμ =  and 0=td , (3.24) reduces to 
0
tt g=τ .45  That is, the optimal tax rate equals the permanent non-interest expenditure 
rate and thus the government runs a balanced budget over time.  
                                                 
43  Using Taylor series expansion it can be verified that [ ] 1)1)(1( 1 =++ −++ jtjtE ξϑ . See Appendix II for 
details. 
 
44 Using the fact that non-interest expenditure cannot exceed output globally, that is , some 
assume that 
1)/( 0 <tt YG
μγ < . Then we have .r<< μγ But for the derivation of our result, we require only r<μ  
and r<γ . 
 
45 A constant tax rate implies that tax revenue also grows at the growth rate of output. If tax revenue 
and expenditure grows at the same rate, debt is zero as deficits/surpluses become zero.  
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 Now suppose that the steady-state tax and non-interest expenditure rates are 
given by 0g and τ , and μγ ≠ . If μγ < , then ( ) ( ) 1/ <−− γμ rr  and 
( ) ( ) 11/1 <++ μγ , therefore, 00)]1/()1)][(/()[( ggrr t <++−− μγγμ  . This implies 
that ττ <t . In this case, for a given positive amount of interest payment  falls 
below its steady-state value because the permanent growth rate of output exceeds the 
permanent growth rate of non-interest expenditure. Tax rate falls below its steady-
state value because of a low tax requirement with a widening tax base.  
0
tg
Conversely, if μγ >  then ( ) ( ) 1/ >−− γμ rr  and ( ) ( ) 11/1 >++ μγ . Thus we 
have 00)]1/()1)][(/()[( ggrr t >++−− μγγμ . Therefore, ττ >t . When μγ > , non-
interest expenditure rate rises over its steady-state value. tτ  also rises over its steady-
state value. This is because the increase in tax requirement exceeds the increase in 
taxing capacity of the economy.  
From the first part on the r.h.s. of (3.24), it can be shown that interest payment 
ratio net of output growth is low (high) if μ  rises above (falls below) its steady-state 
figure. Hence, given other things being constant,  
(i)  A rise (fall) in μ lowers (raises) the permanent non-interest expenditure rate 
and the average interest payments rate net of output growth. Thus, we have a 
lower (higher) tτ .  
(ii) A rise (fall) in γ raises (lowers) non-interest permanent expenditure rate. 
Thus, we have a higher (lower) tτ .  
This implies that tτ  is counter-cyclical to the growth rate of output while it is pro-
cyclical to the growth rate of non-interest government expenditure. In light of the fact 
that the r.h.s. of (3.24) is made up of all long-run components (r, γ and μ ), we set the 
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 whole r.h.s. of (3.24) equal to , the permanent government expenditure rate. Then, 





















μτ    .                                               (3.25) 
The optimal tτ  and  are linearly positively correlated over time. Equation (3.25) 
states that the government should change the optimal tax rate if and only if there is a 
change in permanent government expenditure rate.
p
tg
46 However, (3.25) itself does not 
provide a basis for tests on tax smoothing as tτ in l.h.s. (3.25) is the unobserved 
optimal tax rate. To derive a testable framework for tax smoothing, we combine the 
random walk assumption, (3.15), and the linear relationship between optimal tax rate 


















μττ                                        (3.26) 
which states that expectations on future tax rates depends only on the current 
permanent expenditure rate. Equation (3.26) can be written in an empirically testable 
form as 
                           (3.27a) 1
p
t tg uτ β −= + t
t1t tu uρ ε−= + ,                                                                                          (3.27b) 
where 1β = and tε  is assumed to be a zero-mean white noise process. The 
autocorrelation parameter ρ  ( 0 1ρ≤ ≤ ) measures the degree of cointegration.47 If 
the tax rate follows a random walk, (3.25) shows that the permanent component of the 
government expenditure rate should also follow a random walk by virtue of their 
                                                 
46 In general, the idea is analogous to the efficient market hypothesis in the finance literature (Fama 
(1970)) and the random walk hypothesis in the theory of consumption (Hall (1978)). 
 
47 A brief discussion on cointegration and error correction models can be found in Appendix III. 
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 perfect correlation and thus (3.27) yields a case where two random walks cointegrate 
if the tax smoothing hypothesis holds.  
The tax rate discussed so far is the optimal tax rate. The observed tax rate may, 
however, contain a transitory component in which case additional I(0) variables may 
be required in (3.27) to explain the transitory component of the tax rate.  We can, 
therefore, define three cases of tax smoothing depending on the parameter ρ in 
(3.27b): (i) If 0ρ =  (the highest degree of cointegration) then we have a case of 
strong tax smoothing. (ii) If 0 1ρ< <  (low degree of cointegration) then we have a 
case of weak tax smoothing. (iii) If 1ρ = (no cointegration) then we have to reject the 
tax smoothing hypothesis even if the tax rate follows a random walk. 
The presence of tax smoothing in various forms can be assessed by 
formulating an error correction model (ECM) in the following format: 
0 1 2 1 1 2( )
p p
t t t t tx g gΔτ γ γ δ α τ ε− − − −′= + + + − + t
te
          (3.28a) 
0 1 2 1 2( )
p p
t t t tg x gΔ φ φ α τ− − −′= + + − +            (3.28b) 
where (1 )δ α β= −  and 1tx −  is a vector of I(0) variables that represent transitory 
effects on the future tax rate. Model (3.28) provides a comprehensive framework to 
test a number of hypotheses. If tτ  cointegrates with 1ptg −  then 1 0α ≠ (i.e., 11 0α− ≤ < ) 
If 1β =  as postulated in (3.28) then 0δ = . The tax smoothing hypothesis holds in 
general if 1 0α ≠  and 0 0γ γ δ′= = = . Under this and using (3.25), (3.28a) simply 
reduces to 1t t tτ τ − ε= + .  Since 11ρ α= +  (assuming 2 0α = ) measures the degree of 
cointegration the strong version of the tax smoothing holds only if 1 1α = − . The weak 
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 version of the tax smoothing hypothesis holds if 11 0α− < <  with or without some 
non-zero γ s. The tax smoothing hypothesis does not hold at all if 1 0α = . 
 We introduced the regression in (3.28b) to address the issue of causality. If the 
changes in are exogenous we expect ptg 2 0φ α′ = = . However, with temporally 
aggregated data like ours it is possible to observe spurious feedback effects that may 
be taken as evidence against the tax smoothing hypothesis. Rajaguru and Abeysinghe 
(2005) have shown that the spurious feedback occurs with a predictable sign 
distortion on 2α  estimates. In the case of a true feedback the expected sign of 2α  is 
positive. In the case of a spurious feedback significant estimates of 2α  occur with the 
wrong sign.  
 
3.4 Sample and Data 
To test the tax smoothing hypothesis we use annual data from six OECD 
countries: Australia, Canada, Italy, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom (U.K.) and 
the U.S. These countries were selected because of the relative ease of obtaining the 
necessary data from international sources. Depending on the data availability and to 
cover roughly similar time periods we selected the following sample periods: 
Australia, the Netherlands and the U.K. 1950-2003; Canada 1950-2002; Italy 1951- 
2001; and the U.S. 1950-2004.  
Annual data for government revenue, expenditure, GDP, the unemployment 
rate and CPI are obtained from the International Financial Statistical Yearbook and 
International Financial Statistics CD-ROM of the International Monetary Fund. Tax 
rate and expenditure rate are defined government revenue and government 
expenditure as a percent of GDP. The rate of inflation is the rate of change in CPI.  
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3.5 Derivation of the Permanent Expenditure Rate 
Though the concept of permanent component of economic time series dates 
back to Milton Friedman (1957), there is still no consensus among economists on how 
to measure it. One popular idea is that the permanent component of a time series is 
better reflected by its trend (or smooth series). An alternative view suggests the unit 
root component of a time series should be its permanent component. Box and Jenkins 
(1970) showed that time series may possess stochastic trend which is driven by the 
cumulative effects of random shocks. A process with stochastic trend is also called a 
unit root series (Fuller (1976)). The unit root component of a time series is treated as 
the permanent component because innovations to the unit root component have a 
permanent effect on the series (Stock and Watson (1988), Enders (2004, p. 243)). In 
this study, both the unit root component and the smooth series of government 
expenditure rate are used to represent its permanent component. The smooth series of 
government expenditure rate is derived by the Kalman filter. The unit root component 
of the government expenditure rate is derived by the Beveridge-Nelson decomposition 
method.  
 
3.5.1 The Beveridge-Nelson Decomposition 
Box and Jenkins (1970), Nelson and Plosser (1982), Campbell and Mankiw 
(1987) among others suggest that many economic time series constitute a stochastic 
trend plus a stationary component. Since our variables tax and government 
expenditure rates are bounded series between 0 and 1 and never reach boundaries, 
they possibly constitute a stochastic trend and a stationary component in observed 
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 samples. Thus, we use the Beveridge-Nelson (BN) decomposition method (Beveridge 
and Nelson (1981)) to isolate the unit root and stationary components of government 
expenditure rate.48 For BN decomposition, any stochastically trending I(1) series can 
be written as the sum of stochastic trend, stationary component and an initial 
condition. Let yt be a drift-less I(1) series which can be written as  
)...( 210 tt yy ζζζ ++++=                                                                         (3.29) 
where  tt L εψζ )(=  is a zero-mean I(0) process (with an independent white noise 
process, tε ).  Using the first difference of (3.29), tty ζ=Δ , and the following 
definitions 








j LL αα ,  and ...)( 21 ++−= ++ jjj ψψα    ( j = 0, 1, 2, …) 
tζ  can be expressed as 
1)1()( −−+== ttttt L ηηεψεψζ                                                                   (3.30) 
where tt L εαη )(= is a well-defined zero-mean covariance-stationary process. 






ssst +−+= ∑= −ηηεψ  . 














                                                
                                                                     (3.31) 
 
48 Beveridge and Nelson (1981) originally used this method to observe business cycle patterns of 
macroeconomic variables. Later, Watson (1986) employed this method to decompose permanent and 
temporary components of the U.S. GNP, disposable income and non-durable consumption expenditure. 
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 where ∑ sεψ )1( is the stochastic trend (permanent/unit root component), tη is 
stationary (transitory) component and ( )00 η−y is the initial condition (see also 
Hayashi (2000), Enders (2004)). In order to obtain ∑ sεψ )1( , we fit the following 
auto-regressive integrated moving average [ARIMA(p,1,q)] model for ∆yt  
( ) ( ) tqqtpP LLLyLLL εθθθφφφ −−−−=Δ−−−− ...1...1 221221 .  
Letting L=1, we have  
( ) tty εψ 1=Δ ,  
where ( ) ( ) ( ))...(1)...(11 21121 qp θθθφφφψ +++−+++−= − .  
Multiplying the sum of ARIMA residuals ( ∑ sε ) at each period by ( )1ψ , the 
stochastic trend of yt can be isolated. The stationary component is obtained by 
subtracting the stochastic trend and the initial condition, ( )00 η−y , from actual yt 
series. 
 
3.5.2  The Kalman Filter 
As a benchmark case for the unit root series of the government expenditure 
rate, a smoothed government expenditure rate is derived using the Kalman filter (KF 
herein after). Once a model has been put in a state space form, the KF, a recursive 
procedure, computes the optimal estimator of the state vector at time t based on the 
information available at time t (Harvey (1989)). An advanced feature of the KF is that 
it uses full set of data, not just the past values, to compute a smooth estimate of a time 
series at each period (see Hamilton (1994)). That is, the KF continually updates the 
estimate of the state vector as new observations become available. It also provides 
solutions for both prediction and smoothing of a time series. When the disturbances 
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 and the initial state vector are normally distributed, the KF enables the likelihood 
function to be calculated through prediction error decomposition. Thus, it paves the 
way for the estimation of any unknown parameters in the model and tests on their 
significance and model specification. The KF estimator of the state vector is an 
optimal estimator in the sense that it minimizes the mean square error.49  The KF 
smoothed series of the expenditure rate is computed using the built-in programs in 
STAMP statistical package. By the maximum likelihood estimation method, we 
decompose the smooth trend and the irregular component of the government 
expenditure rate by setting fixed level and stochastic slope of the series in the 
programme (see Hendry and Doornik (2001)).  
 
3.5.3 Decomposed Data   
The decomposition of a time series into a permanent (unit root) component 
and a transitory (stationary) component requires the original series to be non-
stationary. The government expenditure rates of countries in the sample obviously 
show a non-stationary pattern (see Figure 3.1). To be precise, we first test for a unit 
root in the level series of actual government expenditure rate. The ADF unit root test 
with a constant term in the regression fails to reject the null hypothesis of a unit root 
in the level series of (see Table 3.1). The ADF test statistic is clearly above the 1 
percent significance level critical value. This result suggests that series is non-
stationary in all the cases. We, then, perform ADF unit root test on  to determine 





                                                 
49 For details on the derivation of the Kalman filter, see Harvey (1989) and Hamilton (1994). 
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 a unit root in tgΔ suggesting its stationarity. Thus, the absence of a unit root in 
confirms that the level series of  is integrated of order one, I(1).                                tgΔ tg
      
























Actual BN unit root series KF smooth series 




              
           Figure 3.1: Actual, Unit Root and Smooth Series of Expenditure Rate 




ADF Test for a Unit Root in Expenditure Rate 
                    Nether- 
Series               Australia     Canada        Italy         -lands        U.K.          U.S. 
Actual Series 
                    -2.156       -1.308         1.023       -1.312      -1.570       -2.064 tg
         -5.404       -4.259       -5.032       -5.140      -5.061       -7.105 tgΔ
 
Decomposed Permanent Series 
     BN   -1.704       -1.431       -1.208       -1.578      -1.570       -1.527 ptg
     KF              -1.595       -1.238       -1.401       -1.507      -1.516       -2.655 ptg
 
Decomposed Transitory Series 
     BN   -4.632       -3.775       -4.572       -3.979      -4.458       -5.664 ttg
     KF              -11.10       -8.312       -7.307       -5.864      -8.158       -5.737 ttg
Note: ADF critical values at 1 and 5 percent significance levels are given as follows (i) -2.92 and -3.56 
for a random walk with a drift; (ii) -1.95 and -2.61 for a random walk without a drift.  
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 As is non-stationary (in fact I(1)), the unit root component of  is isolated 
by the BN method as described in Section 3.5.1. First, we fit an autoregressive 
moving average (ARMA) model for . The best fitting ARMA model that used for 
the BN decomposition is the one which has the minimum value for the AIC. The 
autocorrelation function (ACF) of 
tg tg
tg
tgΔ  suggests that autoregressive component of the 
series is dominant. The series  of Australia, Canada, Italy and the Netherlands have 




50   Estimated ARMA coefficients are used to compute ( )1ψ . The 
stochastic trend component of the series is obtained multiplying the cumulative sum 
of the ARMA residuals by ( )1ψ . Since the difference between actual series and 
stochastic trend component contains the stationary component and the initial 
conditions, we subtract mean of it to isolate the stationary component. The mean is 
then added to the stochastic trend component to eliminate the level difference. The KF 
smoother for  is derived as described in Section 3.5.2. tg
Figure 3.1 plots the actual and derived BN (unit root) and KF (smooth)  
series. In general, KF  is a smooth series of . Nevertheless, BN  tracks the 
actual series closely. This close tracking of the unit root series and the actual series 
suggests that the unit root component itself causes fluctuations in the actual series. 
Table 3.1 provides ADF unit root test results on the decomposed permanent and 
transitory ( ) components. A null hypothesis of no unit root in both the  series 














                                                 
50 We do not provide the results of ARMA models that used to decompose permanent and stationary 
components of expenditure rates in order to preserve space. 
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              Figure 3.2: Actual Tax and Expenditure Rates 
 
3.6 Test Results  
The random walk assumption in tτ  is examined by regressing tτΔ on a 
constant, 1−tτ  and lagged values of tτΔ . Results in Table 3.2 show that the random 
walk in tτ  cannot be rejected at the 5% level of significance in the cases of Australia, 
Canada, Italy, the Netherlands and the U.K. However, test results of the U.S. tax rate 
are somewhat puzzling as the constant and the coefficient of 1−tτ  are significantly 
different from zero and the coefficients of it−Δτ  are insignificantly different from zero. 
 67
 A significant constant term implies that tτ  constitutes a deterministic trend. In 
contrast, the coefficient of 1−tτ  implies that tτ  is an I(0) process. Nevertheless, we do 
not reject the random walk assumption for the U.S. tτ series also as an alternative unit 
root test (KPSS test) failed to reject a unit root in it.51  These results appear to suggest 
that the U.S. tax rate is a random walk with drift. The apparent drift is clearly a result 
of the upward trend observed in the U.S. tax rate over our sample period.  
In our model, a direct way to test the tax smoothing hypothesis, instead of 
relying on random walk tests on tτ , is to examine whether tτ  and  are 




 over time in all the cases. However, this positive association between tg tτ  and is 
disturbed occasionally. In the case of Australia, the positive correlation between 
tg
tτ and was not evident in 1990s (see Figure 3.2). The Canadian tg tτ  also moved 
opposite to the time path of in some periods, i.e., a sudden jump in 1969 and a 
sharp fall in mid 1980s. In Italy, 
tg
tτ  does not follow in the early 1970s. And  fell 
sharply while 
tg tg
tτ  was almost constant in 1990s. In the Netherlands, tτ  and  follow 
almost the same pattern over time except a brief intervention in mid 1980s where 
tg
tτ  
jumped up irrespective of a negative trend in . The positive association between tg tτ  
and  in the U.K. is not observed in two occasions. In the late 1960s, tg tτ  experienced 
a massive hike while  fell slightly. Again from 1993 to 2000, tg tτ  increased when 
was in a decreasing trend. There are clear opposite movements in the U.S. tg tτ  and 
                                                 
51 Kwiatkowski et al. (1992) propose a test (KPSS test) which has a null hypothesis of no unit root 
against an alternative of a unit root. In the ADF test, a null hypothesis of a unit root is tested against an 
alternative of no unit root. 
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 tg too. Overall, counter movements in tτ  and  are large in the U.S., the U.K. and 
Italy during the last decade. As illustrated in Figure 3.3, the degree of positive 
correlation between the U.S. 
tg
tτ  and is somewhat weaker than that of other 




Test for a Random Walk in the Tax Rate:  
Regression Equation:  t
p
i
ititt v+∑ Δ++=Δ = −− 110 τδβτατ
     Country            Constant      1−tτ            1−Δ tτ  2−Δ tτ        AR F      ARCH F   Sample 
     
     Australia  3.251     -0.149         0.114  -0.254        1.007      0.288      1953-03 
  (1.93)     [-1.99]        (0.88)  (-1.95)      {0.373}    {0.635} 
     
    Canada  -1.639     -0.088          0.208 -0.045        1.625       0.124     1953-02 
  (-1.48)     [-1.47]         (1.46)  (-0.32)      {0.209}    {0.726} 
     
    Italy   0.938     -0.030         -0.139  0.220        0.178       0.011     1955-01 
  (1.26)     [-0.92]        (-0.91)  (1.40)      {0.837}    {0.917} 
     
    Netherlands  2.610     -0.091          0.104 -0.011        1.857       0.017     1954-03 
  (1.47)     [-1.48]         (0.72)  (-0.08)      {0.168}    {0.897} 
     
    U.K.   3.871     -0.108          0.030 -0.096        2.191       0.580     1954-03 
  (1.67)     [-1.59]         (0.21)  (-0.65)      {0.123}    {0.450}  
     
     U.S.   7.365     -0.416          0.128  0.049        0.110       0.146     1954-04 
  (2.92)     [-2.95]         (0.83)  (0.37)      {0.896}    {0.704}  
   
Notes: (a) coefficient t values, ADF t values and diagnostic tests p values are given in parentheses, 
brackets and braces respectively. (b) Student’s t critical values at 40 degrees of freedom are given as 
2.70 at the 1% and 2.02 at the 5% level of significance. (c) For ADF critical values, see the note in 
Table 1.    
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                Figure 3.3: Scatter Plot of Tax and Expenditure Rates 
 
 
Table 3.3 presents the OLS estimates of β  from the regression in (3.27) based 
on both BN and KF measures of the permanent expenditure rate. The estimates of β  
are very similar under both measures and close to unity. The residual based ADF test 
supports cointegration except in the case of Italy. However, the degree of 
cointegration measured by ρ  is not perfect. The residuals exhibit both autocorrelation 
and ARCH effects. Although ARCH effects do not violate the tax smoothing 
hypothesis, residual autocorrelation does violate the strong version of the hypothesis.  
The regressions based on KF show stronger autocorrelation and ARCH effects. We, 




β  is above 0.9 in all the cases, the restriction that β  is unity 
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 is accepted only in the case of the U.K.  This does not imply the rejection of the tax 
smoothing hypothesis for other cases because tτ  and  are cointegrated with ptg 1− β  
that is pretty close to one. It is observed that the recursive estimates of β are quite 
stable and significant over time (see Figure 3.4). In all the cases other than Italy, the 





Test for Cointegration Between Tax Rate and Permanent Expenditure Rate  
Dependant Variable: tτ  
                                 Nether-         
              Australia     Canada      Italy          lands    UK      US 
Beveridge-Nelson Unit Root Series 
BN   0.973      0.913         0.805        0.926    0.983       0.902 ptg 1−
               (94.1)     (54.5)         (53.7)       (97.2)   (75.2)       (78.1) 
 
ADF t of Residuals          -4.295*     -2.148*      -1.351      -3.797*   -2.311*    -2.575* 
Rho (ρ)                            0.417      0.808         0.758        0.555    0.776       0.761 
AR(2) F test  5.775*      41.86*      29.14*     10.66*    35.09*    31.68* 
ARCH F test  0.027      6.249*      18.31*     10.10*      9.29*    11.51* 
 
Kalman Filtered Smooth Series 
KF    0.974      0.915         0.807        0.926    0.983        0.904 ptg 1−
               (95.8)     (58.1)         (57.9)       (114)   (72.8)        (83.7) 
 
ADF t of Residuals        -4.596*     -2.151*     -0.850       -2.776*   -2.560*     -2.359* 
Rho (ρ)                            0.572      0.894         0.806        0.741    0.835       0.757 
AR(2) F test  16.82*      93.18*      61.60*      28.11*    55.09*      31.65* 
 ARCH F test  0.916      20.87*      24.66**    27.33*    22.76*      12.72*  
     
Notes: Figures in parenthesis are t values. * denotes significance at the 5% level.     
 
 
To eliminate high residual autocorrelation, some relevant I(0) variables such 
as temporary government expenditure rate and the rate of inflation are included in 
(3.28) as done by Sahasakul (1986). Though the inclusion of I(0) variables do not 
                                                 
52 Cointegration test results may be prone to misinterpretations in the face of structural breaks or 
regime shifts. However, it is also important to emphasize that structural breaks in a single series does 
not necessarily amount to a breakdown in a causal relationship (see Hoover (2001)).   
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 affect the β  coefficient, it does not resolve the issue of high serial autocorrelation and 
the ARCH effects in the regression results given in Table 3.3.  
      

































        Figure 3.4: Recursive Estimates of β Coefficient 
 
 
Therefore, we proceed to the estimation of the ECM in (3.28). To represent x 
in (3.28a) we chose the transitory component of the government expenditure rate ( ), 
the growth rate of M1 ( ) and the unemployment rate (u
t
tg
tm t). The growth rate of M1 is 
used to capture both the seignorage and the inflation effects. The seignorage effect on 
the tax rate is negative as the government finance excess spending by printing money. 
The inflation effect is expected to be positive because higher inflation and higher 
nominal incomes push tax payers into higher tax brackets. Therefore, the final effect 
of  on tax rate is ambiguous. The effect of unemployment depends on the extent of 
the social welfare network in a country. A country with an extensive social welfare 
tm
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 network may have to raise the tax rate to maintain these services when unemployment 
increases. A country not burdened by social welfare programs can lower the tax rate 
to boost-up economic growth during recessionary periods. We had to use shorter 
sample periods to estimate (3.28) because we were not able to obtain data on the 
unemployment rate over the full sample period.  The vector x in (3.28b) includes two 
additional variables, the lagged dependent variable and the change in the tax rate. 
 
Table 3.4 
Further Tests on Tax Smoothing 
 Dependent Variable: tΔτ  
Explanatory                   Nether- 
Variable            Australia     Canada          Italy   lands       U.K.         U.S. 
Constant  4.114      0.993           1.776    3.682       5.883        7.916* 
   (1.56)      (1.43)          (1.97)   (0.87)      (1.75)         (3.95) 
t
tg 1−                -1.013      0.279           1.059    0.572      -0.725         0.189 
    (-1.31)      (1.24)          (0.91)   (0.58)      (-1.47)        (0.71) 
1−tm                -0.161       0.001         -0.072    0.181      -0.129        0.329* 
    (-0.97)      (0.03)         (-0.68)    (0.82)      (-0.34)        (2.70) 
     0.122      -0.113          0.758*   -0.352      -0.150        0.190* 1tu −
    (0.99)      (-1.45)         (2.43)   (-1.36)      (-1.02)       (-1.97) 
p
tg 2− : δ               -0.210      -0.015         -0.346*   -0.093      -0.141        0.429* 
    (-1.52)     (-0.35)          (-2.86)   (-0.56)      (-1.31)       (-3.77) 
 )( 21
p
tt g −− −τ : 1α              -0.427*      -0.129*        -0.414*   -0.462*     -0.338*     0.628* 
    (-3.08)      (-2.23)         (-3.33)   (-2.27)      (-2.95)       (-5.19)
  
 
 R2   0.200      0.726           0.245    0.263       0.242         0.535 
AR(2) F test  1.931      1.538           0.985    1.380        0.332         2.896 
   [0.16]      [0.23]          [0.38]    [0.27]       [0.72]        [0.07] 
ARCH F test  0.005      2.251           0.084    0.189        0.946         0.195 
   [0.95]      [0.14]          [0.77]    [0.67]       [0.34]        [0.76] 
Normality Chi2(2) 3.316      2.178           5.448    3.586        4.709         2.833 
   [0.21]      [0.34]          [0.07]    [0.17]       [0.10]        [0.24] 
Hetero F test   1.022      0.386           0.551    0.557        1.106         0.703 
   [0.45]      [0.96]          [0.84]    [0.82]       [0.39]        [0.73] 
RESET F test  0.980      0.299           7.307    1.008        0.039         0.424 
   [0.33]      [0.59]          [0.01]    [0.32]       [0.84]        [0.52] 
Regression sample         1957-03    1960-02      1960-01      1971-03    1960-03   1956-03  
Notes: The coefficient t values are given in parentheses and diagnostic p-values are given in brackets. 
For Canada pulse dummies were used for 1969, 1977 and 1981. For the U.S. a step dummy was used to 




 The estimation results of (3.28) are given in Tables 3.4 and 3.5. All the 
coefficient estimates in Table 3.5, with the exception of a marginal case of 1tm −  in 
Canada, are statistically insignificant at the 5% level of significance. Clearly the 
permanent government expenditure rate that we use in the model is exogenous to the 
parameters of interest in the tax equation. This is an important pre-requisite for the tax 
smoothing hypothesis to hold.  
 
Table 3.5 
Test for Causality Between Permanent Expenditure Rate and Tax Rate  
Dependent Variable: ptgΔ  
Explanatory                                Nether- 
Variable            Australia     Canada          Italy    lands       U.K.          U.S. 
Constant  0.282      2.208           2.019    1.527      1.365         -0.232 
   (0.65)      (2.09)          (1.63)   (1.99)      (2.14)        (-0.49) 
t
tg 1−    0.696     -0.727          -3.572   -0.929      0.245          0.227 
    (0.79)     (-0.57)         (-0.75)   (-0.59)      (0.50)         (0.97) 
1−tm    -0.368     -0.284*          0.042    0.333      -0.422        0.002 
    (-1.81)     (-2.06)         (0.26)    (1.38)      (-1.00)       (0.02) 
     0.064     -0.246         -0.298   -0.334      -0.140         0.079 1tu −
    (0.79)     (-1.58)        (-1.57)   (-1.69)      (-1.25)       (0.91) 
p
tg 1−Δ                -0.090     -0.176          0.178    0.104       0.083       -0.230 
    (-0.43)     (-0.45)         (0.42)   (0.31)      (0.47)        (-1.23) 
1−Δ tτ                -0.114      0.091          0.223    0.212      -0.224        0.110 
    (-0.59)     (0.40)         (0.77)   (0.83)      (-1.27)       (1.16) 
 221 :)( ατ ptt g −− −   0.206     -0.061         -0.105   -0.094       0.030        0.100 
    (1.28)     (-0.43)        (-0.90)   (-0.44)      (0.28)        (1.49)
  
 
 R2   0.107      0.235          0.074    0.203      0.143         0.116 
AR(2) F test  1.081      0.063          0.817    1.532       0.051         1.197 
   [0.35]      [0.94]         [0.45]    [0.24]      [0.95]        [0.31] 
ARCH F test  0.113      0.012          0.050    2.048       0.529         1.083 
   [0.74]      [0.91]         [0.83]    [0.17]      [0.47]        [0.30] 
Normality Chi2(2) 3.646      0.957          5.790    1.734       1.301         3.995 
   [0.16]      [0.62]         [0.06]    [0.42]      [0.52]        [0.14] 
Hetero F test   0.759      0.344          0.541    0.571       0.427         0.925 
   [0.68]      [0.97]         [0.86]    [0.83]      [0.94]        [0.54] 
RESET F test  1.481      0.011          9.785    5.232       0.214         1.044 
   [0.23]      [0.92]         [0.01]    [0.03]      [0.65]        [0.31] 
Regression sample         1957-03    1960-02     1960-01     1971-03     1960-03    1956-03  
Notes: The coefficient t values are given in parentheses and diagnostic p-values are given in brackets. * 
denotes significance at the 5% level. 
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 The following observations can be made from the results in Table 3.4. First, 
the estimates of 1α  are statistically significant at the 5% or 1% level in all cases 
(including Italy) and re-confirms the presence of cointegration between tτ  and 1ptg − . 
Note that the residual-based ADF test rejected cointegration for Italy in (3.25). These 
estimates also affirm that cointegration is of lower degree ( ,01 1 <<− α  0ρ > ) than 
required by the strong version of the tax smoothing hypothesis. Second, the estimates 
of δ  indicate that the hypothesis 1β =   holds for all the countries in the sample 
except for Italy and the U.S. The lack of a one-to-one relationship between the tax 
rate and the permanent government expenditure rate in the long run is rather counter 
intuitive. We expect better data on the tax rate may render 1β =  even in the case of 
Italy and the U.S. Third, the constant term and the transitory components are 
insignificant in all cases except for Italy and the U.S. In the case of Italy the 
unemployment rate seems to have a positive transitory effect on the tax rate. The U.S. 
story is rather peculiar. Repeating what observed in Table 3.2, the constant term is 
statistically significant again. As we have already stated the local upward trend in the 
U.S. tax rate appears to be the cause of the non-zero constant term. A longer sample 
period may remove this effect. The transitory effects of M1 growth rate and the 
unemployment rate are also significant in the U.S. case with the former showing a 
positive effect and the latter a negative effect. To reiterate, the presence of these 
transitory effects do not necessarily violate the tax smoothing hypothesis. The U.S. 
regression also shows the strongest degree of cointegration as indicated by the 




 3.7 Conclusion 
The random walk assumption in the tax rate is used to derive a linear relation 
between the tax rate and the permanent expenditure rate. Then, we show that tax 
smoothing is valid if the tax rate at time t and the permanent government expenditure 
rate at time t-1 are cointegrated with one-to-one positive relationship. Further, we 
introduce an error correction format that could allow testing a number of hypotheses 
on tax smoothing. The model that we propose here would yield evidence on strong 
and weak forms of tax smoothing and no tax smoothing.  
The general conclusion that emerges from this exercise is that all the countries 
in the sample follow a weak form of tax smoothing. The fact that the governments do 
not change the marginal income tax rates and corporate tax rates so frequently 
indicates that temporary departures of the effective tax rate from the permanent 
government expenditure rate is quite common. The existence of such departures 
should not be construed as a violation of the tax smoothing hypothesis. Interestingly 
the observed random walk behavior of the tax rate alone does not reveal this outcome. 
















 There are many small and large scale macroeconometric models for Sri Lanka 
built by individuals or teams. These models are, however, not extensively used for 
impact analysis of policy changes and other internal and external disturbances. 
Moreover, we observe that existing models are not very appropriate for our purpose of 
evaluating macroeconomic policy options as there are some drawbacks regarding 
model specification and system links.53  
   In this chapter, we construct a medium-scale macroeconometric model for 
Sri Lanka incorporating most of the vital characteristics of the economy. The model 
developed here is especially designed to carry out analyses on changes in fiscal policy 
variables, in particular changes in various components of government expenditure. 
Nevertheless, the model can be used to evaluate other various internal and external 
shocks. The model is also rich enough to incorporate monetary policy evaluations 
with minor extensions.  
The organization of the rest of the chapter is as follows. Section 4.2 is devoted 
to a review of literature on macroeconometric modelling. This section provides a 
succinct history of macroeconometric modelling including its past and present issues. 
This section also includes a brief discussion on alternative modelling approaches such 
                                                 
53 A discussion on selected macroeconometric models for Sri Lanka is given in Section 4.2.2.  
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 as dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models (DSGE), autoregressive moving 
average (ARMA) or autoregressive integrated moving average (ARIMA) models, 
vector autoregressive (VAR) models and error correction models (ECM). A brief 
discussion on existing models for Sri Lanka is also given in this section. Section 4.3 
provides a detailed discussion of our model. This section covers salient features of the 
model, its statistical properties, sample and data, specification and estimation of 
stochastic equations, accounting and definitional identities, and the complete list of 
model equations. Section 4.4 briefly discusses the transmission mechanism of the 
model. In Section 4.5, actual and simulated data are compared to examine the 
goodness-of-fit and the forecast accuracy of the model. Section 4.6 provides a 
summary of the model.  
 
4.2 Literature Review 
4.2.1 Macroeconometric Modelling in General 
Lawrence Klein reckons a macroeconometric model as a schematic 
simplification of the inner-working and the shape of a more complicated 
macroeconomic system. As he notes, modelling is an art which requires a set of 
scientific procedures (see Klein (1969, 1983)). Klein (1993) further notes that a large, 
detailed and complicated macroeconometric system is necessary for interpreting 
complex economic behaviours and issues. According to Pesaran and Smith (1985), 
modelling provides explanations of some particular set of variables in concern as a 
result of a clear understanding of the links behind them. Hendry (2001) views a 
macroeconometric model as a system of inter-linked macroeconomic equations which 
are estimated from time series data.  
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  Based on the above views, a macroeconometric model can be defined as a set 
of stochastic equations and definitional and institutional relationships representing the 
behaviours of economic agents, thus of the whole economy. Behavioural relationships 
can be empirically quantified by econometric techniques. The resulting model could 
be used to evaluate the economic structure (or theory), to examine the impact of 
certain policy changes (such as fiscal and monetary) and other disturbances (such as 
terms of trade, supply-side shocks, demand-side shocks), and to forecast the future 
values of variables concerned.54  
The nature, the structure and the size of a macroeconometric model depend 
particularly on the interest of the model builder, the purpose of its construction and 
information, financial and time constraints available to the researcher. Pesaran and 
Smith (1985) note that any macroeconometric model should constitute three basic 
characteristics; relevance, consistency and adequacy. Relevance implies that the 
model should be well-suited to the purpose for which it is designed. The model must 
be consistent with existing theory and the inner-working of the system that it 
describes. Adequacy usually involves better within-sample and/or out-of-sample 
predictive performance. However, a model must be especially designed to achieve a 
particular goal (Garratt et al. (2006)). For example, a model designed to evaluate the 
existing economic theory may not perform well in economic policy evaluation or 
forecasting. Theory evaluation model requires a sound theoretical background whilst 
policy evaluation and forecasting purposes require a model with greater predictive 
                                                 
54 Nonetheless, a model is just an approximation of a system that a researcher is willing to explain. To 
quote Lawrence R. Klein, the foremost developer of large-scale macroeconometric models (see Hoover 
(1995, p. 3)), “A model by nature is only an approximation of reality. Therefore, we shall never have 
the definitive system. With much more data, more thinking about the functioning of the economy, and 
improved statistical methods we should be able to come close to reality”(Klein (1993, p.56)). 
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 accuracy and within-sample close tracking performance (see Wallis (1993), Hendry 
and Mizon (2000a), Hendry and Clements (2003)).55 The size of a model is mainly 
determined by the main objective of the model. In a small model theoretical 
consistency can be maintained and therefore such a model is good in theoretical 
evaluation. But, a too small model is not appropriate for policy evaluation and impact 
analysis as it lacks many interlinks that could transmit the effect of a policy change or 
a shock throughout the economy. Typically refinements towards one goal can often be 
achieved at the cost of another.             
Though macroeconometric modelling kicked off in the late 1930s, it owed 
largely to the early developments in economic theory and empirical literature. Bodkin, 
Klein and Marwash (1991) note four important such early contributions: (i) General 
equilibrium models developed by Walras and Pareto; (ii) Mathematical models of 
business cycles developed in the early 1930s; (iii) Economic structure proposed by 
Keynes (1936); and (iv) Empirical verifications of the Keynesian structure in the late 
1930s. Though (i) and (ii) contributed significantly towards a need for empirical 
counterparts for economic parameters, it was the publication of Keynes’ The General 
Theory which gave birth to macroeconometric modelling. Concepts of consumption, 
investment, money demand, money-wage and prices with supporting identities 
provided a structure for the economy. At the onset, macroeconometric models were 
designed to implement this Keynesian system with many endogenously and 
exogenously determined variables. It is often viewed that the advances in the 
Keynesian theory in the late 1930s and 1940s and improvements in national income 
                                                 
55 As Pandit (2000) notes, models without clear theoretical bases are, however, worth less because 
results of such models can hardly be interpreted. 
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 accounting and input-output tables had a profound influence on macroeconometric 
modelling (Klein (1993)).  
In 1950s, model building for policy evaluation and forecasting was a leading 
economic research project.56 Enormous individual and team efforts laid on it yielded a 
large number of divergent (small or large scale) models. The Klein interwar model, 
the Klein-Goldberger model, the Wharton model, the Data Resource Inc. model, are 
few examples of such early models for the U.S. economy (see Bodkin, Klein and 
Marwash (1991), Intriligator, Bodkin and Hsiao (1996)). During this period, 
macroeconometric modelling was popular in other developed countries such as the 
U.K., Canada and the European countries and in some developing countries too.57 
There was a strong consensus regarding the general paradigm of economic decision 
rules (Klein (1969), Challen and Hagger (1983)). Models built in this line were 
routinely used for policy analysis and forecasting.   
The first critique on macroeconometric modelling was made by Keynes (1939) 
commenting on the Jan Tinbergen’s the League of Nations model for the U.S. 
economy. Keynes believed that Tinbergen’s attempts to verify the structural 
parameters as a system would lead to misleading outcomes. He, therefore, commented 
that Tinbergen was largely wasting his time or practicing statistical alchemy (see also 
Klein (1951), Hendry (1980) Bodkin, Klein and Marwah (1991)). Some admit that 
issues raised by Keynes (1939) are quite applicable to even modern-day empirical 
                                                 
56 Jan Tinbergen built the first ever macroeconometric model for the Dutch economy. In 1937, he 
developed the League of Nations model for the U.S. economy (see Bodkin, Klein and Marwah (1986,  
1991), Barten (1991), Intriligator, Bodkin and Hsiao (1996)). The main research agenda of the Cowles 
Commission in 1950s was to develop Tinbergen-type models for the U.S. economy (see Klein (1993)). 
 
57 In 1956, N.V.A. Narasimham (with Jan Tinbergen) developed the first macroeconometric model for 
a developing country (India). This soon followed by another two models for India by K. Krishnamurty 




 econometrics (see Patinkin (1976), Hendry (1980, 2000a)). According to Hendry 
(1980, 2000a), Keynes’ worries pointed to issues such as  omitted variable bias, 
estimating with unobserved variables (involving expectations), measurement errors 
and incorrect data filtering, co-linearity and simultaneity, misspecification of dynamic 
reaction functions, inclusion of lags and the lag length, predicting inaccurately with 
non-constant parameters and failing to relate economic theory to econometrics.  
Though macroeconometric modelling was not deterred by the Keynes’ critique, 
it faced with further criticisms in the late 1960s and 1970s. There were many 
reservations regarding the lack of solid theoretical underpinnings for Keynesian 
structural equations. In particular, ad hoc treatment of sticky prices and the inclusion 
of lagged variables and deterministic time trend in behavioural equations were often 
questioned. Second, with the advent of rational expectations, the naïve nature of 
expectations in the Keynesian structure was severely criticized (see Sargent and 
Wallace (1975)). As Bodkin, Klein and Marwah (1991) note, the Lucas critique has 
done the most serious damage to macroeconometric modelling. Lucas (1976) argued 
that if policy change is anticipated, it would have no real effect on the economy as 
agents change their reaction parameters when the policy is implemented.58 The Lucas 
critique maintains that the coefficients of a macroeconometric model will change 
when there is a change in the policy rule because agents are fully aware of it. Thus, 
the use of large-scale simultaneous equation models and their impulse response 
functions for policy changes are inappropriate. If expectations are rational, the Lucas 
critique is not applicable as agents form decision in a dynamic optimization 
                                                 
58 The critique in Lucas’ terminology is as follows: “[G]iven that the structure of an econometric model 
consists of optimal decision rules of economic agents, and that optimal decision rules vary 
systematically with changes in the structure of series relevant to the decision maker, it follows that any 
change in policy will systematically alter the structure of econometric models.” (Lucas (1976, p. 41)). 
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 framework.59 Though the theoretical reputability of the Lucas critique is indisputable, 
many find very little evidence supporting the empirical relevance of the Lucas critique 
(see for example Fischer (1983), Hendry (2000b), Evans and Ramsey (2004)). In an 
extensive survey on empirical relevance of the Lucas critique, Erricsson and Irons 
reckon that the Lucas critique as a “possibility theorem, not an existence theorem” 
(Erricson and Irons (1995, p.301)). One testable implication of the Lucas critique is 
the invariance of estimated parameters which implies the super-exogeneity of the 
policy variable (see for example Hendry (1995)). Thus, testing stability of estimated 
parameters should be a natural diagnostic test for the reliability of estimated equations 
in the face of possible policy changes (Li (2004)). Abeysinghe and Choy (2007, 
forthcoming) demonstrate a simple framework that remedies the issue of changing 
parameters. As they document, quite often changing parameters result from 
misspecification of the model. Thus, test for regression misspecification is another 
way to address the Lucas critique. Doan, Litterman and Sims (1984) argue that policy 
changes are like the drawings of residuals under a given policy rule. If the change in 
the policy is small, the Lucas critique amounts at most to small non-linearities in 
variables. These non-linearities can be easily addressed in a Bayesian vector 
autoregression (BVAR), in which forecasts are conditional on future paths of 
variables, accommodating time-varying coefficients (see also Sims (1986)). Hendry 
(2000b) argues that rational expectations are not robust in the face of unanticipated 
deterministic shifts. Estrella and Fuhrer (1999) show that models with forward-
looking behaviour are less stable than models with backward-looking behaviours.   
                                                 
59 A brief discussion on this approach is given later in a separate paragraph. 
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 Macroeconometric models came under stern attacks because of their poor 
predictive performance in 1970s too. In particular, they failed to predict the 
simultaneous presence of high inflation and unemployment which contradicts the 
inflation-unemployment trade-off embedded in the Keynesian structure. Recently, 
Clements and Hendry (1996, 1998, 1999) and Hendry and Clements (2003) propose 
deterministic shifts (in means or slopes) in variables as the major source of forecast 
failure in macroeconometric models. Stock and Watson (1996) also documented the 
pervasiveness of structural changes in macroeconomic models that are used for policy 
evaluation and forecasting. Sims (1982) interpreted large predictive errors as large 
random shocks to the equations, not mainly as the effects of parameter changes. 
Further, Hendry and Mizon (2000a, 2000b) admit that structural breaks can lead to 
misleading policy advice as they often lead parameters to change. If a break 
influences dynamic reaction parameters, it would yield false impulse responses. One 
could argue that macroeconometric models failed in policy evaluation and forecasting 
in 1970s and 1980s not solely because of weaknesses in their structure but because of 
some external factors such as deterministic and/or non-deterministic structural shifts. 
Some candidate examples for structural breaks in 1970s and 1980s are the devaluation 
of the U.S. dollar, introduction of floating exchange rate system, resulting capital 
transaction between countries, oil price shocks and the slowdown of economic growth 
and high unemployment.  
For neoclassical economists, the traditional Keynesian demand-driven 
structure cannot explain business cycle fluctuations well because it lacks proper 
mechanisms to incorporate supply-side fluctuations. The failure to incorporate supply-
side shocks such as oil price hikes and technological shocks led macroeconometric 
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 models to be inappropriate in 1970s. Neoclassical economists believe that the 
economy is in a dynamic stochastic nature where representative agents form decisions 
optimally and rationally under given preferences and technologies (see Lucas and 
Prescott (1971), Lucas (1972), Prescott (1986)). The Lucas critique is no longer valid 
in such a dynamic optimization framework in theory too. Kydland and Prescott (1982) 
used dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models to show that a 
neoclassical model driven purely by real technology shocks could explain business 
cycle fluctuations well. Later work extended the approach to allow for various market 
imperfections. The followings are few such extensions: sticky wages and monetary 
shocks (see for example Bordo et al. (2000)), credit market frictions (Bernanke and 
Gertler (1989), Carlstorm and Fuerst (1997), Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999)), 
non-monetary factors such as government consumption, trade unions and antitrust 
policy shocks (Cole and Ohanian (1999, 2004), Prescott (1999)), time-varying wedges 
on productivity, labour and investment taxes, and government consumption (Chari, 
Kehoe, and McGrattan (2006)). These DSGE models which often involved in non-
linear quadratic forms were not empirically estimated but often calibrated (Kydland 
and Prescott (1996)). Parameters of the simulated model are chosen based on 
statistical properties of variables or steady-state values or by appealing to previous 
empirical estimates. However, DSGE models that used linear-quadratic preferences 
with linear production technology are akin to VAR models subject to restrictions 
arising from theory. 60  As Hansen and Sargent (1980) note, maximum likelihood 
methods provide powerful tools for solving and analysing linear-quadratic models and 
forecasting with them. There are also arguments that shrinkage, which refers to the 
                                                 
60 See Kydland and Prescott (1995) for a detailed discussion.  
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 coaxing parameter estimates towards prior mean, emerges as a main estimation 
technique for linear-quadratic DSGE models (see Doan, Litterman, and Sims (1984)). 
One apparent drawback of DSGE models is that their highly stylized nature and 
irrelevance to empirical data. As Mankiw (1989) notes, the nature of preferences and 
production technology, clearing markets, perfect competition, dynamic optimization 
behaviour are quite far from reality. It is also revealed that aggregate functions may 
not be structural with respect to policy interventions. This has the meaning that DSGE 
models may not fully overcome the Lucas critique (see Diebold (1998)). Calibration 
method also does not provide a reasonable assessment between the model and the 
empirical data (see Sims (1996)). For Klein (1993) DSGE models are less data 
intensive than macroeconometric models and rely more on priori judgements about 
parameter values.      
As an alternative to large-scale system equation models, some researchers 
focused on non-structural modelling (see for example Sargent and Sim (1977)).61 Box 
and Jenkins (1976) showed that simple linear difference equations with moving 
average components, called ARMA or ARIMA models, as a convenient and powerful 
framework for modelling economic time series. These non-structural models were 
initially used for forecasting. Since univariate ARMA model forecasts are 
unconditional they do not fall into the Lucas critique. Subsequently, these ARMA 
models are extended to policy or impact analysis in the names of intervention analysis 
and transfer function analysis (see Enders (2004)). Thus, the emergence of non-
structural econometric modelling also had a role in making macroeconometric models 
                                                 
61 It is important to note that much of NBER (National Bureau of Economic Research) research 
projects in 1970s and 1980s were focused on the development of univariate time series models for 
forecasting and other purposes (see Klein (1993)). 
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 hopeless in 1970s (Diebold (1995)). 62  However, the dearth of cross-variable 
relationship in ARMA models is a major macroeconomic concern. Klein (1993, 2002) 
noted that ARMA forecasts are reliable in the short-run (up to 3-6 months) because of 
inherent serial correlation in data. But they do not accurate in the long-run.63  
Since ARMA models are inappropriate for impact analyses and conditional 
forecasting, Sims (1980) by extending ARMA models to multivariate case introduced 
a new modelling approach known as vector autoregressive (VAR) models as an 
alternative to structural macroeconometric models. This follows the Sims’ (1980) 
critique on the identification of the short-term dynamics of behavioural relations. To 
address the endogeneity issue, Sims treated all variables in the system as endogenous. 
A set of equations is estimated simultaneously treating each variable as a function of 
its own lags and lags of other variables. 64  The use of VAR models is greatly 
supported by the fact that either exact or approximate solutions of many DSGE 
models comes in the form of a restricted VAR models (see Hansen and Sargent 
(1980), King, Plosser, and Rebelo (1988)). By construction, VAR models captures 
interlinks and dynamics of the system quite well.65 The derivation of structural VAR 
in which each variable depends on its own lags and contemporaneous and lags of 
other variables from restricted VAR in which each variable depends only on its own 
                                                 
62 See Diebold and Lopez (1995) for a discussion on non-structural econometric modelling. 
 
63 See Klein (2002) for a discussion on issues in prediction by different models.  
 
64  Canova (1995), however, notes that from the perspective of identification, VARs are not 
dramatically different from system-equation macroeconometric models. When the model includes non-
stationary variables, the estimation procedure of VARs renders several concerns. Box-Jenkins 
procedure (ARMA modeling) requires variables to be stationary. However, Sims (1980) and Sims, 
Stock and Watson (1990) argue against estimating VAR models in first (or in higher order) differenced 
form of I(1) (or higher order integrated) variables. Their argument is that differencing may result in 
loss of information concerning the long-term comovements of variables. Engle and Granger (1987) 
suggest writing the model in a vector error correction form and use two-step least square (2SLS) 
procedure to estimate the parameters of interest.  
 
65 See Canova (1995) for an excellent exposition of VAR models.  
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 lags and lags of other variables, however, raise several concerns. Restricted VAR 
models are often criticized on the lack of economic content for lagged variables. The 
selection of ordering for innovation accounting is generally ad hoc. Unless the 
structural VAR is identified from the reduced from, the innovations in Choleski 
decomposition do not have direct meaning (see Enders (2004, p. 291)). This 
procedure is very complex if the number of variables in the system becomes large. 
Sims (1986) and Bernanke (1986) propose that modelling of innovations should be 
done by appealing to economic theory. An alternative approach to obtain the 
structural form is to use long-run restrictions on impulse response functions to exactly 
identify structural innovations (see Blanchard and Quah (1989)). Thus, it seems that 
the lack of theoretical support for the specification of VAR models doubts their 
results on policy simulation and forecasts.      
Following the neoclassical critiques and in the face of weaknesses in DSGE 
models, macroeconometric modellers tend to modify the Keynesian structure. Supply 
factors are incorporated into the model structure (see for example Klein (1983), 
Challen and Hagger (1983), Ball and Holly (1991)). Rational expectations are 
incorporated (often, through model consistent expectations) into the model structure 
and rigorous tests on goodness-of-fit and forecast performances are conducted. 66  
Stochastic equations are designed by appealing closely to theory. Many models 
developed in the last two decades encompass these views of macroeconomics and 
advances in econometric methods (see for examples, Fair (1984, 1994), McKibbin 
and Sachs (1991), Taylor (1993), Wallis (1993), Powel and Murphy (1995), Crowder, 
Hofmann, and Rasche (1999), Garratt et al. (2003, 2006)). These new Keynesian and 
                                                 
66  Hendry (2000) argues against the use of model consistent expectations to allow for rational 
expectations. This procedure will lead to several misspecification issues in estimated models. 
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 neoclassical ideological mixture models are found performing well even in modern-
day analyses (see Valadkhani (2003)).  
An alternative modelling approach, which is originally developed at the 
London School of Economics, 67  suggests modelling endogenous behavioural 
equations using general-to-specific modelling strategy.68 The essence of this approach 
is the recognition that potentially valuable information for the analysis of any 
economic problem can come from numerous sources. Prior to the estimation, this 
methodology concerns largely on underlying economic theory, available sample 
observations on the potentially relevant variables, knowledge of the economic history 
of the period under study, and knowledge of the way in which the observed data are 
defined, measured and their relationship to theory variables (see Mizon (1995)).  In 
the estimation, error-correction models (ECMs) are set for behavioural equations with 
long-run equilibrium solutions. I(1) (or higher order integrated) variables those do not 
have long-run equilibrium solutions are estimated in first (or relevant higher order) 
differenced form. Since all the model variables are stationary, this modelling 
approach does not fall into the issue of simultaneity bias. The approach recommends 
extensive tests on the model relevance and robustness. As per this methodology, a 
model which adequately describes historical data, encompasses previous findings, 
derives from well based theories and passes rigorous tests for model robustness could 
                                                 
67 Thus, this approach coins the name ‘LSE methodology’. Mizon (1995) provides a detailed discussion 
on the LSE methodology, its early contributors, and recent developments and extensions. Since 
contributions and extensions to this methodology have subsequently been made by econometricians 
who are not link to or no longer in the LSE, many suggest a name change (see for example Pagan 
(1992), Gilbert (1986), Erriccson, Campos, and Tran (1990)).  
  
68 See Hendry and Doornik (2001) for a discussion on general-to-specific modelling.  
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 be used for policy analysis and for forecasting with greater accuracy (Hendry 
(2000)).69  
As many issues that macroeconometric models encountered in 1970s and 
1980s were solved by the advances in both economic and econometric theory and the 
advances in empirical econometric techniques, macroeconometric modelling re-
emerged during the past two decades. Again, there is a greater enthusiasm for the use 
of small or large scale macroeconometric models for the evaluation of various policy 
changes and impact of disturbances, and for the purpose of forecasting. Klein’s 
observation on macroeconometric models is as follows: “Among the many 
approaches to economic forecasting, policy analysis and cyclical analysis, 
macroeconometric modelling stands out as the most accurate and insightful” (Klein 
(1993, p. 73)). This is because macroeconometric models are highly data intensive, 
enable modelling the short-term dynamics around the long-term equilibrium paths of 
variables, and allow for extensive tests on the relevance and the robustness of 
estimated equations.       
 
4.2.2 Macroeconometric Models for Sri Lanka 
In a broader framework, the models built for Sri Lanka may be spilt into two 
main categories: macroeconometric models and computable general equilibrium 
models (CGEMs).70 Nonetheless, we ignore CGEMs in this discussion because they 
                                                 
69 Garratt et al. (2006) also discuss various alternative modelling approaches of macroeconometric 
models.  
70 In Fernandez and Cooray (1999) (eds.) Quantitative Tools in Economic Planning: Applications and 
Issues in Asia, Perera (1999), Siripala (1999), and Thenuwara (1999), discuss a number of models built 
for Sri Lanka since independence. See also Dasanayake (2000) for a list of existing macroeconometric 
models for Sri Lanka. 
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 are not the focus of this study.71 Many existing macroeconometric models for Sri 
Lanka are very much unknown to the public and not maintained or not used regularly 
for the purposes of policy analysis and forecasting. In this section, we discuss some 
specific features of few models that are publicly available and used for policy 
evaluation and forecasting. 
The first ever large-scale macroeconometric model for Sri Lanka was 
developed by Karunasena (1986). In this model, Karunasena has placed more 
emphasis on the supply-side of the economy by modelling output of main sectors and 
sub-sectors. In particular, the determination of the agricultural output has received 
more attention. The model also emphasizes fiscal and balance of payments constraints. 
Fiscal operations are connected to other sectors through taxes, subsidies, transfers, 
domestic debt, foreign debt and government investment. Monetary sector is 
represented only by money supply. Money demand is ignored assuming an 
underdeveloped money market. The model contains 89 endogenous variables of 
which 35 are behavioural. There are 82 exogenous variables of which 40 are policy 
variables. The model is estimated by OLS and 2SLS methods on annual data for the 
period 1950-1980. The estimated model was used to conduct policy experiments such 
as changes in government expenditure on food subsidies, capital goods and social 
services, changes in foreign grants and loans and changes in rain fall. It is reckoned 
that the model’s treatment to the demand-side of the economy is rather limited.   
Athukorala and Huynh (1987, pp. 133-167) used a medium-scale 
macroeconometric model to analyze the impact of export instability on the stability 
and growth performance of the Sri Lankan economy. They hypothesize that effects of 
                                                 
71 A discussion on the CGEMs for Sri Lanka can also be found in Dasanayake (2000). 
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 export instability transmit to the domestic economy through variables such as imports, 
investment, consumption and government revenue and expenditure. The size and the 
magnitude of the impact depend on the interdependence of these variables. The model 
consists of 26 equations of which 12 are behavioural. Estimated behavioural variables 
fall into categories of output, investment, consumption, imports, taxes, money supply 
and prices. The model was estimated by OLS and 2SLS methods on annual data for 
the period 1959-1977. The most important implication of the model is that export 
instability impinges on the short-term stability of the economy and retards the 
economic growth. 
Wijesinghe (1989) designed a model to examine the monetary implications of 
external shocks and the effectiveness of alternative monetary policy measures. The 
model assigns a key role to money and highlights the link between money supply, 
expenditure, inflation and the balance of payments. The transmission mechanism of 
external shocks works through money market disequilibrium to major macroeconomic 
variables. The model is small comprising only four behavioural equations for 
expenditure, inflation, imports and exports. Output, balance of payments and money 
supply are given by identities. The period covered by this model is from 1974 to 1982. 
The model was estimated by OLS and 2SLS methods using generated quarterly data. 
Jayamaha (1989) also built a small model to examine the impact of monetary policy 
instruments using generated quarterly data. This is the first model designed on the 
data for the post-liberalization period.72 The sample period runs from 1977 to 1985. 
The model consists of eight behavioural equations and six identities. The model was 
                                                 
72 Modelling this period separately is important as the structure and policies of the economy have 
changed dramatically. From 1977, the economy evolves from relatively closed, regulated, government 
dominated economy to free, open, market forces dominated one. As a result, many macroeconomic 
variables may encounter deterministic shifts or structural breaks in late 1970s or early 1980s.  
Therefore, policy simulation experiments should treat this period separately for better results.    
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 estimated by 2SLS method and was simulated to assess the impacts of various 
monetary policy measures on the macroeconomy.  
Colombage (1992) constructed a model for Sri Lanka that links to the models 
of other South Asian countries. In the model, he includes three blocks for expenditure, 
international trade and fiscal and monetary sections. Expenditure block consists of 
both private and government consumption and investment. International block 
includes imports, exports and the balance of payments. Fiscal and monetary block 
comprises money market and budgetary operations. The model consists of 16 
behavioural equations and 11 identities and was estimated by OLS method on annual 
data for the period of 1960 to 1986. Model simulation results were used to identify the 
impacts of trade linkage with other South Asian countries.  
The model constructed by Perera (1994) is the largest model built so far for 
the Sri Lankan economy. It contains 147 endogenous variables of which 75 are 
modeled with behavioural equations. In a highly disaggregated framework, the model 
gives much emphasis to the supply-side, especially to the agricultural sector. The 
government sector is disaggregated in order to identify linkages between government 
revenue and other sectors of the economy. External trade and monetary sectors were 
modelled to link with the rest of the economy through various channels. The model 
was estimated by OLS and 2SLS on annual data for the period from 1960 to 1989. It 
has been used to evaluate impact of various policy changes and shocks.   
Another large-scale model has been built by Rankaduwa, Rao, and Ogwang 
(1995). This model is especially designed to conquer the shortcomings of 
Karunasena’s model because the latter is the only model that authors were aware at 
the time of constructing their model. Rankaduwa and others attempt to model both 
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 supply-side and demand-side specification in their model. The model consists of 
output, consumption, investment, government, external, monetary sectors and prices. 
There are 60 endogenous variables of which 43 are behavioural equations. The model 
is used to evaluate the effects of monetary policy changes, external shocks, interest 
rate and exchange rate policies in Sri Lanka.   
Cooray (1996) has developed another large-scale model for Sri Lanka. The 
model incorporates both supply-side constraints and demand-side constraints of the 
economy. It contains 68 behavioural equations and 64 identities. The model was 
estimated for the period 1970-90 on annual data by OLS method. One prominent 
feature of the model, as Cooray (1996) notes, is the endogenous population and 
employment. He modelled birth and death rates as functions of per-capita income. 
The population is also given an endogenous treatment. Employment is modeled in a 
disaggregated framework. Estate-sector employment is regressed on land area under 
cultivation. Employment in other agricultural sectors, industry and service sectors are 
taken as functions of value added of these sectors.73 In addition, Cooray introduced a 
mini model for the world tea market in order to reckon the impacts of changes in 
world tea market on the Sri Lankan economy. The model is simulated to evaluate the 
impact of exchange rate depreciation, increase in government capital expenditure and 
pricing policy. Effects of increases in world demand for tea, increases in world 
income and reduction in world supply of tea on the economy were also evaluated. 
There are many shortcomings in these existing models. One important 
drawback is the lack of production technology of domestic goods and export goods. 
                                                 
73 Cooray (1996), however, did not provide details of employment data. It is important to note that 
consistent labour force data (even at aggregate level) are unavailable until 1990. Further, Cooray note 
that employment decisions are irresponsive to the real wage rate. 
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 These models often estimate output on its components, prices and cost variables, and 
on less relevant variables such as rain, land area and investment. The lack of proper 
production function perhaps impedes important supply-side fluctuations arisen 
through investment decisions, labour market conditions and technological changes.  
These models do not pay much attention to the importance of the capital stock and 
labour market conditions. In these models, less attention was given to modelling 
labour market behaviours such as labour demand, unemployment and money wages.74 
Moreover, existing models fail to relate the goods market disequilibrium into prices. 
In the developing country context where a greater degree of market imperfection 
exists, goods and labour markets do not immediately clear and the resulting 
disequilibria feed mainly into prices and wages. Market imperfections prevail as a 
result of government involvements, imperfect competition and trade union behaviours. 
However, no attempt was made to incorporate these phenomena in existing models. 
Further in many existing models specifications of stochastic equations were loosely 
linked to economic theory. Another fact is that models estimated on both pre and post 
economic liberalization samples may encounter the issue of changing parameters as 
the structure and functions of the economy has changed significantly since 1977 
policy changes. Therefore, it is important to develop a model that based only on data 
of the modern Sri Lankan economy to understand and evaluate contemporaneous 
economic policies and other economic issues. The following section presents a new 
macroeconometric model that incorporates most of vital characteristics of the 
economy of Sri Lanka.   
 
                                                 
74 Cooray (1996) has made an attempt to model labour market partially.  
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4.3 The Sri Lanka Model (SLM) 
4.3.1 Salient Features of the SLM 
The new model that we have designed for Sri Lanka (the SLM) shares the 
important features of Keynesian and neoclassical views of economic fluctuations. 
Keynesian features are given by the demand-side of the economy with short-term 
characteristics such as sticky wages and disequilibria in labour and goods markets. 
We allow for neoclassical views of economic fluctuations by incorporating price 
determination, output and labour market decisions into the model. We follow single 
equations ECM modelling approach as it allows short-term dynamics of variables 
around the long-term trend. 75  The estimation methodology assures the use of all 
potential information on stochastic equations and a greater degree of parameter 
stability. The estimated equations are then combined to conduct policy simulation 
experiments. For the ease of operation, the model is kept medium in size. It contains 
15 stochastic equations and nine identities. There are 42 variables (including time 
trend) of which 24 are endogenous and 18 are exogenous.  
The salient features of the SLM are the following. 
1. The economy produces two goods, a domestic good (Y) and an exported good 
(Ex) and consumes two goods, Y and an imported good, Im.  
2. Financial market consists of two assets, money (M1) and interest bearing 
government bonds (B). The bond market is, however, eliminated by Walras’ 
law.  
                                                 
75 See Section 4.2.1 for a discussion on this modeling approach. 
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 3. Assets returns (interest rates) have no role in consumption, investment and 
money market decisions in the model.76     
4. As prices play a vital role in a macroeconometric model, the price block is 
modelled extensively. In the SLM, price of consumer goods, price of domestic 
goods, price of intermediate goods and price of export goods are modelled 
endogenously. Price of import goods and price of foreign goods that compete 
with Sri Lanka’s exports (foreign export price) are exogenous.  
5. We assume that agents in the goods markets have rational expectations of future 
prices. This allows for the conditional expectations of the inflation rate to be a 
random variable which depends on the current information set. Expectations 
of inflation rate are, then, given in a fully-model consistent framework.  
6.  Since our main objective is to examine the impact of alternative deficit 
reduction measures, fiscal sector has been given an extensive treatment. Total 
revenue of the government is modelled as a stochastic equation while revenue 
from income taxation is given by an identity. Though total government 
expenditure is spilt into five components, only interest payment spending is 
modelled endogenously. We impose that the government faces a borrowing 
constraint. This borrowing constraint allows the government to finance its 
deficits in three ways; issuing bonds, printing money or using foreign grants. 
Thus, fiscal deficit and bond financing of deficit are also endogenous.      
                                                 
76 One reason for interest rates to be irrelevant is the highly institutionally pegged nature of nominal 
interest rates. Since the Central Bank of Sri Lanka determines the nominal interest rates, agents’ 
expectations on them may be static. The irrelevance of interest rates is discussed in Section 4.3.4. 
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 7.  We incorporate labour market impact on the economy by modelling demand 
for labour (L), the unemployment rate (U) and nominal wages (W). Labour 
market disequilibrium, U, feeds into W through consumer prices.  
8.  External sector is incorporated by modelling current account transactions of the 
balance of payments. Demand for and supply of exports and demand for 
imports are modelled endogenously.   
9.   The production of Y depends on two factors, capital (K) and labour (L) and on 
technical change. Production technology is assumed Cobb-Douglas with 
constant returns to scale. This assumption is supported by empirical data as the 
labour (thus capital) share of income is relatively stable over time.  
10. We close the model by connecting market disequilibrium or excess demand 
(the difference between YE (aggregate domestic expenditure) and Y (GDP)) to 
the price of domestic goods.   
 
4.3.2 Statistical Properties 
The specification of the long-run and the short-run stochastic equations is 
closely linked to the conventional macroeconomic theory. Stochastic equations are 
designed to have theoretically more suitable framework with better predictive power 
over the historical data. However, the institutional features of developing countries 
may differ from those of developed countries. For instance, money demand function 
may have features of credit rationing and other capital market imperfections. 
Nevertheless, we do not consider incorporating these features of stochastic equations 
at this stage because of limitations to access such data.77  
                                                 
77 The model is expected to revise in future when we get access to more data. 
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 Following general-to-specific modelling methodology (see Hendry and 
Doornik (2001)), we obtain the best fit model by estimating single equations (in 
natural logarithm) in an ECM framework and first differenced form by OLS.78 The 
ECM allows us to examine short-term dynamics of the model around its long-run 
equilibrium conditions. This modelling approach allows all important information on 
stochastic equations. It also provides better policy evaluation outcomes as the 
estimated parameter values are highly stable over time. The use of ECM framework 
requires relevant variables to be cointegrated. Thus, variables involved should be non-
stationary [integrated of order one (I(1)) or of higher order]. Non cointegrating 
relationships of non-stationary variables are estimated in first differenced form to 
avoid issues of spurious regression. The only exceptions are the export supply 
(inverse) function and interest payments equation which are estimated as partial 
adjustment mechanisms. In these two cases, we proceed with the estimation method 
so long as the partial adjustment coefficient is significantly less than unity. As given 
in Table 4.2 all variables in stochastic equations except fiscal deficit, relative price of 
imports and excess demand are non-stationary. A unit root in log levels cannot be 
rejected at the 5% and the 1% levels of significance. Further, all of these non-
stationary variables are found to be I(1) as a unit root in first differenced series is 
clearly rejected. Thus, variables in the ECM format and the first differenced form are 
stationary and their estimation by OLS does not render any statistical issues.   
The long-run solution of each stochastic equation is obtained from a dynamic 
specification which includes current and lagged values of dependent and independent 
                                                                                                                                            
 
78 A discussion of this modeling approach, which is known as the LSE methodology, can be found in 
Section 4.2.1.  
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 variables. We examine the cointegration of I(1) variables by the ECM unit root test 
(see Banerjee et al. (1998)) and the ADF tests on the residuals computed using long-
run coefficients. If necessary, we add dummy variables to capture outlying effects. 
The effect of the long-run constant term is restricted in the error correction term.79 It 
should be noted that reported standard errors of estimated coefficients (thus t and F 
tests statistics) of cointegrating equations have standard distributions. As Pesaran and 
Shin (1998) note, t and F test statistics in a dynamic regression that include non-
stationary variables have standard t and F distributions (see Footnote 25 in Page 34).  
 
The estimated equations are subjected to a battery of tests for model selection, 
predictive power, parameter constancy, out-of-sample tracking performance and other 
diagnostic tests. The goodness of fit of the model is examined by R2 value and the 
plot of actual and fitted values. The best fit model should capture the turning points of 
the dependent variable well. Diagnostic tests are conducted for serial autocorrelation 
(AR F test), conditional heteroscedasticity (ARCH F test), normal errors (Normality 
Chi2 test), heteroscedasticity (hetero F test) and regression specification (RESET F 
test). We strictly require the model to pass all these diagnostic tests. R2 value and the 












                                                 




Definitions of Model Variables 
        Notation Description 
BF Deficit financed by government bonds to domestic and foreign private sector 
CG Government consumption spending on goods and services 
CP  Private consumption expenditure (Private sector spending on locally  
             produced goods and services and imported goods and non-factor services) 
CU Currency in circulation (a component of M1)  
DD Demand deposit (a component of M1) 
ED Excess demand (Gross domestic expenditure less GDP at market prices) 
ER Nominal effective exchange rate 
Ex Total export (Value of exports of goods and non-factor services) 
FD Fiscal deficit (Total government expenditure less total government revenue) 
I  Total investment, gross domestic capital formation, less of changes in total  
stocks 
IG Government investment less of changes in government stocks 
Im Total Imports (Value of imports of goods and non-factor services) 
IP Private-sector investment less of changes in private sector stocks 
IPG  Government interest payment expenditure 
IT Government revenue from taxes on income 
K Capital stock 
L Labour demand (Number of persons employed)  
MF Deficit financed by issuing currency (seignorage), the change in CU  
M1 Money (Narrow money stock) 
NFIA Net factor income from abroad 
OF Amount of fiscal deficit financed by foreign grants 
OG Government expenditure on debt repayment, capital and other transfers to  
government institutions and economic restructuring expenditures 
Pc Consumer prices (Colombo Consumers’ Price Index) 
Pex Export prices in domestic currency (Export Price Index) 
Pex,w World export prices in U.S. dollars (World Export Price Index) 
Pint Prices of intermediate goods (Wholesale price index of intermediate goods) 
Pim Import prices in domestic currency (Import Price Index) 
Py Price of domestic good (Implicit GDP deflator) 
SD  Statistical discrepancy 
T Total tax revenue  
TG Government transfer payments to households 
TF Transfers (net) from citizens working abroad and/or foreigners to domestic  
private sector 
U Unemployment rate 
W Money wage rate (Wage rate index numbers for workers in Wages Boards  
Trades. This is a combined wage index for workers in agriculture, industry  
and commerce and services) 
Y GDP at market prices (Value of domestic goods)  
YE Expenditure on GDP (Aggregate expenditure) 
YD Private-sector disposable income 
YNE Expenditure on gross national product 
Yw Trade-weighted world income for Sri Lanka in U.S. dollars α  Income tax revenue over total revenue (IT/T) 
τ  Average tax rate (T/Y) 




ADF Unit Root Test on Variables in Stochastic Equations(a) 
Variable                                    ADF Test                 First                 ADF Test 
Description                                 Levels           Statistic(b)           Differenced          Statistic(c)  
Private Consumption  logCP          -0.619  ∆logCP  -2.687** 
Private Disposable Income logYD          -1.238  ∆logYD -4.320**(d)
Private Investment  logIP          -1.915  ∆logIP  -3.638** 
Government Revenue   logT          -0.665  ∆logT   -3.201** 
GDP    logY          -1.080  ∆logY  -4.234**(d)
Average tax rate  τ          -2.386  ∆τ  -4.466** 
Govt. Interest Expenditure logIPG          -2.492  ∆logIPG -3.330** 
Fiscal Deficit   FD          -3.814**   ---    ---  
Exports    logEx          -1.186  ∆logEx  -3.627** 
Export Prices        logPex          -0.267  ∆logPex  -2.737** 
Intermediate Prices          logPint            -1.006  ∆logPint  -2.349*  
Capital Stock   logK           -2.218  ∆logK  -2.981*(d) 
Imports    logIm           -0.873  ∆logIm  -3.431** 
Relative Price of Imports  log(Pim/Py)     -5.647**   ---    --- 
Money Demand  logM1          -1.898  ∆logM1 -4.461** 
Gross National Spending logYNE         -2.002  ∆logYNE -3.017** 
Money Wages     logW          -1.618  ∆logW  -2.323* 
Consumer Prices   logPc           -2.104  ∆logPc  -2.023* 
Output Per-Worker  log(Y/L)        -1.872  ∆log(Y/L) -2.820** 
Real Wage Rate  log(W/Py)      -1.618  ∆log(W/Py) -5.045** 
Labour Demand  logL            0.998  ∆logL  -3.575** 
Unemployment Rate  U           -2.023  ∆U  -3.154** 
Govt. Consumption   logCG            -1.415  ∆logCG -3.691** 
Import Prices       logPim            -0.445  ∆logPim  -2.706** 
GDP Deflator   logPy           -2.415  ∆logPy  -3.741**(d) 
Excess Demand   ED           -4.642**   ---    --- 
Capital Per-Worker  log(K/L)         -2.447  ∆log(K/L) -2.668** 
Gross Domestic Spending logYE            -2.076  ∆logYE -2.657** 
Trade-weighted World Income logYw             0.405  ∆logYw  -3.691** 
World Export Prices (SLRs) log(e.Pex,w)       0.048  ∆log(e.Pex,w) -3.498** 
Notes: (a) Sample period is from 1978 to 2004. * and ** denote the rejection of a unit root at the 5% 
and 1% level of significance respectively. (b) ADF test includes a constant term in the regression. ADF 
critical values are -2.97 at the 5% level and -3.70 at the 1% level of significance. (c) ADF test does not 
include a constant term in the regression. Respective ADF critical values are -1.96 at the 5% level and -
2.66 at the 1% level of significance. (d) A constant term is included in the regression. Thus, relevant 
critical values are those given in (b).     
  
 
For its relevance in the use of policy and impact analyses, the model should 
reasonably predict the future values of the dependent variables. The model’s out-of-
sample tracking performance is examined by forecasting for the years 2001-2004 
based on estimates from 1979-2000 period. All the estimated equations show a quite 
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 impressive out-of-sample forecast performance. With better predictive performance, 
what is important next for better simulation results is the stability of estimated 
coefficients. As explained in Section 4.2.1, the constancy of estimated parameters is 
necessary to avoid the Lucas critique. The plot of recursive estimates is used to 
examine the constancy of estimated parameters. Further, since the parameter 
instability could arise due to specification errors, we test each estimated equation for 
regression misspecification by RESET F test.  
 
4.3.3 Sample Period, Data and Variables 
The model is built on annual data for the period 1978-2004. We specially 
select this period to avoid possible structural breaks due to policy changes occurred 
since 1977. The long-run relationships of stochastic equations are obtained for the 
period 1978-2004 while their short-term relationship is estimated for the period 1979-
2004. 
The model involves 42 domestic and foreign variables. Table 4.1 gives 
variable description. Data for all variables in the SLM except for foreign export prices, 
foreign income and exchange rates are from the annual reports of the Central Bank of 
Sri Lanka. Data for world export price index, income and exchange rates (respective 
domestic currency to U.S. dollar) of 15 major trade-partners of Sri Lanka are from the 
International Financial Statistics Yearbook and the CD-ROM of the IMF.  
We constructed data for capital stock, employment, the unemployment rate, 
nominal effective exchange rate and a trade-weighted world income variable. Capital 
stock is constructed using the perpetual inventory accumulation method for the period 
1966 to 2004. Ten starting data points are, then, discarded to eliminate bias arising 
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 through the initial condition. As noted earlier, consistent and continuous data for 
employment and unemployment are available only from 1990. Thus, we interpolate 
data for employment and the unemployment rate for the period 1978-1989 based on 
the parameter estimates from 1990-2004 period. Using exchange rates and trade 
statistics of 15 major trading partners of Sri Lanka, we construct a nominal effective 
exchange rate and a trade-weighted world income variable.80    
  
4.3.4 Stochastic Equations 
The SLM contains 15 stochastic equations. These stochastic equations 
describe the behaviour of private consumption, private investment, tax revenue, 
interest payment expenditure, money demand, export demand, export supply, import 
demand, labour demand, the unemployment rate, money wage, price of intermediate 
goods, price of domestic good, price of consumer goods and the production of 
domestic good. Details of specification (equation number starting with F) and the 




Private consumption expenditure (CP), in general, is the largest component of 
aggregate expenditure. Following the literature, we assume CP as a function of 
                                                 
80 See Appendix IV for details on the construction of data for capital stock, labour demand, the 
unemployment rate, nominal effective exchange rate and trade-weighted world income for Sri Lanka. 
 
81 Notations F and S are used to refer “functional form” and estimated “stochastic” equation.  
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 disposable income (YD) and private sector financial wealth (FW).82 FW is the sum of 
M1 money component and government bonds held by the domestic private sector. 
However, we found that the wealth effect is insignificant in the long-term 
consumption function. The inclusion of FW also leads to a significant drop in the 
income elasticity of consumption. This suggests that YD and FW variables may be 
highly collinear. Therefore, we dropped FW from the consumption function. The CP 
function, then, takes the following form;  
)( tt YDfCP =                                                                                            (F-4.1) 
where > 0 as high income results in high consumption.1f
83  The cointegrating 
relationship is obtained by a dynamic equation which involves current and one period 
lagged values of variables. We accounted for a discrete jump in CP in 1985. The fit of 
the dynamic consumption function is impressive (R2 = 0.997). The ADF test statistic 
of the long-run coefficient based residuals (-4.703) and ECM unit root test (-3.871) 
suggest that CP cointegrates with YD. The resulting long-run solution is given as 
follows: 
85402.0log872.0773.0log DYDCP tt ++= .                                                    
               (0.65)    (7.09)       (1.17)          
 
The estimated long-run income elasticity of consumption is approximately one. 
A restricted null hypothesis which set the income elasticity of consumption to unity 
cannot be rejected. The constant term turns out to be insignificant suggesting that 
autonomous consumption is zero in the long-run. In the ECM, we controlled for 
outlying effects in 1979, 1985 and 1997. The estimated ECM is given as follows: 
                                                 
82 See Leong (2001), Byrne and Davis (2003) and Pesaran (2003) for recent works on the consumption 
function. 
 
83 Here f1 refers to the first derivative of the function with respect to the first argument.  
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85060.079067.0log128.1138.0log DDYDCP tt ++Δ+=Δ       
          (2.94)    (8.10)            (4.98)         (4.44) 
            
       1177.097031.0 −−− tECD  .                                                     (S-4.1)     
          (-2.30)         (-3.28) 
 
R2                         0.882                Normality Chi2(2)     0.734{0.693} 
AR 1-2  F(2,18) 0.012{0.998}    hetero test F(7,12)       0.312{0.935} 
ARCH 1-1 F(1,18)      0.234{0.634}     RESET  F(1,19)          1.184{0.290}   
 
 
ECt-1 term in (S-4.1) is the error correction term. The short-run income 
elasticity of consumption too has the expected sign and is statistically significant. One 
percent increase in YD leads to an equal amount of increase in CP. Since a null 
hypothesis of parameter value equals to unity cannot be rejected for both the 
coefficients, income elasticity of consumption in the long-run and in the short-run are 
almost the same. The coefficient of the ECt-1 suggests a very slow adjustment to the 
equilibrium errors in consumption. The autonomous consumption is positive and 
significant in the short-run. This is quite meaningful as agents may have a positive 
level of consumption in the short-run even if their income level is zero.  
 
Private Investment 
The other important component of the aggregate demand is private investment 
(IP). Total private fixed investment includes investment in machinery and equipment 
and building and other constructions. Fixed investment involves in the production of 
capital goods that are used for the production of goods and services in the current 
period and future periods. Investment is, therefore, a dynamic process or a flow which 
adds to the capital stock (K). We incorporate the accelerator effect and the interest 
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 rate effect on private investment decisions. 84  However, preliminary estimation 
suggests that the interest rate effect is insignificant in the short-run and in the long-run 
investment equations. We found that the nominal interest rate (three months Treasure 
Bill rate in our case) is almost constant with few spikes in the most of the sample 
period though it is time varying at the end of the sample. The reason for relatively 
constant nominal interest rates is that they are highly institutionally pegged. Since the 
Central Bank of Sri Lanka determines the nominal interest rates, agents’ expectations 
on them seem to be static. For this reason agents’ decisions to invest does not depend 
on interest rate effects. Large foreign investment, which are not responsive to the 
domestic interest rate but for profit margins, could also be a reason for the interest 
insensitivity of investment decision in Sri Lanka. On the other hand, as the economy 
is in a transition period where the capital stock is relatively small investment 
decisions are made primary on the growth performance of the economy. This suggests 
that the private business’s investment decisions in Sri Lanka are primarily driven by 
the acceleration effect: high output leads to high investment. Thus, we define IP 
function as follows:  
)( tt YfIP =                                                                                                (F-4.2) 
where , the acceleration effect, is expected to be positive. The long-run static 
solution is obtained by a dynamic investment equation that includes current and two 
period lagged values. The ECM and ADF unit root test statistics (-4.577 and -3.211) 
1f
                                                 
84 The accelerator model of investment is given by )( 11 −− −=−= ttttt YYKKI α where K is capital 
stock and Y is output. A point that is often subjected to heavy criticisms in this model is the assumption 
of full adjustment of K to its desired level. Thus, a partial adjustment accelerator model defines 
investment in the following form: 11 )1()1( −− −+−−= tttt IYYI λαλδαλ . That is, investment is 
determined by the level of current and lagged output and lagged investment. 
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 reveal that (F-4.2) is a cointegrating relationship. The estimated static solution is as 
follows: 
tt YIP log163.1689.3log +−= .                                                                        
               (-3.34)    (10.3) 
             
From the above result, it is clear that there is a one-to-one positive relationship 
between IP and Y in the long-run. Investment increases by the same percentage point 
that output increases. We relate short-term fluctuations of private investment to past 
changes in output. This is quite meaningful as firms’ decision on current level of 
investment is based on output changes in the previous period. Further, we account for 
an outlier in 2001 where the economy experienced an unexpected negative shock. The 
resulting ECM takes the following form:  
 
 11 394.001372.0log608.3289.1log −− −−Δ+−=Δ ttt ECDYIP                 (S-4.2)                         
                       (-3.74)    (4.16)                (-4.02)          (-3.62)              
  
R2                         0.637                Normality Chi2(2)     1.351{0.509} 
AR 1-2  F(2,20) 0.693{0.512}    hetero test F(11,6)       0.627{0.682} 
ARCH 1-1 F(1,20)     1.195{0.287}      RESET  F(1,17)          0.861{0.364}   
 
 
The fit of the ECM is good as R2 is significantly high. From actual and fitted 
data plot (not reported), it is observed that the estimated model captures the turning 
points of the growth rate of investment. Estimated ECM passes all the diagnostic tests. 
In (S-4.2), one percent increase in Y raises the growth rate of IP by 3.6 percent. The 
short-term income elasticity of investment is nearly 3 times higher than that of the 
long-term. This might be due to large short-term fluctuations in investment. The 
sample period involves massive investment boom and recession periods. Though IP 
and Y are trending over time, they do not follow very closely in the long-run (see 
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 panels (a) and (b) of Figure 4.1). But, as given in panels (c) and (d) of Figure 4.1, 
growth rate of IP closely follows the growth rate of Y. Thus, short-run income 
elasticity of investment exceeds that of the long-run. As is given by the error 
correction coefficient, 0.4 percent of any one percent deviation from the equilibrium 
level of investment adjust in a year.   
 
    



















       Figure 4.1: Time Series of Private Investment and Output, 1978-2004 
       (Y axis values are in millions of Sri Lanka rupees)  
           
 
Government Revenue  
Though government revenue consists of taxes and non-tax revenue, we do not 
take them explicitly in the SLM. Total revenue of government is denoted by T. In 
economic theory, the specification of tax function is straight-forward. With 
adequately specified tax rates and base variables, relationships between tax income, 
tax rate and base variables become identities (Davis (1976)). However, the lack of 
required information hampers modelling tax function as an identity. One way to 
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 model the stochastic behaviour of T is to specify it as a function of the tax base, 
(see Evans (1970)). A variant of this approach uses the tax rate in addition 
to the tax base. That is, 
)( tt YfT =
),( ttt YfT τ=  where tτ  is tax rate. Though the appropriate tax 
rate is marginal tax rate, the average or the weighted average tax rate is used as a 
proxy (see Ball (1973), McKibbin and Sachs (1991), Powel and Murphy (1995)).85  
We specify T as a function of Y and the average tax rate: 
),( ttt YfT τ=                                                                                            (F-4.3) 
where ttt YT /=τ  (the average tax rate) and  (effect on tax base) and  (effect of 
tax rate) are expected to be positive. We use 
1f 2f
tτ  as a proxy for the marginal tax rate. 
Since T, Y and τ  variables are I(1), (F-4.3) needs to be a cointegrating relationship. 
We obtained the static solution by dynamic function of (F-4.3) which includes current 
and one periods lagged values of variables and two outlying effects in 1978 and 1984. 
The fit of the dynamic tax function is very impressive as R2 is almost unity (0.9995). 
The ECM unit root test statistic (= -5.943) and ADF unit root test statistic (-4.119) 
indicates the cointegration of T and Y, τ variables. The long-run tax equation is given 
as follows: 
84059.078234.0978.4log970.0396.2log DDYT ttt −−++−= τ . 
   (-14.9)    (7.70)               (26.2)       (-5.00)         (-2.90) 
 
In the long-run, one per cent increase in Y leads to an equal increase in T. 
Further, a higher tax rate brings more revenues to the government. In the ECM, we 
                                                 
85 Another approach of modelling taxes is known as institutional approach. The name is coined from 
the required greater knowledge on institutional information such as tax rates, tax bases, tax levies and 




 include dummy variables for years 1980, 1984 and 1985. The estimated ECM is given 
as follows: 
 
84031.080150.0831.4log984.0110.1log DDYT ttt −+Δ+Δ+−=Δ τ  
      (-11.5)    (17.4)         (7.08)    (2.52)          (-5.18) 
 
      1464.085012.0 −−− tECD .                                                      (S-4.3) 
         (-2.34)         (-11.6) 
   
R2                         0.998                Normality Chi^2(2)    2.844{0.241} 
AR 1-2  F(2,17) 0.395{0.679}    hetero test F(9,9)         0.430{0.888} 
ARCH 1-1 F(1,17)     0.003{0.957}      RESET  F(1,18)          1.158{0.296}  
 
 
The fit of the short-term T function is remarkably good as the model captures 
all the short-term deviations very well. High R2 (0.998) reveals this extremely 
goodness-of-fit. Results reveal that the short-term effect of Y is positive as expected 
and is unity. Long-term and short-term income elasticities of tax revenue are identical. 
Further, positive effects of tax rate on tax revenue are the same in the long-run and the 
short-run. Adjustment of short-term deviations of tax revenue to long-term 
equilibrium is moderate as adjustment coefficient is approximately 0.5.    
 
Government Interest Payments 
As explained earlier, total government expenditure is divided into five 
components. They are consumption (CG), investment (IG), transfer payments to 
households (TG), interest payments on existing debt (IPG) and other expenditures 
(OG). OG includes debt repayments, transfer payments to government institutions, 
capital transfers (loan to government institutions, etc.) and restructuring expenditures. 
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 In 2004, of total government expenditure, CG, IG, TG, IPG and OG accounted for 32, 
9, 17, 24 and 18 percent respectively. 
Of the above components, only IPG is determined by the model. The 
endogeneity of IPG is obvious as it depends on government debt stock which is a 
function of past fiscal deficits (FD).86  Given the endogeneity of FD, IPG is also 
determined by the system. To ignore the endogeneity of IPG leads to incorrect policy 
advice as the model lacks many links of FD and IPG to other sectors of the economy. 
We assume that current IPG depends on past FD: Debt accumulation, as a result of 
past deficits, leads to higher IPG at present. Therefore, IPG can be written as a 
function of distributed lags of FD:   
)( itt FDfIPG −=                                                                                        (F-4.4) 
where i =1, 2, … and the cumulative effect of FD on IPG is expected positive. In the 
estimation, we limit the higher order lags of FD by one period lag of IPG. Therefore, 
(F-4.4) is estimated as a partial adjustment equation. Since IPG is an I(1) process and 
FD is an I(0) process, deterministic time trend is included to capture the trend in IPG 
which corresponds to the trend in debt series. Two outlying effects in years 1980 and 
2004 are also incorporated into the model. The estimated equation is given as follows: 
 
80196.0020.0log152.0250.1log 1 DTrendFDIPG tt −++= −  
       (2.06)   (2.49)           (2.96)          (-1.98) 
        
                   )log(591.004160.0 1−+− tIPGD                                              (S-4.4) 
                       (-2.34)         (5.84) 
 
R2                         0.982                Normality Chi^2(2)    1.929{0.381} 
AR 1-2  F(2,19) 0.913{0.418}    hetero test F(8,12)       0.686{0.698} 
ARCH 1-1 F(1,19)      0.569{0.460}     RESET  F(1,20)          2.280{0.148}  
                                                 
86 Some studies, however, attempted to give an endogenous treatment to all expenditure components of 




The fit of (S-4.4) is quite impressive. Estimated equation passes all the 
diagnostic tests too. Current IPG is high if FD is large in the previous period. As 
expected, IPG is positively trending over time. As is given by the partial adjustment 
coefficient, 0.6 percent of the previous period IPG carries over to the current period. 
Equation (S-4.4) allows FD to fall in response to cuts in any components of 
government expenditure. The effect is, however, expected to decay geometrically in 
subsequent years.     
 
Export Demand and Supply Functions 
Modelling export demand and supply functions is problematic as there is no 
distinction between data on export demand and export supply. If the specification is 
an export supply function, it depends on domestic factors such as capacity to produce, 
export prices and prices of domestic goods. Whereas export demand function depends 
on price of exports, prices of competitive goods and the level of foreign income. In 
practice, many researchers prefer to estimate an export demand equation as data for 
such function are readily available. However, as Klein (1960) noted, if the exporting 
country is a price taker (a small open economy) in the world market, the country is 
facing an infinitely elastic demand curve when the market is perfectly competitive. 
Therefore, estimating an export supply function is theoretically more meaningful than 
estimating an export demand function.  
Because of the theoretical and empirical inconsistency in modelling the export 
sector, Goldstein and Khan (1978) estimate both export demand and supply equations 
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 simultaneously. They estimate an export demand equation and an inverse export 
supply equation. A decade later reversing the process, Riedel (1988) estimates an 
inverse export demand equation and an export supply equation. Subsequently a large 
volume of research papers emerged on the issue over the last two decades.87 Given 
this lack of empirical consensus, some argue that estimation of an export function in 
which both demand and supply factors involved is meaningful for a small open 
economy. Kapur (1983) has noted that both demand and supply factors are important 
in modelling exports of a small open economy. Using dynamic optimization 
behaviour of firms with certain specific assumptions on the production of exportable 
goods, Abeysinghe and Choy (2005) derived exports as a function of both demand 
and supply factors. Their specification takes the following form: 
)/,/,,( exrwexywt PPPPKYfEx =  
where Yw is world income, K is capital stock which stands for production capacity, PPy 
is price of domestic good, PexP  is price of exports and PPrw is price of raw materials. 
Both relative price variables, price of domestic goods relative to price of exports and 
price of raw materials relative to price of exports, stand for costs of exports. It is 
expected that  (foreign income effect), (impact of capital stock) to be positive and 
relative price effects ,  to be negative. The above specification fits well 
Singapore’s export data. 
1f 2f
3f 4f
In the SLM, a preliminary attempt was made to estimate an export function for 
Sri Lanka. Given that PPy is positively linearly dependent on price of intermediate 
goods (PintP ), we use only one relative price variable, (PPy/PexP
                                                
). We estimate a dynamic 
model which includes current and one period lagged values and two year dummies for 
 
87 See, Abeysinghe and Choy (2005) for a detailed discussion and references. 
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 1988 and 1989. The ECM unit root test (= - 4.522) and ADF unit root test (-3.675) 
indicate the cointegration of variables. Estimated coefficients on Yw and K have 
expected signs and are significantly different from zero. However, the relative price 
effect turns out to be positive. Though (PPy/PexP ) is replaced by (PPint/PexP ) there is no 
change in the above outcome. Adding PPy and PexP
                                                
 variables separately does not yield a 
meaningful result either. The relative price effect is insignificant in the short-term 
export function too. The result is rather discouraging as it does not provide any 
theoretical or empirical meaning. It may be a result of meagreness of our price 
variables as costs of exports. Since the domestic market is closed for most of 
exportable goods (such as garments) of BOI industries and foreign price is always 
higher than the domestic price (for agricultural exports), decisions to export may not 
be closely linked to these domestic prices.  
Since the estimation of an export function is quite tricky, following Goldstein 
and Khan (1978) we estimate both demand for and supply of export functions. First, 
we define the export demand function as follows: 
),,( , wwexext YPERPfEx ⋅=                                                                       (F-4.5) 
where ER is nominal effective exchange rate (NEER) and  is world average 
export prices.
wexP ,
88   In (F-4.5),  (own price effect) is negative and  (effect of 
competitive prices),  (world income effect) are positive. A dynamic function of (F-
4.5) is estimated with current and one period lagged variables. The fit of the dynamic 
model is impressive as R
1f 2f
3f
2 is 0.985. The ECM and ADF unit root test statistics suggest 
that (F-4.5) is a cointegrating relationship. The long-run cointegraing solution takes 
the following form: 
 









, ++−=  .         
    (3.70)   (-0.32)              (0.05)                           (1.96) 
 
Though both the price variables have correct signs, t-test statistic rules out 
their significance. The result may render doubts on perfectly inelastic long-term 
export demand function. However, the joint significance F test confirms the 
significance of exP  and )( ,wexPER ⋅  variables too.89  
Though and  are decisive factors in the long-term demand for 
exports, they have virtually no role in the short-run demand for exports. It is quite 
meaningful for world income variable to be insignificant in the short-term export 
demand. The insignificance of 
wY )( ,wexPER ⋅
)( ,wexPER ⋅ may be due to its less relevance as a 
competitive price. Thus, we dropped both variables from the ECM. With outlying 
effects in 1984 and 1990, the ECM of export demand takes the following form: 
 
 
90193.084113.0log463.0673.0log DDPEx extt ++Δ−=Δ .         
       (2.61)    (-5.41)            (2.63)        (4.56) 
           
                                                                                             (S-4.5) 1114.0 −− tEC
                       (-2.30) 
 
R2                         0.745                Normality Chi^2(2)    5.241{0.073} 
AR 1-2  F(2,19) 1.645{0.219}    hetero test F(6,14)       0.393{0.871} 
ARCH 1-1 F(1,19)      0.013{0.909}     RESET  F(1,19)          1.529{0.230}   
 
 
The above ECM captures the short-term dynamics of export demand quite 
well. R2 value is 0.75. Estimated equation passes all the diagnostic tests. Changes in 
                                                 
89 F test statistic (with probability in parenthesis) for each variable is given below; exP  is 5.030(0.017); 
 is 4.066(0.033). )( ,wexPER ⋅
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 exP has a significant impact on export demand in the short-run too. The estimated EC 
term suggests a very slow speed of adjustment of export demand for any equilibrium 
error.  
Second, we specify the export supply function as follows: 
),,( int tt
ex
tt KPPfEx =                                                                              (F-4.6a) 
where  and  are expected to be positive and  is expected to be negative. We 
use  as a cost variable of export supply. Given the data issue discussed earlier, we 
define an inverse function of export supply as, 
1f 3f 2f
intP
 ),,( int ttt
ex
t KPExP ς=                                                                              (F-4.6b) 
where 1ς , 02 >ς  and 03 <ς . The long-run solution to (F-4.6b) is obtained by a 
dynamic equation that involves current and one period lagged values. For better 
predictive performance, K is replaced by KΔ . Further, we account for two outliers in 
1984 and 2000. The dynamic equation fit historical data pretty well (R2 is 0.997) and 
passes all the diagnostic tests. The ECM unit root test statistic (-4.21) and ADF unit 
root test statistic (-3.319) suggest that (F-3.6b) is cointegrated. The long-run 




int Δ−++−=  
    (-0.96)    (0.93)               (2.44)                (-1.93)             
 
      00431.084835.0 DD ++ .                                                              
                      (2.50)         (1.81) 
 
Estimated long-run solution constitutes expected signs for all explanatory 
variables. Though Ex  is insignificant by the t test, the F test confirms the significance 
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int Δ−Δ+Δ−−=Δ  
         (-1.72)    (-4.45)               (3.56)                  (-1.97)   
              
                     1173.000108.084231.0 −−Δ+Δ+ tECDD    .                                
            (4.87)            (2.67)            (-2.09) 
 
 
The fit of the ECM of the inverse export supply function is impressive.  
Variables intP  and KΔ  have expected signs and are significant in the short-run 
equation too. Surprisingly the short-term relationship between and Ex turned out 
to be negative notwithstanding their long-term positive relationship. This could be due 
to the dominance the demand effect on export prices in the short-run. The result raises 
serious concerns on the estimation of a short-term export supply function. Also we 
found that the reduced forms of export supply and demand functions fail to recover 
their expected structural forms. 
exP
Because of the above difficulties in estimating an ECM, the inverse export 
supply function is specified as a partial adjustment mechanism. As Turnovsky (1977) 
pointed out, exports/imports take time to adjust to their desired level because of 
delayed response to changes in demand since exports/imports are bound by contracts 
extending over a period of time and non-proximity of markets. To accommodate 
delayed response, one period lagged PPex is included on the r.h.s. of (F-4.6b). Both 
and K variables are replaced by their first differences as they predict Pex intP P
                                                
quite well. 
 
90  The F test statistic values for , Ex intP  and KΔ (with probability values in parenthesis) are 
22.41(0.000), 6.456(0.008) and 3.198(0.066) respectively.  
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 Four dummy variables are also included in the partial adjustment equation for outliers 
in 1983, 1984, 1990 and 2000. The partial adjustment inverse export supply function 
is given as follows: 
 
83269.0log299.3log993.0log449.0548.2log int DKPExP ttt
ex
t +Δ−Δ++−=  
      (-1.85)   (2.14)               (4.05)                  (-4.50)               (2.85)   
                     
                 extPDDD 1log733.000219.090213.084286.0 −++−+    .          (S-4.6) 
         (3.05)          (-2.29)         (2.43)          (7.27) 
 
R2                         0.993                Normality Chi^2(2)    2.059{0.357} 
AR 1-2  F(2,16) 0.538{0.594}    hetero test F(12,5)       0.224{0.984} 
ARCH 1-1 F(1,16)      0.055{0.817}     RESET  F(1,17)          1.001{0.331}  
 
The model passes all the diagnostic tests. Estimated coefficients have the 
expected signs and are significant.  The coefficient on the lagged PP
                                                
ex is well short of 
unit value. Recursive plots show that the estimated coefficients are highly stable over 
time.  
 
Import Demand  
 Imports account for about 57 percent of total trade in Sri Lanka. Of total 
imports, 53 percent are intermediate goods, 24 percent are investment goods and 17 
percent are consumption goods.91 Import of goods and services, therefore, mainly 
links to consumption, investment, production and prices of the economy. Thus, the 
effect of changing international economic conditions, mainly prices, easily and 
rapidly transmits to the domestic economy through import demand equation.    
 
91 These figures are as of trade statistics in the year 2000. 
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 As theory of demand suggests, level of income of the importing country and 
the relative price (price of imports relative to domestic substitutes) are the major 
determinants of imports (Im). It is assumed that the level of domestic Y is positively 
related to Im.92 The relative price variable captures the degree of price sensitivity of 
Im.93 In place of relative price variable, the real effective exchange rate is used to 
represent the price effect.94 In this model, we define Im as a function of disposable 




ttt PPYDf=                                                                              (F-4.7)         
where  (income effect) and 01 >f 02 <f  (relative price effect). The ADF unit root 
test reveals that Im and YD are I(1) but  is I(0). Therefore, Im and YD could 
be cointegrated. The cointegration between Im and YD is obtained by a dynamic 
equation with two lags and one dummy variable for 1981. Dynamic Im equation fits 
data well (R
)/( yim PP
2 = 0.972) and passes all the diagnostic tests. Unit root test statistics 
indicate the cointegration of (F-4.7). The long-run static solution takes the form: 
81694.0log890.0047.0Imlog DYDtt −+−= .                           
      (-0.04)    (7.40)         (-2.66)              
 
As expected the income elasticity of Im is positive and insignificantly different from 
unity. With , the estimated ECM is given as follows: )/( yim PP
 
 
                                                 
92 See for examples Houthakker and Magee (1969), Goldstein and Khan (1982), Reinhart (1995). 
 
93 For recent works, see Senhadji (1998), Catao and Falcetti (1999). 
 
94 Many studies use other variables such as real interest rate as a measure of cost of imports, amount of 
foreign reserves as a proxy for quantitative restrictions (see Turnovsky (1977)). 
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 81212.0)/log(195.0log554.1038.0Imlog DPPYD yt
im
ttt −−Δ+−=Δ           
         (-0.94)   (2.36)             (-2.10)                        (-3.40) 
 
                    1323.092101.088145.0 −−+− tECDD    .                             (S-4.7) 
  (-2.45)         (1.72)         (-2.56) 
 
R2                         0.700                Normality Chi2(2)     1.223{0.543} 
AR 1-2  F(2,17) 1.191{0.328}    hetero test F(9,9)         0.232{0.980} 
ARCH 1-1 F(1,17)      0.009{0.925}     RESET  F(1,18)          2.283{0.148}  
 
 
The ECM explains over 70 percent of short-term deviations of Im. The plot of actual 
and fitted values also illustrates the goodness-of-fit of the model. Estimated equation 
passes all the diagnostic test statistics. The coefficient on income growth suggests that 
one percent increase in growth of domestic YD leads to 1.55 percent rise in imports. A 
null hypothesis that restricts the parameter value to unity cannot be, however, rejected 
(t=0.84). Estimated relative price coefficient also has the expected sign and is 
significant. The speed of adjustment of equilibrium errors is relatively slow.   
 
Money Demand 
 We modelled the monetary sector by estimating demand equation for narrow 
money (M1). The demand for real M1 is specified as a function of gross national 
expenditure (YNE) and short-term nominal interest (3 months Treasury bill) rate. 
Money demand driven by transaction and precautionary motives is assumed 
proportional to the level of real income of individuals. Speculative demand for money 
is inversely related to the rate of interest which is the opportunity cost of holding 
money. However, in a variant of specifications, the short-term nominal interest rate 
effect turned out to be insignificant in demand for money. Interest insensitivity of 
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 money demand might be due to static expectations on interest rates as they are 
institutionally pegged. Thus, in the SLM people hold money just for transaction 
motives. We define demand for real money as a function of real gross national 
expenditure (YNE); 
)(1 tt YNEfM =                                                                                        (F-4.8) 
where  (income effect of money demand) is expected to be positive.1f
95  Since 1M  
and YNE are I(1) variables, (F-4.8) needs to be a cointegrating relationship. We derive 
this cointegrating relationship by a dynamic specification of (F-4.8) which includes 
current and one period lagged values of  1M  and YNE and two outliers in 1981 and 
1988. The ADF unit root test statistic (-3.719) and ECM unit root test statistic (-3.275) 
ensures the cointegration between M1 and YNE.  The long-run solution to the dynamic 
M1 equation is given as follows: 
   88292.081423.0log490.0443.21log DDYNEM tt +−+=  .                            
      (3.31)    (6.10)                 (-2.53)        (2.05)  
 
The long-run income elasticity of money demand is about 0.5. The ECM of money 
demand equation is given as follows: 
 
88134.081202.0log576.0107.11log DDYNEM tt +−Δ+=Δ     
                    (3.88)   (3.89)                     (-3.69)         (2.55) 
 
1471.004088.094095.0 −−−+ tECDD .                            (S-4.8) 
   (1.81)           (-1.67)        (-3.89) 
 
 R2                         0.673                Normality Chi2(2)     0.329{0.848} 
AR 1-2  F(2,17) 2.714{0.100}    hetero test F(8,10)       0.350{0.925} 
ARCH 1-1 F(1,17)      0.701{0.414}     RESET  F(1,18)          0.906{0.354}   
 
                                                 
95 See Identity (I-4.1) for the definition of YNE. 
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The ECM explains the short-term deviations of money demand quite well. 
One percent growth in YNE leads to 0.5 percent growth in money demand in the 
short-run too. The speed of adjustment of equilibrium errors is moderately fast as the 
estimated EC coefficient amounts to about 0.5.    
 
Money Wages 
The determination of money wages, W, is better explained by the Phillips 
curve. The Phillips curve suggests an inverse relationship between changes in W and 
the unemployment rate, U (Phillips (1958)). Lipsey (1960) suggests that changes in W 
occur due not only to U but also due to its changes, )( UΔ . However, if W is perfectly 
rigid downwards, there is no relationship between W and U. Friedman (1968) and 
Phelps (1968) state that shifts in the Phillips curve occur in response to expectations 
on future prices. This has led to an expectations augmented Phillips curve. Another 
important determinant of the wage rate (real or nominal) is labour productivity. If 
factors earn their marginal returns, wage rate depends on the productivity of labour: 
Wages are higher the higher is the productivity of labour. In this model, W is specified 
as a function of expected inflation ( eπ ), productivity of labour (Y/L) and U. That is 
                                                                  (F-4.9) )),/(,( 1111 −−−+= tttett ULYfW π
where  is positive (workers bargain for higher money wage when prices are 
expected be high),  is positive (high productivity of labour increases wages) and  
is be negative (wages are lower when U is high).  
1f
2f 3f
In (F-4.9), we invoke rational expectations to set the conditional expectation 
of future inflation rate to its current value. This implies that that the inflation rate 
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 follows a martingale sequence. The solution for the inflation rate is set to be fully-
model consistent. A measure of labour productivity is obtained dividing Y by the 
number of workers, L. One period lagged (Y/L) is included in W equation as current 
wages depends mostly on the productivity in the previous period. Since U constitutes 
a decreasing trend,  is used in the place of  in preliminary regressions. After a 
variant of specifications, we found that 
UΔ 1−tU
UΔ  is insignificant. This may signal perfectly 
downward rigid nominal wages. Thus, UΔ  is dropped from (F-4.9). We account for 
outlying effects in 1981, 1988, 1989 and 2001. Estimated W equation takes the 
following form: 
 
( ) 81088.0/log808.0log736.0006.0log 11 DLYPW ttctt −Δ+Δ+−=Δ −−                             
       (-0.34)    (4.90)                (4.85)                          (-2.47)  
       
       01064.089079.088084.0 DDD −++ .                                  (S-4.9) 
          (2.45)           (2.27)         (-1.86)  
 
R2                         0.791                Normality Chi^2(2)    0.519{0.771} 
AR 1-2  F(2,17) 0.075{0.928}    hetero test F(4,18)       0.378{0.909} 
ARCH 1-1 F(1,17)      0.010{0.921}     RESET  F(1,20)          0.766{0.393}   
 
 
In (S-4.9), one percent increase in the expected inflation rate leads to 0.74 
percent rise in W. If the labour productivity increased by one percent in the previous 
period, it would raises W by about 0.8 percent.  
 
Labour Demand  
The demand for labour (L) is determined by two main factors, Y and real wage 
(W/PPy). Since demand for L is implicitly determined by the production function, 
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 higher Y implies higher L given that K (capital) is fixed. A higher (W/PyP ) relative to 
the cost of capital, on the other hand, leads to low demand for L as firms shift 
production from labour intensive technology to capital intensive one. Labour demand 
function takes the following form: 
)/,( ytttt PWYfL =                                                                                   (F-4.10) 
where , income effect on labour demand, is positive and effect of real wage is 
negative. A dynamic function of demand for L includes current and one period lagged 
variables. This dynamic labour demand function tracks actual data pretty well. The 
ECM unit root test statistic is -3.366 and equilibrium error based ADF test statistic is -
3.945. So, the cointegration of L and Y,  W/P
1f ,2f
y is ensured and it can be given as  
 
80109.0)/log(324.0log477.0919.1log DPWYL ytttt +−+−=                    
    (-5.43)   (14.9)             (-3.22)                     (1.97)      
 
                 84117.082093.0 DD −+ .                                                             
                     (1.92)          (-2.19) 
Estimated long-term income elasticity of labour demand is about 0.5 and is 
significantly different from zero. As expected, a rise in real wages lowers the demand 
for labour: If (W/PPy) rises by one percent, demand for L decreases by 0.32 percent. 
Though (W/P) has a significant impact on the long-term labour demand, it is 
insignificant in the short-run. This result is quite meaningful as firms are unable to 
replace L by K in the short-run. Thus, (W/P) is excluded from the short-term labour 






82059.080045.0log791.0954.0log DDYL tt ++Δ+−=Δ    
      (-3.91)    (3.41)               (2.07)             (2.55)          
         1494.084080.0 −−− tECD .                                                 (S-4.10) 
            (-3.93)            (-3.91) 
   
R2                         0.696                Normality Chi2(2)     0.436{0.804} 
AR 1-2  F(2,18) 1.281{0.301}    hetero test F(7,12)       0.715{0.662} 
ARCH 1-1 F(1,18)      0.001{0.970}     RESET  F(1,19)          1.847{0.190}   
 
 
The short-term income responsiveness of labour demand is higher than that of 
the long-term. A null hypothesis that set the short-term income elasticity to unity 
cannot be rejected (restricted t = -0.90). That is one percent increase in growth of Y 
leads to an equal increase in demand for L. Since K is fixed, firms hire more workers 
to increase the production in the short-run. Estimated coefficient on the EC term 
indicates relatively fast adjustment of equilibrium errors.  
 
The Unemployment Rate  
As per Okun’s law, the unemployment rate, U, is proportional to output 
deviations from the full employment level. That is )( tt YYbaU −+= where is a 
positive constant. If current output rises over its full employment level, U falls. In 
practice, U is often treated as a negative function of the deviations of current output 
over the previous period output. Besides, we treat U as a function of CG (government 
consumption expenditure). CG would arrest the effect of non-productive workforce of 
the government. The functional form of U  is given as follows:  
b
),( CGYfU ΔΔ=                                                                                    (F-4.11) 
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 where  (high output decreases U), 01 <f 01 <f  (high government consumption 
spending decreases U). Given negative local trend in U, I estimate  on and 
. Four dummy variables are included to capture outlying effects in 1980, 1983, 
1984 and 1988. As given in (S-4.11), our model explains changes in U pretty well. As 
expected changes output and government consumption expenditure have negative 




83040.080037.0ln032.0log185.0002.0 DDCGYU ttt +−Δ−Δ−=Δ              
           (0.45)    (-1.90)             (-1.98)               (-4.23)          (5.11) 
 
                                                                         (S-4.11) 88026.084044.0 DD −+
                 (5.78)          (-4.84) 
          
R2                         0.867                Normality Chi2(2)     0.525{0.769} 
AR 1-2  F(2,16) 0.534{0.569}    hetero test F(9,8)         0.193{0.988} 
ARCH 1-1 F(1,16)      0.040{0.844}     RESET  F(1,17)          0.810{0.381} 
 
 
Price of Intermediate Goods  
A large part of intermediate goods used in the production process in Sri Lanka 
are imported goods, such as fuel, fertilizer, chemicals, textiles and related items. 
Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the price of intermediate goods, ,  is 
mainly determined by the price of imported goods, , in the long-run. That is  
intP
imP
)(int imPfP =                                                                                            (F-4.12) 
where . Since  and are I(1) series, they need to cointegrate over time. A 
dynamic equation of (F-4.12) is estimated with current and one period lagged values 
of both variables. Dynamic model fits empirical data well (R
01 >f intP imP
2=0.996) and passes all 
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 the diagnostic tests. Unit root tests ensure the cointegration in (F-4.12). The long-run 
relationship between and is given as follows: intP imP
im
tt PP log819.0085.1log
int +=   .                                                                        
    (7.32)   (24.2)     
 
One percent increase in leads to 0.82 percent increase in . This high 
dependency of 
imP intP
intP on imP indicates the domestic economy’s vulnerability to foreign 
price shocks. The short-term fluctuations of is given by the following ECM: intP
 
95096.094098.0log403.0488.0log int DDPP imtt ++Δ+=Δ  
        (5.34)    (5.70)                (2.34)           (2.21)   
      
                                                                                           (S-4.12) 1466.0 −− tEC
                      (-4.94) 
 
R2                         0.775                Normality Chi2(2)     0.225{0.894} 
AR 1-2  F(2,19) 1.041{0.372}    hetero test F(6,14)       0.254{0.894} 
ARCH 1-1 F(1,19)      0.491{0.492}     RESET  F(1,20)          3.104{0.100}  
 
The ECM explains short-term fluctuations of pretty well. In the short-run, 
one percent rise in leads to 0.4 percent increase in . That is import prices 
largely affect the price of intermediate goods in the long-run than in the short-run. 





Price of Domestic Good    
Generally the price of domestic goods, , is assumed to be a mark-up of costs 
of production such as prices of capital, labour and other inputs. In this setup demand 
variables are not implicitly included in the function of 
yP
yP . Later developments in 
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 mark-up pricing models, however, incorporate aggregate demand variables too. 
Moreover, price inertia due to imperfect information leads to a partial adjustment 
mechanism of . Imperfect information leads to slow adjustment in prices in the 
short-run. They, nevertheless, adjust fully in the long-run. In the SLM, we assume that 
is a mark-up of W and . In a general specification dynamic equation, we found 
that is cointegrated with W and . Nonetheless we do not formulate an ECM but 





y. The specification of PyP  is given as 
follows:   
),,( int ttt
y
t EDWPfP =                                                                              (F-4.13) 
where ED is the excess demand of the economy. In (F-4.13),  (effect of 
intermediate price),  (effect of money wages) and  (effect of excess demand) are 
expected to be positive. A positive coefficient of ED has the meaning that any 
disequilibrium in the goods market adjusts prices until the equilibrium is restored. 
That is, if , it would increase until demand equals supply. As ED is an I(0) 
variable, the growth rate of is estimated on growth rates of and W and on ED. 
The regression includes a dummy variable for an outlying effect in 1985. The 









int +Δ+Δ+=Δ   
       (4.38)   (3.97)                  (2.03)                (1.90)          
 
                                                                                            (S-4.13) 85079.0 D−
                     (-2.93) 
 
R2                         0.716                Normality Chi^2(2)    0.153{0.926} 
AR 1-2  F(2,19) 0.271{0.766}    hetero test F(7,13)       0.882{0.546} 
ARCH 1-1 F(1,19)      0.465{0.503}     RESET  F(1,20)          0.586{0.453}  
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 Estimated equation tracks the actual time path of PPy pretty well. It also passes 
the diagnostic tests. As expected, estimated coefficients have correct signs and are 
significant. Notably any disequilibrium in the goods market feeds into the price level.  
 
Consumer Prices 
Because consumption involves of two goods, Y and Im, consumer prices, , 
is obviously a linear combination of and . That is 
cP
yP imP imyc PPP )1( αα −+=  where 
α is a positive parameter (see Eckstein and Fromm (1968)). Given that yP  depends on 
and, depends on in the model, we specify  as a positive function of 
in the long-run:   




t PfP =                                                                                             (F-4.14) 
where  (effect of domestic price) is positive. The cointegration relationship between 
and  is obtained by a dynamic model that includes current and one period lags 




cP extremely well as R2 is almost one (0.9999). The dynamic model also 
passes the diagnostic test criteria. The ECM unit root test statistic (=-5.196) and ADF 
unit root test statistic (-4.231) ensure the following cointegrating relationship:  
 80085.0log108.1491.0log DPP yt
c
t ++−= .                                                   
   (-20.8)   (216.0)          (3.21) 
 
There is one-to-one positive relationship between  and  in the long-run. Though 
the long-term behaviour of is determined by , its short-term dynamics could be 




 we include one period lagged ∆U to account for the trade-off between inflation and 
the unemployment. The estimated ECM is given as follows: 
 




t +Δ−Δ+−=Δ −  
          (-5.30)   (18.0)               (-1.76)           (4.73)          
    
1667.0 −− tEC                                                                    (S-4.14) 
                                      (-5.56) 
 
R2                         0.963                Normality Chi2(2)     0.976{0.614} 
AR 1-2  F(2,19) 0.366{0.698}    hetero test F(7,13)       0.396{0.888} 
ARCH 1-1 F(1,19)      0.000{0.991}     RESET  F(1,20)          0.582{0.454}  
 
The short-term impact of on is quite similar to its long-term impact. Not 
surprisingly, there is a trade-off between inflation and U (in fact ) in the short-run. 
If increases by one percent at time t-1, it would decrease  by about 0.2 percent. 




UΔ ) directly as is given in (S-4.9), the labour 
market disequilibrium causes W to fall by lowering expected rate of inflation 
. It denies perfectly rigid nominal wages. The speed of adjustment of an 
equilibrium error is fast as the estimated coefficient on the EC term is about 0.7.    
)log( ctPΔ
 
Production of Domestic Good  
We assume that the domestic good, Y is produced by two factors, K and L. The 
production technology is Cobb-Douglas with constant returns to scale. The production 
function takes the following form:   
αα −== 1),( LKLKfY   
where 10 << α . The assumption of Cobb-Douglass technology requires the share of 
labour income (and capital income) should be relatively constant in the sample period.  
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             Figure 4.2:  Labour Income as a % of GDP 
 
  
We examine this in the following way. Because of data unavailability on 
wages in levels, we compute an approximate for labour income as follows: First, we 
obtained per worker wage earnings in the year 1992 by multiplying wage earnings per 
hour (in rupees) by (annual) number of per worker work hours. These data are from 
Yearbook of Labour Statistics, 2002 of International Labour Office. Then, we 
multiply the growth rate of nominal wage index by the 1992 per worker wage 
earnings to obtain per worker wage earnings for the period 1993-2004. Total money 
wage earning is obtained by multiplying per worker wage earning by number of 
employed persons. Then, labour income share is obtained by dividing total nominal 
wage earnings by nominal GDP. Figure 4.2 illustrates labour income share in Sri 
Lanka over the period 1992-2004. It is found that the computed labour share varies 
between 45 and 55 percent during the period 1992-2004. This clearly implies that 
labour income share is relatively constant. 96   Thus, it is reasonable to assume a 
                                                 
96 Another implication is that the labour share of income and capital share of income are almost the 
same. Since Sri Lanka is a labour abundant country and its technology is labour intensive, the labour 
income share should exceed the capital income share. The computed labour income share may be 
underestimated due to issues in data. There may be downward bias in the computed initial per worker 
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 relatively constant labour share (and capital share) in Sri Lanka during the period 
1978-2004. 
Since factor income shares are relatively constant, we estimate the intensive 
form of the production function as it provides more meaningful factor elasticity 
coefficients than the production function in level. Dividing the production function 
through by L and incorporating technological progress (time trend) as an additional 
argument, we write down the intensive form of the production function as  
TrendeLKTrendLKfLY λα)/());/(()/( ==   
where λ  is a parameter. By imposing log linearity in arguments and allowing for a 
random disturbance term, the production function can be written as  
ttt kTrendLKaLY +++= λα )/log()/log(                                          (F-4.15) 
where  is a constant and k is a random error. Since both (Y/L) and (K/L) variables 
are I(1)
a
97, (F-4.15) needs to be a cointegating relationship. The dynamic function of 
(F-4.15) includes current and two period lagged values of (Y/L) and (K/L). The fit of 
the dynamic model is impressive as R2 is 0.994. The ECM unit root statistic (= -5.959) 
and ADF unit root test statistic (-4.124) implies that (Y/L) and (K/L) are cointegrating 
over time. The long-run solution is given as follows: 
TrendLKLY tt 014.0)/log(465.0408.3)/log( ++= .                                  
                     (7.74)    (7.78)                    (6.53) 
 
Results imply that long-term output elasticities of K and L are approximately 
the same. That is an additional K or L unit increases Y by almost the same amount. 
                                                                                                                                            
earning in the year 1992 due to measurement errors in wage earning per hour and number of working 
hours. Total employment does not include persons employed (apart from government employees) in 
some parts of northern Sri Lanka due to difficulties in surveying. 
 
97 See Table 4.1 for ADF test for a unit root in the level and first differenced series.  
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 This estimate is quite consistent with the average of computed labour and capital 
income shares. Per-worker output increases by 0.013 from one year to another due to 
technological progress.  The ECM of the production function takes the following form: 
 
1336.001041.0)/log(564.0052.1)/log( −−−Δ+=Δ ttt ECDLKLY    (S-4.15) 
             (2.25)   (7.52)                       (-2.29)         (-2.23)          
 
R2                         0.729                Normality Chi2(2)     1.005{0.605} 
AR 1-2  F(2,20) 1.023{0.377}    hetero test F(5,16)       1.203{0.344} 
ARCH 1-1 F(1,21)      0.146{0.706}     RESET  F(1,21)          0.269{0.609}  
 
The ECM captures the short-term behaviour of (Y/L) quite well. The short-
term elasticity of K is slightly higher than the long-term elasticity. This might be due 
to data issues. If the long-run elasticity of K is rounded to 0.5, there would be no 
significant difference between long-run and short-run elasticities of K. Estimated 
coefficient on the EC term implies that any deviation from the cointegrating 
relationship adjusts slowly.     
 
4.3.5 Accounting and Definitional Identities 
The model consists of nine identities. They are as follows: 
Expenditure on Gross National Product (YNE) 
NFIAYEYNE +=                                                                                     (I-4.1) 
where YE is expenditure on GDP and NFIA is the net factor income from abroad.  
 
Expenditure on GDP (YE) 
Im−+++= ExICGCPYE                                                                     (I-4.2) 
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 where CP is private consumption, CG is government consumption, I is total 
investment less of changes in stocks, Ex is exports of goods and services and Im is 
imports of goods and services.98  
 
Total Investment (I) 
  IGIPI +=                                                                                                 (I-4.3) 
where IP is private investment excluding changes in private stocks (inventories) and 
IG is government investment excluding changes in government stocks.  
 
Income Tax Revenue (IT) 
TIT α=                                                                                                     (I-4.4) 
where T is total government revenue and TIT /=α . We assume that α is time 
varying and is exogenously given.  
 
Private Sector Disposable Income (YD) 
TFGTITYYD ++−=                                                                              (I-4.5) 
where GT  is government transfer payments to domestic households and TF  is 
transfers (net) from domestic citizens working abroad and/or foreigners to domestic 
households.  
 
Fiscal Deficit (FD) 
 TOGIPGTGIGCGFD −++++= )(                                                    (I-4.6) 
                                                 
98 To comply with national accounting, I include figures given under statistical discrepancy (SD) too on 
the r. h. s. of (I-4.2). The Central Bank of Sri Lanka defines SD as a balancing item between GDP from 
the production approach and GDP from the expenditure approach. 
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 where components in parenthesis sum to total government expenditure. 
 
Bond Financing of Deficit (BF) 
OFMFFDBF −−=                                                                                (I-4.7) 
where BF is the amount financed by issuing new bonds to domestic and foreign 
private sector (bond finance), MF is the amount financed by printing money, and OF 
is the amount financed by foreign grants. And )1(−−= CUCUMF where CU is the 
stock of currency in circulation.  
 
Capital Stock (K) 
The overall capital stock is computed by the perpetual inventory accumulation 
method. Thus, capital stock at time t is given as   
ttt IKK += −1905.0                                                                                     (I-4.8) 
where the rate of depreciation is set to 0.095. 
 
Excess Demand (ED) 
Because data for the intended and unintended inventory accumulation are 
unavailable, we treat all changes in stocks (inventories) as unintended. If that were the 
case, changes in stocks are determined by aggregate demand and aggregate supply 
decisions. Since YE is total expenditure net of changes in stocks, we define the 
difference between YE and Y as a measure of excess demand of the economy:   
)log()log( YYEED −= .                                                                             (I-4.9) 
The market disequilibrium occurs as agents do not fully foresee price changes 
in the goods market. The resulting disequilibrium then affects price level. Therefore, 
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 ED works as a price correcting measure in the domestic good market. And (I-4.9) also 
serves as the model closing relationship in the SLM.  
 
 
4.3.6 Complete List of Model Equations 
(I) Private Consumption 
 
85060.079067.0))(log(128.1138.0))(log( DDYDdCPd +++=  
 
)))1(log(872.0))1((log(177.097031.0 −−−−− YDCPD  
 
 
(II) Private Investment 
 
01372.0)))1((log(608.3289.1))(log( DYdIPd −−+−=  
 
)))1(log(163.1))1((log(394.0 −−−− YIP  
 
 (III) Tax Revenue 
 
84031.080015.0)(831.4))(log(984.0110.1))(log( DDdYdTd ++++−= τ  
 
        ))1(978.4))1(log(976.0))1((log(464.085012.0 −−−−−−− τYTD  
 
 
(IV) Government Interest Payment Expenditure 
 
TrendFDIPG 020.0))1(log(152.0250.1)log( +−+=  
 
        ))1(log(591.004160.080196.0 −+−− IPGDD  
 
(V) Export Demand 
 
90193.084113.0))(log(463.0673.0))(log( DDPdExd ex ++−=  
 
))1(log(132.0))1((log(114.0 −+−− exPEx  
 






 (VI) Export Supply (Inverse) 
 
))(log(299.3))(log(993.0)log(449.0548.2)log( int KdPdExPex −++−=  
 
00219.090213.084286.083269.0 DDDD +−++  
 
))1(log(733.0 −+ exP  
 
 
(VII) Import Demand 
 
88145.081212.0)/log(195.0))(log(554.1(log(Im)) DDPPYDdd yim −−−=  
)))1(log(890.0))1(log(Im(237.092101.0 −−−−+ YDD  
 
(VIII) Money Demand 
 
94095.088134.081202.0))(log(576.0107.1))1(log( DDDYNEdMd ++−+=  
 




(IX) Money Wage Rate 
 
)))1(/)1((log(808.0))(log(736.0006.0))(log( −−++−= LYdPdWd c  
01064.089079.088084.081088.0 DDDD −++−  
 
(X) Labour Demand (Employment) 
81059.080045.0))(log(791.0954.0))(log( DDYdLd +++−=  
 
                   ))1(log(477.0))1((log(494.084080.0 −−−−− YLD  
 
                      )))1(/)1(log(324.0 −−+ yPW  
 
 
(XI) The Unemployment Rate 
 
80037.0))(log(032.0))(log(185.0002.0)( DCGdYdUd −−−=  
            88026.084044.083040.0 DDD −++  
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 (XII) Price of Intermediate Goods 
95096.094098.0))(log(403.0488.0))(log( int DDPdPd im +++=  
 
          )))1(log(819.0))1((log(466.0 int −−−− imPP  
 
 
(XIII) Price of Domestic Good 
 
))(log(174.0))(log(271.0047.0))(log( int WdPdPd y ++=  
 
           85079.0140.0 DED −+  
 
 
(XIV) Price of Consumer Goods 
 
80053.0))1((153.0))(log(091.1327.0))(log( DUdPdPd yc +−−+−=  
 
           )))1(log(108.1))1((log(667.0 −−−− yc PP  
 
 
(XV) Production of Domestic Good 
 
01041.0))/(log(564.0052.1))/(log( DLKdLYd −+=  
                             ))1(/)1(log(465.0)1(/)1((log(301.0 −−−−−− LKLY  
Trend014.0−  
 
(XVI)   Gross National Expenditure           NFIAYEYNE +=     
(XVII)   Gross Domestic Expenditure          SDExICGCPYE +−+++= Im   
              
(XVIII)  Total Investment                             IGIPI +=      
 
(XIV)   Private Disposable Income              TFTGITYYD ++−=    
 
(XX)   Income Tax Revenue                        TIT α=  
     
(XXI)   Fiscal Deficit                                     TOGIPGTGIGCGFD −++++= )(
  
(XXII)   Bond finance of Fiscal Deficit         OFCUCUFDBF −−−−= ))1((  
  
(XXIII) Capital Stock                          IKK +−= )1(905.0  
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(XXIV) Excess Demand                                )log()log( YYEED −=                
 
 
4.4 Transmission Mechanism of the SLM 
 Chart 4.1 presents the detailed flowchart of the SLM. It includes interactions 
among all endogenous and exogenous variables. Exogenous variables are given in 
shaded boxes. For analytical simplicity, we divide the SLM into six main blocks. 
They are as follows: 
(a) Production block. This includes the determination of Y, L and K. 
(b) Expenditure block. This includes YE, its components and YNE. 
(c) Fiscal block. This includes components of G, T, FD and deficit financing. 
(d) Monetary block. This includes demand for and supply of M1 money. 
(e) Price block. This includes the determination of consumer price, price of 
domestic good, price of exports, and price of intermediate goods. 
(f) International trade block. This consists of exports and imports.  
 
In the production block, as the production of Y is a function of K and L, and K 
and L are functions of Y itself, any effort taken to increase Y reinforces as it leads to 
higher K and L. Higher Y directly raises L while it increases K through IP and I. In the 
employment sub-sector U lowers W by decreasing the expected inflation. It will 
results in higher L and thus Y. Production shocks precipitate into the fiscal block 
through T. The effect transmits to the expenditure block through YD, then into the 
monetary block, price block and back again into production, expenditure and fiscal 
blocks. 
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 YE comprises CP, CG, IP, IG, Ex and Im. It also includes figures reported 
under ‘statistical discrepancy’, SD. Any shocks to production, fiscal, price and 
international blocks easily transmit to the economy through the expenditure block. A 
production shock passes on to expenditure block through Y (affecting IP), through YD 
(affecting CP and Im) and through U, W and prices. Higher YE and thus higher YNE 
alters money market conditions increasing demand for money. Further, YE feeds into 
the price block by raising domestic prices if YE increases more than Y.  
In the fiscal block, exogenous government expenditures affect the economy in 
several channels. An increase in IG increases Y by increasing K. It also raises YE and 
thus affects prices and wages. It will increase FD, IPG and BF too. On the other hand, 
a change in CG affects the economy through YE and U. It also affects FD, IPG, and 
BF in many rounds. A change in government transfer payments to private sector (TG) 
affects CP and Im through YD. It also changes FD, thus IPG and BF. Therefore, any 
change in expenditure components has a significant impact on the economy through 
the production sector and through the expenditure sector. However, the extent of the 
impact of each expenditure component is expected to be different as they affect the 
economy through different channels and by different magnitudes. T, on the other hand, 
affects the economy through YD and FD. An increase in T (in fact IT) lowers YD and 
thus lowers CP, Im and YE. The change will affect monetary and price blocks and 
then back into all sectors.  A change in T also alters FD, IPG and BF significantly.  
We now turn to the price block. Price of intermediate goods is determined by 
import prices. It has positive effects on prices of the domestic good and the exported 
good. Any external price shock transmits through the price of intermediate goods. On 
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 the other hand PPy together with U determine PcP . Then, the price effect precipitates into 
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International trade block constitutes only current account transactions of the 
balance of payments. The export volume is determined by supply factors (K, PPex, PintP ) 
and demand factors (Yw and PPex,w). Demand for imports is determined by YD and the 
relative price of imports. As Ex and Im are components of YE, shocks to Ex and Im 
are mainly transmitted to the economy through the expenditure block. However, 
imports have large effects on the economy as PintP  is mainly determined by import 
prices. This has an adverse impact on the production of domestic goods as it in turn 
raises W and lowers L. A rise in import prices thus PPint lowers the supply of exports 
too by weakening the competitiveness of Sri Lanka’s exports in the world market.  
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 In its present set up, the monetary block is the least connected block to the 
other blocks of the SLM. Though money demand depends on the real sector through 
YNE, it does not feedback to the real or nominal sectors. However, this model setup is 
not reasonable with sticky prices in which monetary shocks have real effects. 99  
Money supply, which is exogenous, affects the fiscal block. It lowers the amount of 
fiscal deficits that is expected to finance raising taxes or issuing new bonds to the 
private sector.  
 
4.5 Tracking Performance of the SLM 
We evaluate the tracking performance of the SLM by simulating it in static 
and dynamic forms. Though individual equations fit actual data pretty well, it is quite 
possible for them to perform poorly when all equations are solved simultaneously. To 
begin with, we briefly explain the simulation methods followed. At this stage we 
employ the model only for deterministic simulation rather than stochastic simulation. 
In a deterministic simulation, all equations in the model are solved simultaneously so 
that they hold without any error during the simulation period. Further, all estimated 
coefficients are held fixed and all exogenous variables are held constant. Under this 
solution method, the model generates a single path for each endogenous variable.100 
Simulated results can be compared with actual values of variables to evaluate the 
tracking performance of the model. 
                                                 
99 Therefore, this is a point where the model needs extensive extensions which are expected to done in 
future research. We, nonetheless, believe that the lack of monetary transmission mechanism does not 
hinder the present use of the model for the simulation on government expenditure policies.  
  
100 In a stochastic simulation, equations of the model are solved by assigning them random error 
components. It also allows estimated coefficients and exogenous variables to vary randomly. This 
method of simulation generates a variant of counterfactual paths for endogenous variables. 
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 Under the deterministic simulation, we obtain static and dynamic solutions to 
the SLM to assess its tracking performance. In static simulation, actual values of 
endogenous variables observed up to the last period are used when the model solved 
each time. This solution method generates a set of one-step-ahead forecasts of 
endogenous variables over the historical period. In the dynamic simulation, pre-
solution sample values are used only for endogenous variables when forming 
forecasts. Future forecast values are formed based on the current period forecasts. 
Therefore, dynamic simulation method involves multi-step forecasting. 
Gauss-Seidel iterative algorithm is used in solving the SLM. In each iteration, 
the algorithm solves endogenous variables (left-hand-side variable in each equation) 
treating all other endogenous variables (in the model) fixed. If the equation system of 
the model is fairly stable over time, the algorithm guarantees the fast convergence of 
the model (Klein, Welfe, and Welfe (1999)).101 Since our estimated ECM equations 
are reasonably stable over time, Gauss-Seidel algorithm is chosen for the simulation 
process. However, we found that the model performs well with the Newton solution 
method too.  
Figures 4.3 and 4.4 illustrate within-sample tracking performances of the static 
and dynamic simulation results of the SLM. Actual and simulated values are given by 
solid and broken lines respectively. As Figure 4.3 illustrates, static simulation results 
of the SLM are quite impressive. Simulated data track actual data of each variable 
very closely. With this impressive tracking performance of static simulation, we 
obtained dynamic simulation results for the SLM. It is expected that dynamic solution 
may deviate from actual when time passes as forecast error accumulates over time. 
                                                 
101 For details, see Eviews 5.1 help manual. 
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 What is important for the model relevance is that dynamic simulation results should at 
least be able to follow the time path of actual series. Illustrated in Figure 4.4, the 
tacking performances of dynamic simulation results of most of the endogenous 
variables are impressive. It is observed that dynamic simulation poorly predicts actual 
series, especially investment series, in the middle of the sample. Also there is a level 
difference between actual and predicted series of some variables such as the 
unemployment rate and money demand. Apart from these poor predictions, dynamic 
simulation results also follow the paths of actual data pretty well. Moreover, these 
middle sample poor predictions gradually diminish as implied by the convergence of 
simulation results to actual data at the end of the sample. An important implication of 
this better tracking performance is the model’s relevance for policy simulation 
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      Figure 4.3: Actual and Static Simulation Results of the SLM  
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       Figure 4.4: Actual and Dynamic Simulation Results of the SLM 





 4.6 Summary 
In order to examine the implications of various policy changes and of other 
impact analyses, we construct a medium scale macroeconometric model for Sri Lanka. 
The model contains 24 endogenous and 18 exogenous variables. Of endogenous 
variables, 15 are given by stochastic equations and nine are given by identities. 
Stochastic equations describe behavioural patterns of private consumption, private 
investment, government revenue, government interest payments, export demand and 
supply, import demand, labour demand, the unemployment rate, nominal wages, price 
of intermediate goods, price of domestic good, consumer prices and the production of 
domestic good. Identities describe gross national expenditure, gross domestic 
expenditure, total investment, private sector disposable income, fiscal deficit, deficit 
financing, capital stock, revenue from income taxation and excess demand of the 
economy.  
Stochastic equations are specified appealing to conventional economic theory. 
They are estimated in ECM format or in first differenced form by OLS. However, 
export supply function (inverse) and interest payment expenditure are modeled as 
partial adjustment mechanisms. The model is estimated on annual data for the period 
1979-2004. Fit of single equation estimation is quite impressive. Estimated equations 
were subject to a battery of tests for low and higher order autocorrelation, 
heteroscedasticity, normal errors, regression specification, parameter constancy and 
for one-step-ahead forecast performance. All stochastic equations were required to 
pass these diagnostic tests. Static and dynamic solutions of the model are obtained 
solving it deterministically. Tracking performance of the model is quite impressive. 
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SIMULATION EXPERIMENTS ON GOVERNMENT  
EXPENDITURE POLICIES IN SRI LANKA  
 
5.1 Introduction 
In this Chapter, we examine the impact of government expenditure reduction 
policies on the macroeconomy of Sri Lanka. Though the prime focus is the effect on 
fiscal deficit, we trace out the impact on many macroeconomic variables.  
Despite recent attempts downsizing its size, the government has been playing 
a big role in the economy of Sri Lanka. Government expenditure has historically been 
consistently high in comparison to low taxes. High spending and low revenue result in 
large and recurrent fiscal deficits and large accumulation of debt.102 In response to an 
increasing demand, policymakers have recently taken measures against large fiscal 
deficits. Given the heavy expenditure commitments of welfare state in 1960s and 
1970s, more efforts have been placed on the reduction of expenditures in containing 
fiscal deficits. The government could easily curb expenditures on consumption, 
investments and transfer payments. However, little flexibility is there for expenditure 
cuts on interest payments, loan repayments and national defence. The unawareness of 
economic impact of various expenditure programmes is another concern in choosing 
spending programs for scratch. Economic impacts of various expenditure components 
could obviously be different as they affect the economy through various channels and 
in different magnitudes.      
                                                 
102 See Section 5.2 for a detailed discussion on the fiscal stance of Sri Lanka. 
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 This study is an attempt towards the fulfilment of this knowledge gap as it 
sheds light into the macroeconomic impact of several expenditure components. 
Changes introduced here are an equal percent reduction (to achieve a low fiscal deficit) 
in (i) consumption, (ii) investment and (iii) transfer payment (to households) 
expenditures of the government. The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. 
Section 5.2 provides a brief discussion on trends in Sri Lanka’s fiscal indicators 
during the last few decades. This section briefly discusses results of two early 
simulation experiments on government expenditures. In Section 5.3, we report results 
of simulation experiments and provide a detailed discussion on economic impacts of 
the above policy changes. Section 5.4 concludes.  
 
5.2 Trends in Fiscal Indicators of Sri Lanka  
Public finance in Sri Lanka, as in many other developing countries, earns 
much attention. It is in the centre of macroeconomic management and policy 
discussions as the country is experiencing persistent fiscal deficits and an excessive 
accumulation of debt. Before 1980s, the government sector had a dominant role in the 
economy by heavily intruding manufacturing, service and welfare activities in 
addition to the provision of general administration and defence. Since the orientation 
of economic policies has changed significantly from 1980s, however, the 
government’s role in the economy has been lessened.  
As Jayasundara (1986) notes, the government budget of Sri Lanka is primarily 
used as a mean of mobilizing resources to promote economic growth, as a mean of 
attaining social welfare objectives and as an instrument of demand management 
policies. Main objectives of fiscal policy measures have varied overtime with pursued 
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 economic policies. In late 1940s and 1950s, the government’s role in the economy 
was mainly limited to provide general administration, defence and social services. 
Inherited from the colonial rule, most of the economic activities were privately 
managed. Fiscal policy instruments were used to maintain the price stability and to 
achieve a better financial management (Jayasundara (1986)). In consequence, fiscal 
deficit was low and therefore the accumulation of debt was not high. In 1950s, fiscal 
deficits and the debt stock stood below 5 percent and 20 percent of GDP respectively.    
At the end of 1950s, economic policies were changed to restrict the private 
sector economic activities, to place a dominant role for the government in the 
economy and to achieve more equitable income distribution. Though their extent 
varied with political regimes, these restrictive economic policies continued until late 
1970s.103  The government mainly used fiscal operations to meet these objectives. 
Fiscal policy instruments were often used to promote economic growth and to 
redistribute income. Taxes were used not only as a means of revenue collection but 
also as a tool of income redistribution. In unison, a large volume of government 
expenditures were placed on a wide range of welfare programs. The government 
started large scale production and service providing activities too. Resulting increased 
government spending and stagnant tax revenue generated an increasing fiscal deficit 
over time. At the end of 1970s, fiscal deficits rose to about 6 to 8 percent of GDP 
from its low figures in 1950s (Abeyratne and Rodrigo (2002)). Total public debt stock 
stood over 50 percent of GDP (Jayawickrama, (forthcoming)).       
However, this heavy government involvement and restrictive policies did not 
bring much success to the economy of Sri Lanka. In late 1970s, the country 
                                                 
103 During the period 1965-70, policies were taken towards a deregulated, market forces dominated and 
trade oriented economy. These policy changes were arguably inadequate to make a significant 
transformation of the economy.  
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 experienced severe economic hardships as economic growth was arrested for an 
extended period. This poor performance of the economy deserved radical changes in 
policies. New economic policies introduced in late 1970s were basically aimed at 
higher economic growth with greater reliance on the market mechanism, liberalization 
of trade and the balance of payments and foreign direct investment. Assigned key role 
to the private sector, the role of the government in the economy is reduced to a 
facilitator to the private sector activities. The government concentrated heavily on the 
development of infrastructure and institutional facilities. Its involvement in 
production, services and welfare programs tended to decline over time (Athukorala 
(1986), Athukorala and Jayasuriya (1994)). Therefore, fiscal policies after 1977 
mainly target on economic growth by revitalizing private sector economic activities.  
Although the orientation of fiscal policies has historically been varied, the 
fiscal stance of Sri Lanka has deteriorated significantly over the last few decades. 
Fiscal deficit rose to 6-8 percent of GDP at the end of 1970s from its low level in 
1950s. As Figure 5.1 illustrates, fiscal deficit quickly stood over 15 percent of GDP in 
1980s. Recently, it has decreased to 8-10 percent of GDP. But, its size is still 
reckoned high as far as the macroeconomic stability is concerned (Abeyratne and 
Rodrigo (2002)). Jayasundara (1986) and Athukorala and Jayasuriya (1994) view 
these high fiscal deficits in 1980s as a result of increased government expenditure on 
massive investment projects. Though investment expenditure was a major source of 
fiscal deficit in the early 1980s, its importance has declined subsequently with the 
emergence of many other expenditure components. Increased expenditure on defence 
and interest payments on existing debt are the major sources of fiscal deficit after 
1985. They together accounted for nearly 45 percent of government expenditure. As 
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 Abeyratne and Rodrigo (2002) have documented, the defence spending share of total 
expenditure rose to 17 percent in 2000 from its 1.6 percent in 1980 and 0.6 percent in 
1950. Though only 2.5 percent of total government expenditure was allocated to 
interest payments in 1950s, it has gradually increased to 8 percent in 1980 and more 
than 25 percent recently (Jayawickrama, (forthcoming)). The rapid rise in defence and 
interest payment spending caused total government expenditure to go up sharply. For 
example, government expenditure has skyrocketed to about 40 percent of GDP in 
1980s (see Table 5.1). As the government trims down spending through privatization 
of state owned-enterprise, lowering welfare expenditure and completing massive 
investment projects, government expenditure over GDP is however reduced to 25 
percent in recent years.  
Government revenue raised by taxation and other means, on the other hand, 
often falls short of spending. Athukorala and Jayasuriya (1994) note that the tax 
system in Sri Lanka has failed to show the buoyancy in generating revenue for the 
government. Expansion of revenue sources in relation to GDP seems unsatisfactory. 
As given in Table 5.1, the revenue-GDP share has reduced to 16 percent in 2004 from 
its high figures in 1980s and 1990s. Colombage (1996) views this less promising 
revenue generation as a result of income tax concessions and exemptions offered to 
income earners and to private enterprises, export tax concessions and exemptions 
offered to BOI industries and falling income tax rates. Athukorala and Jayasuriya 
(1994) reckon the low level of tax income as a result of the underdeveloped state of 
the economy. They further note that it is also a result of weaknesses of the tax system. 
Tax evasion and avoidance are notably high in the economy. Thus, recent fiscal 
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 policy options gave much emphasis on raising tax revenue by mobilizing potential tax 




Summary of Fiscal Policy Indicators of Sri Lanka (1975-2004)  
           As a Percent of GDP                As a Percent of Total Spending (G)                          
              Total     Total    Consu-      Invest-    Transfer       Interest   
             Revenue   Spending          -mption     -ment      Payment      Payment    Other 
     Year   (T)      (G)     (CG)        (IG)          (TG)     (IPG)       (OG) 
    1975  19.15     29.32   31.86        14.07        30.88     8.98        14.21 
    1976  20.66     33.53   32.44        17.51        28.31     9.02        12.72 
    1977  22.90     33.43   31.95        15.80        30.53   10.38        11.34 
    1978  32.02     51.64   21.44        16.32        16.97     7.27        38.00 
    1979  27.74     49.87   22.29        17.71        16.92     7.88        35.20 
    1980  22.15     51.61   18.74        12.29        11.20     7.39        50.38 
    1981  20.11     42.31   20.29        13.66        15.91   12.02        38.12 
    1982  18.49     43.24   21.75        12.63        13.69   13.47        38.46 
    1983  22.01     37.42   24.95        15.21        13.99   16.67        29.18 
    1984  26.24     36.85   24.95        14.92        13.57   14.09        32.47 
    1985  25.69     39.15   30.05        14.02        12.60   13.45        29.88 
    1986  23.40     37.19   31.22        16.36        11.10   14.80        26.52 
    1987  23.97     36.35   30.56        17.62        12.92   15.90        23.00 
    1988  20.51     37.60   28.55        16.31        11.79   16.45        26.90 
    1989  23.09     35.15   32.14        17.31        14.78   17.47        18.30 
    1990  22.54     33.10   31.46        12.37        15.08   20.84        20.25 
    1991  21.38     33.79   30.43        13.12        17.84   18.48        20.12 
    1992  20.97     29.79   34.19        11.34        16.38   21.68        16.41 
    1993  20.13     29.00   32.32        14.39        15.92   21.32        16.05 
    1994  19.66     30.51   32.80        10.29        16.55   22.27        18.09 
    1995  21.49     32.09   37.65        11.57        14.40   18.79        17.59 
    1996  19.33     28.89   37.05        10.59        15.60   22.37        14.38 
    1997  18.67     26.62   39.22        12.71        16.32   23.50          8.25 
    1998  17.24     26.42   37.19        12.65        14.06   20.47        15.63 
    1999  17.60     25.08   35.77        12.61        13.32   22.25        16.05 
    2000  16.82     26.73   39.36        12.24        12.45   21.21        14.74 
    2001  16.40     27.05   37.37        10.95        13.79   24.40        13.49 
    2002  17.04     25.85   33.09          7.53        12.82   27.68        18.88 
    2003  16.47     24.19   31.52          9.20        11.92   28.32        19.04 
    2004  15.94     24.13   32.74          8.97        16.61   23.80        17.88 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Annual Reports, Central Bank of Sri Lanka.  
 
 155
 Excess spending over revenue leads to fiscal deficits, in overall and primary 
accounts. 104  The time path of the overall fiscal deficit tracks closely that of the 
primary deficit before 1980s (see Figure 5.1). Increased interest payments and rising 
defence expenditure, thereafter, makes fiscal deficits larger than ever before. Even if 
revenue constitutes income from money printing (seignorage), surpluses are rare in 
the primary fiscal balance (Jayawickrama (forthcoming)). A consistent primary deficit 
is a good indicator of the habit of borrowing further to repay interest bills on past 
debts. This enduring worsening fiscal stance has resulted in an excessive 
accumulation of public debt. The stock of public debt grew rapidly during the last five 
decades and stood over the country’s GDP in recent times. Illustrated in Figure 5.1, 
increase in outstanding debt is apparently high since 1977.  
Emphasized in Chapter 2, an important concern of large and persistent fiscal 
deficit is its macroeconomic consequences. Fiscal deficits have several repercussions 
on macroeconomic management. First, deficits require departures from an otherwise 
optimal fiscal policy. Second, deficits are likely to have real effects on the 
macroeconomy.105 Moreover, recurrent deficits and excessive accumulation of debt 
may lead to a fiscal policy crisis. If a fiscal crisis leads to defaults in public debts, it 
would escalate the economic recession. Thus, it is always important to contain fiscal 




                                                 
104 Primary fiscal deficit is defined as the difference between non-interest government expenditure and 
government revenue.  
 
105 A detailed discussion is given in Chapter 2. 
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         Figure 5.1: Fiscal Deficits and Debt Accumulation in Sri Lanka, 1975-2004 
 
Note: Overall fiscal deficit is the difference between total government expenditure and total 
revenue. Primary deficit is the difference between interest payment exclusive government 
expenditure and total revenue.  
     
 
Over the last few decades, there has been a growing pressure (especially from 
international funding agencies) to downsize the government of Sri Lanka. In 
particular, policymakers are asked to restrain various forms of expenditures. In the 
context of expenditure overruns in respect of defence and interest payments and 
limited avenues for revenue hikes, policymakers have adopted measures to restrict 
other expenditure components to contain the fiscal deficit. However, as public 
investment is viewed as vital for economic growth 106 , much of deficit lessening 
                                                 
106 This view is expected to confirm by a simulation experiment on government investment expenditure 
later in this chapter.   
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 efforts are placed on consumption expenditure, transfer payments to households and 
to loss-making public enterprises.  
As the government faces the issue of allocating its limited resources on most 
efficient expenditure means, it is interesting to examine the macroeconomic impact of 
various components of government expenditure. Such a study would help fiscal 
authorities greatly in making future policies. There are few prior studies, for instance 
Karunasena (1986), Perera (1994) and Cooray (1996), that investigated the issue. 
However, as Karunasena’s sample lies outside the sample period of interest of this 
study, we discuss only the simulation results of Perera (1994) and Cooray (1996) in 
this section.  
Perera (1994) examined the macroeconomic impact of an increase in current 
and capital expenditures of the government. Though he reports the impact on many 
macroeconomic variables, our focus is on the impact on GDP and few other variables 
only. An increase in both the components of expenditure initially raises GDP and 
fiscal deficit. The subsequent impact on GDP is also positive. Thus, it reduces fiscal 
deficit in later periods. One weird result of Perera’s study is the higher positive impact 
on GDP of an increase in current expenditure than of an equal increase in capital 
expenditure. A 10 percent increase in current and capital expenditure immediately 
increases GDP by 0.75 percent and 0.12 percent respectively. The subsequent effect 
of current expenditure on GDP is also higher than that of the capital expenditure. 
Another less promising result is the negative impact on exports. There is no reason for 
exports to fall as the government increases its spending (in particular, capital 
spending). Moreover, the above changes in expenditure components increase the 
 158
 country’s general price level by about 40 percent in six years. Such a huge impact on 
prices could perhaps be dubious.  
Cooray (1996) examine the macroeconomic impact of an increase in 
government capital expenditure. He reports the impact on major macro variables such 
as GDP, disposable income, money supply, prices, trade balance, government revenue 
and fiscal deficit. A 10 percent increase in capital expenditure increases the GDP 
immediately by 0.81 percent. The positive impact lasts for a long period of time. The 
change results in an improvement in the trade balance. Notably an increase in capital 
expenditure results in a continuous increase in fiscal deficit. So, Cooray note that 
budget deficits can be lowered by reducing government investment. To my mind, the 
above conclusion is obviously true in the short-run but not in the long-run as lower 
investment could shrink the economy. These inconsistent policy outcomes could be 
due to model specification issues.  
 
5.3 Simulation Experiments on Government Expenditures 
To reiterate, we split total government expenditure into five components; 
consumption expenditure (CG), investment expenditure (IG), transfer payment 
expenditure to households (TG), interest payments on existing debt (IPG) and other 
government expenditure (OG). When there are no system links and when T and other 
expenditure components remain constant, 10 percent cut in CG, IG, TG, IPG and OG 
at a time lead fiscal deficit to fall by 11, 3, 4, 6 and 7 percent respectively. When 
system links are at work, above figures could obviously be different. Since IPG is 
endogenous and OG affects only on fiscal deficit (subsequently IPG) in the SLM, our 
simulation experiments are limited to changes in CG, IG and TG.  
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 Within-sample simulation experiments start from 1995. Since our simulation 
is deterministic, the random disturbance components of stochastic equations are set to 
zero. We first obtained a baseline solution by solving the SLM dynamically. The 
model is then solved to obtain counterfactual paths for the endogenous variables by 
introducing one-time shock (10 percent cut) in CG, IG and TG at a time. The 
percentage deviation of counterfactual paths from their control run (the baseline) is, 
then, traced out to assess the impact of each policy option. This policy experiment is 
better known as the expenditure multiplier analysis. Annual deviations of 
counterfactual paths from their control run provide the short-term impact of the 
change. The cumulative sum of short-term deviations is the long-term impact.  Tables 
5.2-5.7 provide short-term and long-term effects of our simulation experiments. 
Figures 5.2 and 5.3 illustrate the impact of each change on selected macroeconomic 
variables. Figure 5.4 illustrates the impact on the fiscal deficit ratio (as a percent of 
GDP). 
 
5.3.1 Impact of Consumption Expenditure  
First, we examine the macroeconomic impact of a reduction (10 percent) in 
government consumption expenditure, CG. As seen in Table 5.2, the initial effect on 
many real variables (except money demand, aggregate spending and imports) is zero. 
The change immediately reduces aggregate expenditure, money demand and imports 
by 1, 0.7 and 0.04 percent. It increases the unemployment rate by 2.8 percent 
immediately. The change has a significant negative impact on nominal variables. 
Domestic prices fall as aggregate demand shifts downward when aggregate supply 
(GDP) remains constant. Low prices results in low nominal wages. As CG decreases 
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 by 10 percent fiscal deficit is immediately down by 17 percent.107 The fall in fiscal 
deficit has been reinforced by several channels. One is that the fall in imports due to 
the change in relative price reduces CG further and IG and TG too. This is because 
these expenditure components constitute a significant import content. Second, as 
government consumption is relatively price inelastic, decreased prices bolster the fall 
in government expenditure. The fall in nominal wages also fortifies the fall in CG. 




Impact of Temporary Cut in Government Consumption Spending (CG) 
(% deviation of the within-sample dynamic simulation from the baseline)(a)  
Years       
  Shock                    
       Variable(b)         1        2        3        4        5       6       10  
       Private consumption (CP)     0.00     0.00     0.00    -0.01    -0.01    -0.02    -0.01 
       Private investment (IP)     0.00     0.00    -0.04     0.00    -0.03    -0.03    -0.03  
       Total investment (I)      0.00     0.00     0.00     0.00    -0.03    -0.03    -0.03 
       Capital stock (K)      0.00     0.00     0.00     0.00     0.00     0.00     0.00 
       Labour demand (L)      0.00     0.00    -0.02    -0.02    -0.02    -0.02    -0.02 
       GDP (Y)       0.00     0.00     0.00     0.00     0.00     0.00    -0.07 
       Exports (Ex)       0.00     0.00     0.00     0.00     0.00     0.00    -0.02 
       Imports (Im)      -0.02    -0.06    -0.09    -0.11    -0.12    -0.14    -0.11 
       Total govt. revenue (T)     0.00     0.00     0.00     0.00     0.00     0.00    -0.04 
       Interest payments (IPG)     0.00    -2.82    -2.04    -1.52    -1.07    -0.78    -0.18 
       Money demand (M1)     -0.67     0.00     0.00     0.00     0.00     0.00     0.00 
       Unemployment rate (U)     2.83     0.00     0.00     0.00     0.00     0.00     0.00 
       Nominal wages (W)      -0.14    -0.19    -0.11    -0.12    -0.11    -0.11    -0.09 
       Consumer prices (PPc)     -0.19    -0.24    -0.16    -0.16    -0.15    -0.15    -0.10 
       Price of domestic good (PPy)    -0.18    -0.17    -0.16    -0.16    -0.15    -0.15    -0.09 
       Disposable income (YD)     0.00     0.00     0.00     0.00     0.00     0.00    -0.07 
       Expenditure on GDP (YE)    -1.02     0.00     0.09     0.00     0.00     0.08     0.00 
       Fiscal deficit (FD)                 -17.20    -2.40   -2.10   -1.10   -1.00    -0.50    -0.10 
Notes: (a) Baseline scenario is the dynamic simulation with actual data for all endogenous and 
exogenous variables; (b) The abbreviation assigned to each variable in the SLM is given in parenthesis.    
 
 
                                                 
107 As noted earlier, when system links are not allowed, 10 percent fall in CG reduces fiscal deficit by 
11 percent. 
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 The cut in CG affects variables such as private consumption, private 
investment, total investment, labour demand and GDP slightly in subsequent periods 
too (see, Table 5.3). However, its impact on imports, interest payment spending, fiscal 
deficit and on nominal variables is significant in the post-shock period as well. From 
the second period of the shock, interest payment spending drops markedly. This 
would have enduring negative effect on interest payments and fiscal deficit. The 
effect, however, shows a geometrically decaying pattern over time. Nominal variables 
also continue to fall even after ten years of the shock. This would result in further falls 
in the fiscal deficit.   
 
Table 5.3 
Cumulative Effect of Government Consumption Spending Cut (CG)  
(% deviation of the within-sample dynamic simulation from the baseline)(a) 
Years        
   Shock          
      Variable(b)          1        2        3       4       5      6      10  
       Private consumption (CP)     0.00     0.00     0.00    -0.01    -0.02    -0.04    -0.08 
       Private investment (IP)     0.00     0.00    -0.04    -0.04    -0.07    -0.13    -0.20  
       Total investment (I)      0.00     0.00     0.00     0.00    -0.03    -0.06    -0.21 
       Capital stock (K)      0.00     0.00     0.00     0.00     0.00     0.00     0.00 
       Labour demand (L)      0.00     0.00     0.00    -0.02    -0.04    -0.06    -0.14 
       GDP (Y)       0.00     0.00     0.00     0.00     0.00     0.00    -0.07 
       Exports (Ex)       0.00     0.00     0.00     0.00    -0.02     0.00    -0.02 
       Imports (Im)      -0.02    -0.08    -0.17    -0.28    -0.40    -0.54    -1.00 
       Total govt. revenue (T)     0.00     0.00     0.00     0.00     0.00    -0.04    -0.08 
       Interest payment (IPG)     0.00    -2.82    -4.86    -6.38    -7.43    -8.21    -9.54 
       Money demand (M1)     -0.67    -0.67    -0.67    -0.67    -0.67    -0.67    -0.49 
       Unemployment rate (U)     2.83     2.83     2.83     2.83     2.83     2.83     2.83 
       Nominal wages (W)      -0.14    -0.33    -0.44    -0.56    -0.67    -0.78    -1.16 
       Consumer prices (PPc)     -0.19    -0.38    -0.56    -0.74    -0.91    -1.22    -1.58 
       Price of domestic good (PPy)    -0.18    -0.35    -0.51    -0.67    -0.82    -0.97    -1.41 
       Disposable income (YD)     0.00     0.00     0.00     0.00     0.00     0.00    -0.14 
       Expenditure on GDP (YE)    -1.02    -1.02    -0.93    -0.93    -0.93    -0.81    -0.73 
       Fiscal deficit (FD)                -17.20     -19.60    -21.70    -22.80    -23.80    -24.30    -25.20 
Notes: (a) Baseline scenario is the dynamic simulation with actual data for all endogenous and 




 As implied by the cumulative impact (see Table 5.3), ten years after the shock 
all endogenous variables (except capital stock) have been affected. However, the 
magnitude of the cumulative impact is significantly high only on fiscal deficit, interest 
payments, imports, the unemployment rate and on nominal variables. Interest 
payment expenditure and fiscal deficit are lower than their control run by 10 percent 
and 25 percent. Money demand, aggregate expenditure and imports are less than their 
baseline by 0.7, 0.8 and 1 percent. The unemployment rate rises over the baseline by 3 
percent. Nominal variables are below their control run by about 2 percent. 
Nonetheless, the impact on other macroeconomic variables is minimal even after 10 
years.  
 
5.3.2 Impact of Investment Expenditure  
  In the second simulation experiment, we introduce 10 percent cut in 
government investment spending, IG. As given in Table 5.4 and Table 5.5, unlike the 
case of CG the fall in IG affects the economy markedly. As IG falls, investment of the 
economy falls by large amount. Resulting slower capital accumulation will have 
negative impact on GDP, employment, private consumption, exports, imports, tax 
revenue, disposable income and money demand. The shock immediately raises the 
unemployment rate by 0.25 percent. In comparison to the effect of CG shock, 
negative effect on prices and nominal wages is less. Decreased aggregate demand and 
aggregate supply keep less upward pressure on nominal variables. Fiscal deficit is 
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 quickly down by 5 percent as IG falls. Even if tax revenue falls at the same period of 




Impact of Temporary Cut in Government Investment Spending (IG) 
(% deviation of the within-sample dynamic simulation from the baseline)(a)
       Years       
 Shock               
       Variable(b)        1       2       3      4       5      6      10  
       Private consumption (CP)   -0.15   -0.17   -0.16   -0.17   -0.16   -0.15   -0.09 
       Private investment (IP)    0.00   -0.56   -0.54   -0.43   -0.37   -0.28   -0.07  
       Total investment (I)    -1.36   -0.54   -0.44   -0.38   -0.30   -0.25   -0.06 
       Capital stock (K)    -0.18   -0.22   -0.26   -0.29   -0.26   -0.24   -0.18 
       Labour demand (L)    -0.12   -0.10   -0.10   -0.08   -0.06   -0.06   -0.01 
       GDP (Y)     -0.18   -0.18   -0.18   -0.16   -0.16   -0.15   -0.10 
       Exports (Ex)     -0.21   -0.17   -0.14   -0.09   -0.06   -0.02    0.06 
       Imports (Im)     -0.21   -0.23   -0.24   -0.23   -0.22   -0.21   -0.07 
       Total govt. revenue (T)   -0.13   -0.18   -0.18    -0.16   -0.14   -0.14   -0.09 
       Interest payments (IPG)    0.00   -0.73   -0.43    -0.22   -0.09    0.03    0.12 
       Money demand (M1)    -0.29   -0.10   -0.10   -0.09    0.00    0.00    0.00 
       Unemployment rate (U)    0.25    0.25    0.36    0.29    0.40    0.35    0.24 
       Nominal wages (W)     -0.04   -0.08   -0.09   -0.11   -0.12   -0.11   -0.09 
       Consumer prices (PPc)    -0.05   -0.06   -0.08   -0.07   -0.05   -0.05    0.08 
       Price of domestic good (PPy)   -0.03   -0.05   -0.07   -0.07   -0.05   -0.05    0.00  
       Disposable income (YD)   -0.17   -0.16   -0.16   -0.15   -0.14   -0.14   -0.06 
       Expenditure on GDP (YE)   -0.37   -0.27   -0.17   -0.17   -0.16   -0.08    0.00 
       Fiscal deficit (FD)    -4.81   -0.05    0.26    0.30    0.50    0.39    0.27 
Notes: (a) The Baseline scenario is the dynamic simulation with actual data for all endogenous and 
exogenous variables; (b) The abbreviation assigned to each variable in the SLM is given in parenthesis.    
 
 
Decreased IG affects the economy to large extent in subsequent years of the 
shock too. From the second period, private investment and government interest 
payments fall markedly. All endogenous variables except the unemployment rate and 
fiscal deficit continue to plunge. The unemployment rate, on the other hand, rises over 
time. Unlike the case of CG shock, fiscal deficit decreases only up to the second 
period. The effect, then, turns positive as revenue fall overwhelms expenditure fall. 
As a result, interest payments drive up adding further pressure on fiscal deficit. 
                                                 
108 To reiterate, 10 percent fall in IG leads to 4 percent decrease in fiscal deficit when there are no 
dynamic links.  
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 Table 5.4 shows the extent of the economic contraction throughout the 10 year 
period. Private investment and total investment are down by 2.7 and 3.7 percent 
respectively. Consequently, capital stock decreases by 2.3 percent. The number of 
persons employed is below by 0.7 percent and the unemployment rate is high by 3 
percent. Decreases in capital stock and employment lower GDP by 1.4 percent from 
its control run. This will have a significant negative impact on government revenue, 
private consumption, trade, demand for money and aggregate demand. The 
cumulative effect on prices and wages is not quite high. Despite five percent initial 





Cumulative Effect of Government Investment Spending Cut (IG)  
(% deviation of the within-sample dynamic simulation from the baseline)(a)
       Years       
   Shock                       
       Variable(b)          1          2          3          4          5          6         10  
       Private consumption (CP)    -0.15      -0.32      -0.48      -0.65      -0.81      -0.96      -1.38 
       Private investment (IP)     0.00      -0.56      -1.10      -1.53      -1.90      -2.18      -2.64  
       Total investment (I)     -1.36      -1.90      -2.34      -2.72      -3.02      -3.27      -3.62 
       Capital stock (K)     -0.18      -0.40      -0.66      -0.95      -1.19      -1.45      -2.32 
       Labour demand (L)     -0.12      -0.22      -0.32      -0.40      -0.46      -0.52      -0.68 
       GDP (Y)      -0.18      -0.36      -0.56      -0.68      -0.84      -0.99      -1.47 
       Exports (Ex)      -0.21      -0.38      -0.52      -0.61      -0.67      -0.69      -0.53 
       Imports (Im)      -0.21      -0.44      -0.68      -0.91      -1.14      -1.35      -1.81 
       Total govt. revenue (T)    -0.13      -0.31      -0.49      -0.65      -0.79      -0.93      -1.40 
       Interest payments (IPG)     0.00      -0.73      -1.16      -1.38      -1.47      -1.44      -1.05 
       Money demand (M1)     -0.29      -0.39      -0.49      -0.58      -0.58      -0.58      -0.86 
       Unemployment rate (U)     0.25       0.50       0.86       1.15       1.55       1.90       2.97 
       Nominal wages (W)      -0.04      -0.12      -0.21      -0.32      -0.44      -0.55      -0.83 
       Consumer prices (PPc)     -0.05      -0.11      -0.19      -0.26      -0.31      -0.37      -0.33 
       Price of domestic good (PPy)    -0.03      -0.08      -0.15      -0.22      -0.27      -0.32      -0.36 
       Disposable income (YD)    -0.17      -0.33      -0.49      -0.64      -0.88      -1.02      -1.42 
       Expenditure on GDP (YE)    -0.37      -0.64      -0.81      -0.98      -1.14      -1.22      -1.30 
       Fiscal deficit (FD)     -4.81      -4.86      -4.60      -4.30      -3.80      -3.41      -2.19 
Notes: (a) The Baseline scenario is the dynamic simulation with actual data for all endogenous and 





 5.3.3 Impact of Transfer Payments 
Thirdly, we examine the macroeconomic impact of 10 percent reduction in 
transfer payments to households, TG. In the SLM, the effect of TG channels through 
disposable income to private consumption and imports. The effect, then, transmits to 
other sectors of the economy (see Chart 4.1). As given in Table 5.6, the immediate 
negative effect of TG cut on private consumption and imports is large. However, the 
change marginally affects aggregate expenditure. The other real variables (except 
interest payments and fiscal deficit) are not affected by the change. Since variables 
governing aggregate demand and aggregate supply do not change markedly, there is 
no significant pressure on nominal variables too. Nonetheless, the change generates 7 
percent immediate fall in fiscal deficit.109 The fall in fiscal deficit is reinforced by 
decreases in imports and private consumption. Decreased imports would lower TG 
itself, CG and IG as their import content is high. Decreased private consumption 
lowers the demand for supply of publicly provided goods and services (such as public 
utilities). End result is, therefore, a large fall in fiscal deficit. 
The change leaves most of the macroeconomic variables unaffected in the 
subsequent periods of the shock. Though the change affects the paths of private 
consumption, imports and nominal variables over time, that effect is fairly negligible. 
However, the negative effect on fiscal deficit continues as it leads to a significant drop 
in interest payments subsequently. Effects on interest payments and deficits die out to 
zero only after 10 years of the initial shock.  
 
 
                                                 






Impact of Temporary Cut in Transfer Payments to Households (TG)  
(% deviation of the within-sample dynamic simulation from the baseline)(a)
     Years        
  Shock           
       Variable(b)          1        2        3        4         5       6       10  
       Private consumption (CP)    -0.44     0.01     0.02     0.01     0.01     0.01     0.00 
       Private investment (IP)     0.00     0.00     0.00     0.00     0.00     0.00     0.00  
       Total investment (I)      0.00     0.00     0.00     0.00     0.00     0.00     0.00 
       Capital stock (K)      0.00     0.00     0.00     0.00     0.00     0.00     0.00 
       Labour demand (L)      0.00     0.00     0.00     0.00     0.00     0.00     0.00 
       GDP (Y)       0.00     0.00     0.00     0.00     0.00     0.00     0.00 
       Exports (Ex)       0.00     0.00     0.00     0.00     0.00     0.00     0.00 
       Imports (Im)      -0.61     0.06     0.04     0.04     0.02     0.00     0.00 
       Total govt. revenue (T)     0.00     0.00     0.00     0.00     0.00     0.00     0.00 
       Interest payments (IPG)     0.00    -1.02    -0.74    -0.55    -0.39    -0.20    -0.07 
       Money demand (M1)      0.00     0.00     0.00     0.00     0.00     0.00     0.00 
       Unemployment rate (U)     0.00     0.00     0.00     0.00     0.00     0.00     0.00 
       Nominal wages (W)      -0.02    -0.01    -0.01    -0.01    -0.01    -0.01     0.00 
       Consumer prices (PPc)      0.00    -0.02    -0.02    -0.01    -0.01    -0.01     0.00 
       Price of domestic good (PPy)     0.00    -0.02    -0.01    -0.01    -0.01    -0.01     0.00 
       Disposable income (YD)    -0.43     0.00     0.00     0.00     0.00     0.00     0.00 
       Expenditure on GDP (YE)    -0.07     0.00     0.00     0.00     0.00     0.00     0.00 
       Fiscal deficit (FD)                  -6.57      -0.88      -0.76      -0.39   -0.37   -0.10     0.00 
Notes: (a) The Baseline scenario is the dynamic simulation with actual data for all endogenous and 





As given in Table 5.7, the cumulative effect on disposable income, private 
consumption, imports, aggregate expenditure and nominal variables is very marginal. 
The most affected variables are, however, interest payments and fiscal deficits. They 
are less than their baseline figures by 4 percent and 10 percent. Therefore, it is 
important to note that reductions in government transfer payments to households 
hardly affect the supply-side of the economy. It lowers aggregate demand only very 








Cumulative Effect of Transfer Payments Cut (TG)  
(% deviation of the within-sample dynamic simulation from the baseline)(a)
Years       
  Shock                 
      Variable(b)         1      2      3      4       5       6      10  
        
       Private consumption (CP)   -0.44   -0.43   -0.42   -0.41   -0.40   -0.38   -0.38 
       Private investment (IP)    0.00    0.00    0.00    0.00    0.00    0.00    0.00  
       Total investment (I)     0.00    0.00    0.00    0.00    0.00    0.00    0.00 
       Capital stock (K)     0.00    0.00    0.00    0.00    0.00    0.00    0.00 
       Employment (L)     0.00    0.00    0.00    0.00    0.00    0.00    0.00 
       GDP (Y)      0.00    0.00    0.00    0.00    0.00    0.00    0.00 
       Exports (Ex)      0.00    0.00    0.00    0.00    0.00    0.00    0.00 
       Imports (Im)     -0.61   -0.55   -0.51   -0.47   -0.45   -0.43   -0.43 
       Total govt. revenue (T)    0.00    0.00    0.00    0.00    0.00    0.00    0.00 
       Interest payment (IPG)    0.00   -1.02   -1.76   -2.31   -2.70   -3.19   -3.50  
       Money demand (M1)     0.00    0.00    0.00    0.00    0.00    0.00    0.00 
       Unemployment rate (U)    0.00    0.00    0.00    0.00    0.00    0.00    0.00 
       Nominal wages (W)     -0.02   -0.03   -0.04   -0.05   -0.07   -0.09   -0.09 
       Consumer prices (PPc)     0.00   -0.02   -0.04   -0.05   -0.06   -0.09   -0.11 
       Price of domestic good (PPy)    0.00   -0.02   -0.03   -0.05   -0.06   -0.09   -0.10 
       Disposable income (YD)   -0.43   -0.43   -0.43   -0.43   -0.43   -0.43   -0.43 
       Expenditure on GDP (YE)   -0.09   -0.09   -0.09   -0.09   -0.09   -0.09   -0.09 
       Fiscal deficit (FD)                 -6.57      -7.45      -8.21      -8.60   -8.97   -9.26   -9.44 
Notes: (a) The baseline scenario is the dynamic simulation with actual data for all endogenous and 
exogenous variables; (b) The abbreviation assigned to each variable in the SLM is given in parenthesis.    
 
 
5.3.4 A Comparative Analysis on Expenditure Multipliers 
In this section, we compare how an equal percent reduction in CG, IG and TG 
affect some selected macroeconomic variables. Figure 5.2 and Figure 5.3 illustrate 
short-term and long-term effects of reductions in CG, IG and TG.  
 
Private Consumption 
Low CG reduces private consumption very slightly from the second period of 
the shock and onwards. If IG falls instead of CG, it would affect private consumption 
to a larger extent. The fall continues up to three years before it tapers off to zero. An 
equal percent reduction in TG immediately lowers private consumption. But from the 
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 second period, the effect turns out slightly positive before it decays towards zero. The 
cumulative effect of IG on private consumption is very high compared to that of CG 
and TG.  
 
Investment and Capital Stock 
A fall in TG has virtually no impact on private investment. The effect of CG 
on private investment is also negligible. Nevertheless, in response to a decrease in IG 
private consumption spending falls significantly. Though the effect gradually tapers 
off to zero, it lasts for more than 10 years. For changes in CG and TG, total 
investment does not respond significantly. But it responds to IG changes by large 
amounts. Initial large effect of IG shock reduces in the second period and then 
gradually tapers off to zero. In sum, 10 percent cut in IG lowers total investment by 3 
percent in 10 years.  
Only changes in IG have significant impact on the economy’s capital stock. 
One-time reduction in IG lowers capital accumulation up to seven years. Then only 
the effect starts to decrease slowly.  
 
Labour Demand 
Changes in CG and IG but TG affect the time path of labour demand.  As CG 
decreases, labour demand falls slightly from the third of the shock. If IG decreases 
instead, labour demand falls by 0.12 percent at the time of the shock. The effect, then, 
gradually reduces towards zero. The cumulative effect of IG on labour demand is 
nearly four times higher than that of CG.  
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IG shock CG shock TG shock  
       Figure 5.2: Impact Multipliers of Government Spending Shocks (Selected Variables) 
      (Percentage deviation of the counterfactual path from the control-run) 
       Note: The expenditure shock is given at period (year) 1. 
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IG shock CG shock TG shock  
 
    Figure 5.3: Cumulative Effect of Government Expenditure Shocks (Selected Variables)  






 The country’s GDP is hardly affected by changes in TG. A fall in CG has 
slight impact on GDP only after seven years. Despite this insignificant impact of CG 
and TG, changes in IG have large short-term and long-term impact on GDP. In sum, 
10 percent (one-time) fall in IG reduces GDP by 1.4 percent in ten years time. 
 
International Trade 
As Figure 5.2 illustrates, falls in CG and TG do not have significant impact on 
exports of Sri Lanka. But, in response to a fall in IG exports decreases significantly. 
The decrease in exports is mainly brought by decreased capital stock. The effect 
tapers off to zero in seven years. It turns positive at the end of the simulation period. 
The rise in exports in the later years is due to increased export prices.  
Unlike the case of exports, changes in expenditure components affect imports 
significantly. Demand for imports falls considerably when TG falls. This fall is due a 
decrease in disposable income. TG, however, does not have long-term impact on 
imports. Though the impact of decrease in CG on imports is negligible at the time of 
the shock, it increases gradually. On the other hand, 10 percent fall in IG immediately 
decreases imports by 0.21 percent. The effect decays slowly towards zero as time 
passes (see, Figure 5.3). In ten years, the cumulative negative effect of 10 percent fall 
in IG, CG and TG on imports is 2, 1 and 0.4 percent respectively.   
 
Government Revenue 
It is found that changes in TG leave government revenue totally unaffected. A 
change in CG marginally affects tax revenue with a long lag. The fall in government 
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 revenue is, however, comparably high if IG decreases. The fall in tax revenue 
continues for three years before it start to tapers off to zero slowly. Due to 10 percent 
cut in IG, tax revenue falls cumulatively by 1.4 percent in a decade.  
 
Government Interest Payments 
Interest payment spending responds to changes in other four components of 
expenditure with a lag. A decreased fiscal deficit lowers interest payment expenditure 
in the future. The effect continues until the change in deficit approaches zero. The 
extent of the fall in interest payments spending depends on the size of the initial fall in 
fiscal deficit.   
Though the impact pattern is similar, the size of the effect of three expenditure 
components on interest payments differs largely. In response to 10 percent cut in IG, 
TG and CG, interest payment spending falls immediately by 0.7, 1 and 3 percent 
respectively. The effect of IG shock slowly tapers off to zero and then becomes 
positive. But the negative impact of TG and CG on interest payments slowly 
decreases towards zero. The ten year period cumulative effect of 10 percent reduction 
in IG, TG and CG amounts to 2, 4 and 10 percent respectively.  
 
Aggregate Expenditure 
Changes in CG and IG are expected to have larger impact on aggregate 
expenditure than changes TG. This is because CG and IG are direct components of 
aggregate expenditure. The immediate effect of CG on aggregate expenditure is large. 
The effect dies out to zero in the second period. The fall in IG reduces aggregate 
expenditure immediately by 0.7 percent. The effect then follows a gradual decaying 
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 pattern. In response to a fall in TG, aggregate expenditure decreased slightly only in 
the initial period of the shock due the contemporaneous effect on private consumption 




Fall in fiscal deficit is obvious for decreases in any component of government 
expenditure. The initial fall in fiscal deficit due to 10 percent cut in CG, IG and TG is 
about 17, 5 and 7 percent respectively. As Figure 5.2 illustrates, the negative effects 
of CG and TG shocks, then, taper off to zero gradually. However, the fall in IG 
reduces deficit only up to two periods. Third period onwards the effect turns positive 
as the economy is experiencing a recession. Falling tax revenue (due to the recession) 
and increasing expenditure (due to high interest payments) result in an increasing 
deficit. This subsequent positive impact reduces the cumulative negative effect 
substantially. However, the cumulative effects of TG and CG on fiscal deficit amount 
to -10 and -25 percent. 
As emphasized in Chapter 1, it is worth examining changes in fiscal deficits in 
relation to the size of the economy. Therefore, we compare the impact on the fiscal 
deficit ratio (deficit as a percent of GDP). Figure 5.4 illustrates the impact of 
reductions in CG, IG and TG on deficit ratio. A reduction in CG causes a significant 
fall in the deficit ratio (by 1.08 percent) immediately. The effect drops markedly in 
the second period and then gradually tapers off to zero. Second large effect on the 
fiscal deficit ratio is borne by cuts in TG. A 10 percent cut in TG immediately lowers 
deficit ratio by 0.4 percent. The effect lasts for another 8 to 10 years with 
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 geometrically decaying pattern. However, an equal percent cut in IG immediately 
lowers deficit ratio by only 0.3 percent. The effect quickly turns positive and shows 
an upward trend. Results indicate that reductions in government consumption 
expenditure and transfer payments (to households) lower the deficit ratio markedly. A 
similar fall in government investment spending increases the deficit ratio in the long-
run despite the initial decrease.  
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             Figure 5.4: Change in Fiscal Deficit Ratio in Response to Spending Cuts 
 Note: Baseline stands for baseline FD as a ratio of baseline GDP. FD ratio attached to each 




In this chapter, we examine the economic impact of alternative fiscal deficit 
reduction policies. The focus was on the impact of an equal percent reduction in 
consumption, investment and transfer payments (to households) expenditures of the 
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 government. In the SLM, changes in government consumption expenditure affect the 
economy through aggregate expenditure and through the unemployment rate. A fall in 
government consumption expenditure lowers aggregate expenditure and therefore 
reduces aggregate demand. The resulting fall in excess demand lowers prices. The 
effect, then, transmits through demand and supply factors. Moreover, a fall in 
consumption expenditure affects nominal and real sectors through the unemployment 
rate as well. Changes in transfer payments to households affect aggregate expenditure 
through private consumption and import demand. On the other hand, changes in 
investment expenditure directly affect both the aggregate demand and supply-sides of 
the economy. A fall in government investment spending reduces aggregate 
expenditure directly and aggregate supply by slowing down capital accumulation. 
Results indicate that a reduction in government consumption expenditure 
initially affect only on few variables such as money demand, imports, aggregate 
expenditure, interest payments, the unemployment rate, fiscal deficit. The change 
leaves many real variables, especially the production sector, unchanged. But it has a 
significant impact on nominal variables, prices and money wages. The fall in fiscal 
deficit is large as the initial fall in consumption expenditure lowers government 
expenditure in many ways. Moreover, in response to one-time shock in government 
consumption expenditure, fiscal deficit continues to fall over ten years or more.  
Since changes in government transfer payments to households affect the 
economy only through disposable income in the SLM, its temporary cuts immediately 
lower private consumption, imports and fiscal deficits. From the second period, the 
effect on private consumption and imports turns out to be marginally positive. 
Nevertheless, the change affects the paths of fiscal deficit and thus, interest payments 
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 considerably. A decrease in transfer payments does not affect aggregate demand and 
aggregate supply largely. Hence, it leaves nominal variables largely unaffected.           
Results reveal that decreases in investment expenditure leads the economy into 
a severe contraction both in the short-run and in the long-run. A fall in total 
investment, thus, in capital stock arising from the decreased government investments, 
lowers GDP. This initial fall in GDP reinforces as it lowers private investment, capital 
stock, labour demand, aggregate demand, prices and wages in many rounds. By 
lowering investment spending the government could decrease fiscal deficit in the 
short-run. But such attempt increases deficit in the long-run as it reduces tax revenue.  
These results draw important policy implications on deficit reduction through 
cutting down government consumption, investment and transfer payment expenditure. 
If the government of Sri Lanka chooses to reduce deficit by lowering consumption 
and or transfer payments expenditure, the policy does not affect the other sectors of 
the economy significantly. But such a policy would lower fiscal deficits continuously 
and considerably. Instead, if the government decides to slash investment expenditure 
it can still reduce the fiscal stress in the short-run. But the policy obviously leads the 
economy into severe contraction in the short-run and in the long-run. The resulting 
recession will in fact end up in large fiscal deficits as government revenue falls 
significantly.  
Thus, policy advice here is not to lower government investment expenditure 
aiming fiscal consolidation. Such a policy would deteriorate the government balance 
sheet. Since government consumption and transfer payment spending do not have 
significant impact on the economy and large part of these expenditures are borne by 
the civil war, a negotiated settlement to the country’s ethnic issue would ensure the 
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 fiscal consolidation of the government of Sri Lanka. Further, it would enhance the 


























CONCLUDING REMARKS  
 
6.1 Fiscal Sustainability  
Fiscal sustainability requires that the government should match its current 
stock of debt to the discounted sum of expected future primary surpluses. We argue 
that tests based on the full intertemporal budget constraint are more desirable than the 
tests based on debt or surplus series alone. However, we reckon that existing present 
value model requires substantial modifications to explain non-stationary movements 
in the debt series over a longer period of time. Thus, we extend the present value 
model under rational expectations to include a large information set on the present 
value of discounted debt.  
 Based on the current and lagged values of taxes, government expenditure, M1 
money stock, government foreign financial assets, the unemployment rate, and the 
real interest rate as predictors of future surpluses, the model that we developed 
predicts the U.S. net debt stock very well over very different fiscal episodes. The 
model provides highly stable recursive estimates on the main coefficient 0A  
(coefficient of the deterministic bubble term, (1+r)t) that tests the validity of the 
present value borrowing constraint. Our results show that the U.S. federal budgetary 
policies do not violate the present value borrowing constraint. That is, the U.S. federal 
government is solvent in the long-run, despite the observed rapid rise in the debt 
series since 1980s. 
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 The main policy implication of the study is that non-stationarity in the public 
debt series alone is inadequate to decide whether the policy violates the present value 
borrowing constraint. Non-stationarity in debt series could be a result of non-
stationarity in the scale of the economy and, therefore, the budget variables. Therefore, 
for fiscal sustainability, one needs to take into account the scaling effect of the 
economy too. Once full information in the present value borrowing constraint are 
incorporated, non-stationarities in the U.S. debt series are explained well without the 
help of artificially defined dummy variables or regime shifts.    
  
6.2 Tax Smoothing  
The tax smoothing hypothesis, which states that a constant tax rate would 
minimize the deadweight loss of taxation, predicts that the tax rate follows a random 
walk. That is, only the current tax rate has a significant predictive power over future 
tax rates. A random walk in tax rate, however, does not necessarily lend support to the 
tax smoothing hypothesis because a random walk in the tax rate may arise due to 
other reasons.   
Therefore, we present a new theoretical and empirical framework to test the 
tax smoothing hypothesis. Assuming growth rates of non-interest expenditure and 
output are less than the real rate of interest and using the random walk assumption in 
the tax rate, we derive a linear relationship between the optimal tax rate and 
permanent component of the government expenditure rate. Positive linear association 
between tax and permanent expenditure rates provides a new framework for testing 
the tax smoothing hypothesis. The model predicts that the current tax rate must be 
cointegrated with one period lagged permanent component of the government 
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 expenditure rate. Since the permanent expenditure rate is itself a random walk, we 
propose that tax rate at time t and the permanent expenditure rate at time t-1 are 
cointegrated if tax rate and the permanent expenditure rate are perfectly colinear. 
Further, we show that once the tax rate at time t and the permanent expenditure rate at 
time t-1 are cointegrated, the significance of any other relevant information in the 
form of I(0) variables in the tax rate equation does not violate the tax smoothing 
hypothesis. Based on conditions of cointegration and an error correction model of the 
tax rate, we propose that countries could follow either strong/weak forms of tax 
smoothing or no tax smoothing. We found that the tax rate in all six countries in the 
sample follows a random walk. Nonetheless, cointegration test and error correction 
model results support only the weak form of tax smoothing in all the cases. It should 
be noted that this result is not observable from random walk tests on the tax rate.   
 
6.3 Simulation Experiments on Government Spending in Sri Lanka 
We examine the macroeconomic impact of equal percent reductions in 
consumption, investment and transfer payments (to households) expenditure of the 
government of Sri Lanka.   
Government consumption expenditure reduction affects only few variables 
(such as money demand, imports, aggregate expenditure, interest payments, fiscal 
deficit). Many real variables, especially the production sector, remain unchanged. But 
it has a significant impact on nominal variables (prices and money wages). 
Government consumption expenditure cuts lead to large falls in interest payments and 
fiscal deficit.  
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 A decrease in transfer payments immediately lowers only private consumption, 
imports and fiscal deficits. The change does not alter aggregate demand and aggregate 
supply decisions and therefore the nominal sector. However, it affects the time paths 
of fiscal deficit and thus, interest payments markedly.  
Simulation results show that falls in government investment expenditure lead 
the economy into a contraction. Low investment, thus, slow capital accumulation have 
negative effect on the economy’s real output. This initial fall in output reinforces as it 
lowers investment, capital stock, labour demand, aggregate demand, prices and wages 
in many rounds. By lowering investment spending the government could decrease 
fiscal deficit. But the effect quickly turns positive as it reduces tax revenue.  
These results have important policy implications on deficits reduction by 
lowering government expenditures. If the government of Sri Lanka chooses to reduce 
deficit by slashing consumption expenditure and or transfer payments, it does not 
affect the other sectors of the economy significantly. But such policy will lower fiscal 
deficits continuously and significantly. Instead, if the government decide to cut 
investment expenditure, it can still reduce the fiscal deficits in the short-run. But this 
policy choice obviously leads the economy into a recession. The government would in 
fact end up in large fiscal deficits as its revenue falls significantly.  
 
6.4 Prospects for Future Research  
In this section, we propose some possible extensions to the research content of 
this thesis. They are as follows: 
(a) The present methodology on the fiscal sustainability can be applied for many 
developed and developing countries. Since fiscal policy choices mainly 
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 depend on country specific conditions and political regimes, it would 
provide a comparative analysis on the issue of fiscal sustainability.  
  
(b) The model developed for Sri Lanka for policy simulation experiments can be 
extended in many ways. This includes further disaggregation of government 
expenditures and revenues, inclusion of foreign and domestic borrowings, 
costs of borrowing, and disaggregation of all other sectors of the economy. 
Moreover, links between monetary and fiscal policy variables need to be 
developed. In Sri Lanka, as in many other developing countries, monetary 
and fiscal policy instruments are closely linked. And policies which mix 
both these instruments are often used to stimulate economic growth and to 
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DERIVATION OF EQUATIONS IN CHAPTER TWO 
 
A: Intertemporal Budget Constraint With Constant Real Interest Rate  
The instantaneous budget constraint of the government is given as follows: 
ttt SDrD −+= −1)1(                                                                                     (AI.1) 
 where D is government debt stock, r is real interest rate paid on existing debt and S is 
primary surplus,   in which T is tax revenue and G0ttt GTS −= 0 is interest payment 
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 By substituting the each period debt series up to N-t periods to (AI.2) we obtain debt 












1 .                                                            (AI.3) 
Rearranging (AI.3) and taking expectation with information set at time t and the 
condition of iterative expectations, we arrive at 
∑∞










ErD .                             (AI.4)  
When no-Ponzi-game (NPG) condition holds for the government, that is 
0
)1(
1lim =+∞→ NNtN DrE , 
(AI.4) states that the current stock of debt must equal to the present discounted value 
of expected future surpluses. 
 
B: Intertemporal Budget Constraint With Variable Real Interest Rate  
When the real rate of interest paid on existing debt is variable, the 
instantaneous budget constraint of the government is given as follows: 
tttt SDrD −+= −1)1(  .     

















D .                                                               (AI.5) 














































By iterating continuously forward for t+N period and substituting we obtain the 

































.                                        (AI.6) 
By rearranging (AI.6) and taking expectations on information at time t and applying 
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C: Rational Expectations Representation for the Discounted Sum of Expected 
Future Primary Surpluses 
We derive an expression for the discounted sum of expected future primary 
surpluses in terms of observed variables in a framework of rational expectations. The 
following derivation is from Hansen and Sargent (1980) with some modifications to 
accommodate non-stationary variables. With conditions of constant conditional 
expectations and the iterated expectations of real interest rate, we shall express the 
discounted sum of expected future surpluses as 













where ( )r+= 11ρ , t tZ a X′= , a is an (n×1) vector of constants and X is an (n×1) 
vector of relevant informational variables known both to the government and the 
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 public, and wt is an unsystematic informational variable only known to the 
government with the property 0t t kE w + = . The information set Xt may include both 
stationary and non-stationary variables and we assume that Zt is stationary but it 




We assume the following finite order moving average representation for Zt  
ttt eLeLLZ )()()]([
1 βθη == −                                                                      (AI.9) 
where )()()( LLL ηθβ = .                                                
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where jjj ηθβ /= and j = k, k+1,…, ∞.                                           
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j LLLLLL ρρβρβψ  
   )1/())()(( 11 −− −−= LLL ρρβρβ . 









k eLLLZE ρρβρβρ                                        (AI.11) 
From (A1.10) we write 
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   ttt ZLZLe )()]([
1 φβ == − .                                                                         (AI.12)  
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Accordingly,  series depends on the current and r-1 lagged values of Z. Obviously 




















DERIVATION OF EQUATIONS IN CHAPTER THREE 
 
We assume that the time path of government expenditure is exogenously given 
and taxation necessarily involves deadweight loss to the private economy. We further 
assume that this deadweight loss of taxation is an increasing and convex function of 
the tax rate. Following Roubini (1988), Bohn (1990) and Ghosh (1995), we define the 
deadweight loss of taxation per unit of output (z) in the following simple form  
( ) 22ttz ττ =                                                                                               (AII.1) 
where τ is the tax rate. This quadratic form of the deadweight loss function assures 
that ( ) 0>′ tz τ  and ( ) .0>′′ tz τ  Since a single tax rate is applied to the whole economy, 
we multiply (AII.1) through by  to obtain the total deadweight loss of taxation (Z) 
as  
tY
 ( ) ( ) ttttt YYzZ 2)( 2τττ ==  .                                                                      (AII.2) 
It is important to note that in a stochastic environment, the deadweight loss of taxation 
is determined by the expectations of future tax rates. We assume that agents have 
rational expectations on future interest rate. Thus, the conditional expectation of 
interest rate is constant. From iterated expectations, we can show that the mean of the 
conditional expectations of interest rate is given by its period average. With these 
conditions, the government choose an optimal tax rate by minimizing an intertemporal 
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itttitt TErDGEr                                               (AII.4) 
where G0 is interest payments non-inclusive government expenditure, is the 
initial debt and T is government revenue.  
1−tD
We set the above optimization problem in ratio form dividing t+i period 
(AII.3) and (AII.4) by  and collecting the ratio form equations. For this, we 
arrange 
itY +
1)1( −+= ttt YY μ where 11 /)( −−−= tttt YYYμ . We maintain that conditional 
expectations of rt and tμ are constant and the law of iterated expectations holds. The 
Lagrange constrained optimization problem that the government faces in choosing an 


































τμλτ    (AII.5) 
where λ  is the Lagrange multiplier. The first order condition w.r.t. it+τ  for the above 
constrained optimization problem can be given as follows: 
:tτ∂∂l      λτ =t   
:1+∂∂ tτl     111 )1()1( −+− +=+ rEr tt λτ  
M  
:it+∂∂ τl   iitti rEr −+− +=+ )1()1( λτ . 
These FOCs yield the following standard result  
tittE ττ =+ ,   for all i = 1,2,…   .                                                               (AII.6) 
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 Equation (AII.6) shows that τ  follows a random walk: No information other 
than the current τ  has a significant power in predicting the futureτ . That is, current 
tax rate is the optimal forecast of future tax rates. It is often viewed that random walk 
in tax rate does not necessarily imply the tax smoothing pattern of fiscal policy.  
Because of the inconclusiveness of random walk tests, there is a necessity for 
a direct test on tax smoothing hypothesis. Therefore, a new methodological 
framework for tax smoothing hypothesis is developed in the following section.  For 
this, we use the following one-period budget constraint of the government; 
tttt TGDrD −++= −1)1(  .                                                                         (AII.7) 
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)1(                                                                           (AII.9) 
where lowercase letters in (AII.9) stand for normalized values of relevant variables. 
(AII.9) is rearranged as  
( )111 +++ +−= tttt gdd τω                                                                            (AII.10) 
where ( )ρμω t+= 1  and ( )tr+= 1/1ρ . Iterating (AII.10) forward and substituting for 















ωτωω .                                                          (AII.11) 
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  Expectations of (AII.11) conditional on information set at time t with the NPG 
condition ( 0lim =+∞→ NtNtN dEω ) result in the following intertemporal budget 











t gEEd ωτω .                                                                  (AII.12) 
Plugging (AII.6) into (AII.12) and assuming that 1<ω  (that is r<μ , the condition 









tt gEd ωωωωωτ .                                           (AII.13) 
To derive an implicit expression for the expected future non-interest spending 
rate in (AII.13), we assume that G and Y are growing at their trend growth rates, 
γ and μ . The time paths of G and Y could, however, deviate from their trends by 
transitory factors tϑ  and tξ . Then, and Y  values at time t+1 take the form:  G
( )( ) ttt GG ϑγ ++=+ 111 ,   and  ( )( ) ttt YY ξμ ++=+ 111 .                               (AII.14) 
Expressing  over  and taking expectations conditional on information set at 























γ .                                                                (AII.15) 
The second part on the r.h.s. of (AII.15) can be written as  
( )( )[ ] ( )[ ] ( )[ ]1111111 1111 ++−+−++ +++=++ tttttttt EEE ξϑξξϑ  
( )[ ] 01 11 ++= −+ttE ξ . 





))(()()( +−′′′+−′′+′= axxfaxxfafxf  
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 and evaluating marginal functions 
1)1()( −+= xxf  
2)1(1)( −+−=′ xxf /1! 
!2/)1(2)( 3−+−=′′ xxf  
M  
at  and with linearization, we have  0=x
( )[ ] 11 11 =+ −+ttE ξ . 
Then (AII.15) is reduced to  
( )





1 .                                                                                  (AII.16) 
From (AII.16), expectations of the t+i period non-interest expenditure rate can be 












1  .                                                                              (AII.17) 
Plugging (AII.17) into (AII.13), we obtain 








tt gd λωωωωτ                                                    (AII.18) 
where ργλ )1( += . Assuming 10 << λ (that is, r<γ ), we solve (AII.13) to arrive at 
[ ] [ ][ ] ttt gd λλωωωωτ /)1(/)1(/)1( −−+−= .                                       (AII.19) 
We substitute ( )ρμω += 1 , ( )r+= 11ρ  and ργλ )1( +=  back into (AII.19) to 
























COINTEGRATION AND ERROR CORRECTION METHODOLOGY 
 
To solve the issue of spurious regression that could associate with non-
stationary variables and to prevent loss of information due to differencing data, 
Davidson, Hendry, Sbra and Yeo (1978) suggested the error correction model (ECM) 
approach which subsequently opened up the way for cointegration among integrated 
variables.  In accordance with cointegration due to Granger (1981) and Engle and 
Granger (1987), if two time series are integrated of order one (or I(1)) individually, 
there exists a linear combination of them that is integrated of order zero (or I(0)). 
Cointegrated variables, if positively related, tend to move parallel to each other. In the 
case of negatively related variables, the reciprocal of one variable moves parallel to 
the other. If variables in a regression are cointegrated the OLS estimators are super-
consistent even if the correlation between regressors and the error term is non-zero. 
That is, in cointegrated systems, simultaneity or endogeneity bias disappears in large 
samples. Despite the property of super-consistency, the OLS estimators of a 
cointegrated system and their test statistics do not follow standard distributions. 
Nevertheless, cointegrating parameters and their test statistics that derived from a 
dynamic model do follow standard distributions (see Pesaran and Shin (1998)). 
Although cointegration implies a causal relationship, the direction of causality 
can not be easily inferred from data. Thus, in general cointegration between two I(1) 
variables, namely  and , can be written as  ty tx
ttt vxy =+ 21 ββ                                                                                        (AIII.1) 
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 where  is I(0) and tv ),( 21 ββ is the cointegrating vector. However, (AIII.1) involves 
an identification problem as any constant times the vector ),( 21 ββ is also a 
cointegrating vector. But if theory directs that be the dependent variable, the 
normalized cointegrating vector 
ty
)/,1( 12 ββ does not involve the identification problem 
as it is unique.  
In a system with more than two I(1) variables, there could be more than one 
cointegrating relationships. Proper modelling requires accounting for all such 
relationships. Let be an ty )1( ×n  vector of I(1) variables such that 
tt uy +=Δ δ                                                                                               (AIII.2) 
where  is a zero mean covariance stationary process. From multivariate version of 
the Wold representation, we have the following infinite order moving average 
[MA(∞)] presentation for : 
tu
tu
...)( 11 ++== −tttt Lu εψεεψ  
where 0)( =tE ε , Ω=),( jtE εε  for jt ≠  and 0 otherwise. From Beveridge-Nelson 
decomposition (Beveridge and Nelson (1981) and see Appendix II also), we write 
(AIII.2) as 
0210 )...)(1( ηηεεεψδ −++++++= ttt tyy   .                                         (AIII.3) 
If the rows of  matrix  represent all the cointegrating vectors, from (AIII.3) 
we have 
)( rn× β
tpt tyy ηεεεψδη βββββ ′++++′+′+−′=′ )...)(1()( 2100                         (AIII.4) 
where represents an  vector of cointegrating relations which are stationary, tyβ′ )1( ×r
tδβ′  is deterministic trend and )...)(1( 21 pεεεψ +++′β is stochastic trend. Thus, 
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 cointegration requires 0=′δβ  and 0)1( =′ψβ  (see Hamilton (1994)). There are several 
representations for a cointegrated system. Phillips’ triangular representation (see 
Philips (1991)) separates the )1( ×n  vector into )1( ×r  vector of cointegrating 
relationships and  vector of unit root variables. The common trend 
representation proposed by Stock and Watson (1988) shows that all the variables in 
the system share common deterministic trend and 
)1)(( ×− rn
)( rn− )( rn−  common stochastic 
trend (see Hamilton (1994)). Engle and Granger (1987) representation suggests the 
estimation of cointegrated systems in two steps. First step is to estimate the 
cointegrating relationship and save long-term residuals. Second step is to estimate an 
error correction model (ECM) using saved long-term residuals. The ECM constitutes 
VAR in first differences other than the error correcting term. Though a cointegrated 
system does not have a finite order VAR presentation for tyΔ , there may be a VAR 
presentation for certain class of variables in levels. Suppose  has the following pty
th 
order VAR model, 
tptttt yyyy ελ +++++= −−− pφφφ ...2111                                                    (AIII.5) 
where λ is a vector of intercept terms. Cointegration implies that 
pnI φφφφ( −−−−= ...)1 21  is a singular matrix (see Hamilton (1994)). If the rank of 
is r, then we can write  )1φ(
βαφ( ′=)1                                                                                                 (AIII.6) 
where α and β  are  matrices each with rank r. Then, we write (AIII.5) as  )( rn×
ttptpttt yyyyy ελ +++Δ++Δ+Δ= −−−−−− 1)1(12111 ... ρΓΓΓ                            (AIII.7) 
where pφφφρ +++= ...21 , )...( 21 piii φφφ +++−=Γ ++  for 1,...,2,1 −= pi . By subtracting 
 from both sides of (AIII.7), we obtain 1−ty
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 ttptpttt yyyyy ελ +++Δ++Δ+Δ=Δ −−−−−− 1)1(12111 ... ΠΓΓΓ                        (AIII.8) 
where )1()...()( 21 φφφφρ −=−−−−−=−−=Π pnn II . Plugging (AIII.6) into (AIII.8), 
we obtain the following ECM representation: 
ttptpttt yyyyy ελ ++′−Δ++Δ+Δ=Δ −−−−−− )(... 1)1(12111 βαΓΓΓ                 (AIII.9) 
where represents the r cointegrating relationships and α is the matrix of 
adjustment coefficients.  
tyβ′
If n = 3 such that , and , and r = 2, then two cointegrating relationships can 
be written as 
ty1 ty2 ty3
tttt yyyz 3312211111 βββ ++=  
                                                                                                               (AIII.10) 
tttt yyyz 3322221122 βββ ++=                                                         
 
where iβ are cointegrating parameters and are zero mean I(0) error terms. Then, 
the vector ECM ignoring constant terms and lags of 
itz































































.                                                   (AIII.11) 
It should be noted that all iα coefficients are not necessarily non-zero. The non-zero 
iα  coefficients indicate how and which variables make the adjustments in response to 
the equilibrium errors, and . tz1 tz2
In case some of the variables in the cointegrating system are I(2) and others 
are I(1), it is possible that a linear combination of I(2) variables that is I(1) can be 
cointegrated with I(1) variables of the system. This is known as multicointegration. 
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 Suppose and are I(2) and  is I(1). The long-run equilibrium solution can be 
given as follows: 
ty1 ty2 ty3
ttt yyy 33221 ββ += .                                                                                (AIII.12) 
The linear combination )( 221 tt yy β−  is I(1). If multicointegration presents the linear 
combination ttt yyy 33221 )( ββ −− produces a series that is I(0). The detection of 
multicointegration involves two-step procedure. In the first step, one must find a 
possible cointegration relationship between I(2) variables. In the second step, the 
estimated cointegration relation between I(2) variables is used to find the 
cointegrating relation with remaining I(1) variables in the system (see Enders (2004: p. 
343)).    
The general VAR system presented in (AIII.5) through (AIII.11) cannot, 
however, be implemented in large scale macroeconometric models like that we 
constructed because data and other errors in some equations will affect all the 
estimates. Therefore, we followed the single-equation ECM approach known as the 
LSE methodology (see pages 88-89). In this framework, static version of each 
equation is guided by economic theory. We applied the Johansen (1988) procedure 
initially to determine the cointegrating rank. When find one normalized cointegrating 
vector, we moved to model the variable as a single-equation dynamic error correction 
model using general-to-specific modelling approach. I(1) variables those do not have 
long-run equilibrium solutions are estimated in first differenced form. Since all the 
model variables are stationary, this modelling approach does not fall into the issue of 
simultaneity bias. The approach recommends extensive tests on the model relevance 
and robustness. According to this methodology, a model which adequately describes 
historical data, derives from well based theories and passes rigorous tests for model 
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 robustness could be used for policy analysis and for forecasting with greater accuracy 


























CONSTRUCTION OF VARIABLES USED IN CHAPTER FOUR  
 
A. Capital Stock Estimates  
We use the perpetual inventory accumulation method to calculate the overall 
capital stock of the Sri Lankan economy. Accordingly, capital stock at time t is given 
as follows: 
ttt IKK +−= −1)1( δ                                                                                 (AIV.1) 
where K is capital stock, δ is the rate of depreciation of capital stock, I is gross 
investment.  In (AIV.1), one unit of investment yields one unit of new capital and 
existing capital depreciates at a rate, δ. From time series data sources, we observe data 
only for I in (AIV.1). To compute K over time, we should know values of δ and the 
initial capital stock.  
We approximate the rate of depreciation of the overall capital stock by the 
average of depreciation rates for each type of capital stock. These depreciation rates 
are originally reported in Hulten and Wykoff (1980) and reproduced in Tsao (1985, 
1986), Young (1992) and Rao and Lee (1995). Reported depreciation rates are: 1.3 
percent for residential constructions, 2.9 percent for non-residential constructions, 
18.2 percent for transport equipments and 13.8 percent for machinery. We use the 
average of these depreciation rates, 9.05 percent, as the depreciation rate of the overall 
capital stock of Sri Lanka. The rate seems to be reasonable as most of the capital in 
Sri Lanka is categorized under the above types.  
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 To find an approximation to the initial capital stock, we use the implications of 
the average capital output ratio (ACOR) and the incremental capital output ratio 











It is important to note that for a given depreciation rate and an initial value of capital 
stock, a fairly stable ICOR could mean the stability of ACOR as well. As this point 
deserves further clarification, suppose capital output ratio is given by a constant, λ. 
Then, we write 
)()( tYtK λ= .                                                                                          (AIV.2) 





tdK .                                                                                              (AIV.3) 
For a given depreciation rate and an initial capital stock, (AIV.3) implies that ICOR is 
also equal to the constant, λ. Since the reverse case is also true, this implies that a 
stable ICOR means a stable ACOR. Given the unavailability of data for K, we do not 
observe ACOR. But ICOR can be computable as I and Y are observable.  
Computed ICOR values are illustrated in Figure AIV.1. It seems that ICOR 
figures vary greatly in different investment and growth episodes. However, we 
observe that ICOR is relatively stable during the period 1963-1966. ICOR figures for 
years 1963, 1964, 1965 and 1966 are 4.6759, 6.1726, 3.7496 and 4.4694 respectively. 
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Capital Stock Estimates for Sri Lanka (1966-2004)(a) 
(LKR Million in 2000 Prices) 
      Gross Capital       Gross Capital 
 Year   Investment  Stock   Year  Investment  Stock 
1966     270.26 8989.18 1986     1768.18 13239.01 
1967     304.64 8480.31 1987     1774.28 13815.16 
1968     355.15 8067.99 1988     1684.78 14249.67 
1969     438.48 7776.32 1989     1645.15 14605.22 
1970     433.53 7506.09 1990     1747.06 15030.51 
1971     422.94 7249.73 1991     1868.79 15539.04 
1972     315.58 6909.21 1992     1951.38 16084.13 
1973     332.14 6616.07 1993     2237.47 16865.99 
1974     498.94 6516.25  1994     2527.66 17867.28 
1975     473.76 6400.30  1995     2624.20 18874.49 
1976     581.48 6302.55 1996     2407.72 19574.06 
1977     629.33 6452.45  1997     2633.81 20436.42 
1978     950.03 6818.53 1998     2840.47 21427.39 
1979   1333.42 7534.87  1999     3202.57 22690.79 
1980   1534.50 8387.46 2000     3525.52 24162.79 
1981   1552.57 9180.16 2001     2712.05 24688.11 
1982   1833.04         10183.12 2002     2608.90 25062.74 
1983   1904.15         11165.70 2003     2891.67 25686.23 
1984   1809.59         11964.80 2004     3542.17 26903.80 
1985   1730.25         12612.23    
Source: Author’s calculation based on gross investment and changes in stocks data reported in 
Annual Reports, Central Bank of Sri Lanka. 
Note: (a) We treat changes in stocks as unintended. Therefore, investment and capital stock 




Since the stability of ICOR means a stable ACOR as well, the average of 
ICOR figures of 1963-66 period, 4.7675, is used as an approximation to the value of 
ACOR for the period 1963-66. Then the approximated capital stock figures for the 
years 1963 through to 1966 are computed multiplying 4.7675 by the real GDP 
(deflated by CPI at 2000 prices) of each year. The computed initial (real) capital stock 
figures for years 1963, 1964, 1965 and 1966 (in millions of Sri Lanka rupees) are 
8215.53, 8410.12, 8700.90 and 8989.18 respectively. Now we use the 1966 figure as 
the initial value of the capital stock. Since all changes in stocks are treated as 
unintended (in our macroeconometric model developed in Chapter 4), our gross 
investment figures do not include changes in stocks. The computed capital stock 
figures using (AIV.1) are given in Table AIV.1.      
 
B. Interpolation of Employment and Unemployment Data   
 
Since a systematic labour force survey (Quarterly Labour Force Survey) was 
started in 1990, continuous and consistent data for employment and the 
unemployment rate of Sri Lanka are available only from 1990. Before that labour 
force data reported by various sample surveys are not continuous. These data are not 
consistent overtime and survey-wise as well. One issue we face in modeling Sri 
Lankan economy is the lack of long-term labour market data. In order to link the 
labour market decision to the aggregate economy, we, at least, need data on 
employment (in estimating a production function), the unemployment rate (in 
modelling labour market disequilibrium effects) in addition to the nominal wage rates. 
Therefore, we interpolate employment and the unemployment rate data for the period 
1977-1989 based on the reported data for the period 1990-2004.      
 231
 Employment Data 
 
We estimate an employment function for the period 1990-2004. First, we fit 
actual employment data by various observed variables. Even though our objective was 
here to find a best fit model, we choose explanatory variables carefully to hold the 
theoretical consistency as well. We specify employment as a function of factors that 
determine the demand for labour and of supply of labour. Therefore, we have 
),/,,( tttttt PWPOPYfEmp τ=                                                                 (AIV.4) 
where Emp is number of persons employed, Y is real GDP, POP is total population, 
W/P is real wage and τ is average tax rate (T/Y).  
The effect of Y on Emp is expected to be positive because high income leads 
to high demand for labour. It is obvious that an increase in POP will also lead to high 
employment, an effect arising through the supply-side. The real wage rate accounts 
for both the demand-side and supply-side effects on employment. If W/P is high, 
firms demand less labour. From the supply-side, higher W/P attracts more workers. 
Therefore, the final effect is ambiguous. We include tax rate in the employment 
equation because of its impressive predictive performance. Since we use the average 
tax rate (government revenue/GDP), τ also captures the business cycle effect. Since 
higher tax rate discourages firms or income earners, it will have negative effect on 
employment. Because of better predictive power, we use the first difference of Y in 
place of the level series. Further, we account for an outlying effect in the year 1997. 
The estimated employment function for the period 1990-2004 is given as follows (t 




 )/log(369.0)log(249.1)log(223.1798.0)log( ttttt PWPOPYEMP −+Δ+−=  
                                  (-0.72)   (5.34)                 (4.32)                   (-3.71) 
 
97055.0226.1 Dt −− τ                                                      (AIV.5) 
   (-2.07)     (-3.62) 
 
R2     0.992    
Log-likelihood   46.65 
Regression F test F(5,9)  220.3 (0.000) 
AR 1-1 F (1,8)   0.426 (0.532)  
ARCH 1-1 F (1,7)   0.092 (0.770) 
Normality Chi^2(2)    1.436 (0.488) 
RESET F(1,8)   0.388 (0.551). 
 
 
The fit of the model is pretty impressive as R2 is high as 0.992. As it can be 
seen in Figure AIII.2, fitted values of the model track actual data quite well. Further, 
the model passes all the diagnostic tests except tests on heteroscedasticity. It is 
reported that the number of observations are not enough to conduct the hetero F test.   
  
      























     
      Figure AIV.2: Actual and Fitted Values of Employment, 1990-2004      
 
 
As expected all the independent variables in (AIV.4) have expected signs and 
are significant. Higher output and population increase total employment. A negative 
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 coefficient on the real wage implies that the demand effect of the real wage dominates 
over the supply effect. As expected, an increase in average tax rate results in lower 
employment. These estimated relationships are found robust as recursive estimates of 
the model are quite stable over time.  
 
Table AIV.2 
Actual and Estimated Data for Employment and Unemployment 
         Employment (million-persons)          Unemployment rate 
Year   Actual       Estimated  Actual           Estimated 
1977    ---        4.474     ---  0.2113 
1978    ---        4.025     ---  0.2788 
1979    ---        3.988     ---  0.2387 
1980    ---        4.357     ---  0.1920 
1981    ---        4.718     ---  0.1789 
1982    ---        4.919     ---  0.1526 
1983    ---        4.817     ---  0.1816 
1984    ---        4.534     ---  0.2180 
1985    ---        4.629     ---  0.1911 
1986    ---        4.712     ---  0.1701 
1987    ---        4.667     ---  0.1778 
1988    ---        4.755     ---  0.1486 
1989    ---        4.673     ---  0.1656 
1990  5.047        5.018  0.1590  0.1600 
1991  5.015        5.051  0.1467  0.1476  
1992  4.962        4.953  0.1457  0.1450 
1993  5.201        5.200  0.1378  0.1352 
1994  5.281        5.348  0.1311  0.1312 
1995  5.357        5.360  0.1227  0.1247 
1996  5.537        5.509  0.1129  0.1128 
1997  5.608        5.614  0.1050  0.1024 
1998  6.049        5.961  0.0917  0.0910 
1999  6.082        6.065  0.0886  0.0887 
2000  6.310        6.441  0.0757  0.0748 
2001  6.236        6.244  0.0793  0.0782 
2002  6.519        6.672  0.0876  0.0894 
2003  7.013        6.905  0.0837  0.0875 
2004  7.319        7.268  0.0855  0.0855 
Source: Actual data for employment and unemployment rate are from Annual Reports, 
Central Bank of Sri Lanka. Estimated data are author’s calculation. 
 
 
We use estimated (AIV.5) to predict employment figures for the period 1990-
2004 as well as the employment figures of the years 1989 backwards. For this purpose, 
we assume that estimated coefficients of (AIV.5) are constant for the period before 
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 1989 as well. Then, employment data for the period 1977-1989 are interpolated using 
these constant coefficients and observed independent variables. Actual data for the 
period 1990-2004 and our estimated data for the period 1977-2004 are reported in 
Table AIV.2. In Chapter 4, we used estimated data for the period 1978-1989 and 
actual figures for the period 1990-2004. These data well perform in estimating labour 
demand equation, wage rate determination and the aggregate production function.   
 
Unemployment Data  
We estimate the unemployment rate for the period 1990-2004 using the 
reported data. Unemployment rate is specified as a function of changes in real GDP, 
government consumption expenditure (GC) and the average tax rate. That is  
),,( tttt GCYfU τΔ= .                                                                              (AIV.6) 
It is expected that an increase in Y lowers U as implied by the Okun’s law. 
Though the change in CG is appropriate in (AIV.4), we use logGC as it well captures 
the trending pattern of U. It is also expected that higher GC reduces U as people find 
more employment opportunities in government undertakings such as military. We 
find that tax rate well captures the dynamic behaviour of U over time. We expect a 
higher U if tax rate is high. We believe that tax rate also captures a part of business 
cycle effect on U. The estimated U equation is given as follows (with t values in 
parentheses):  
94007.0897.0log066.0log065.0401.0 DGCYU tttt ++−Δ−= τ             
                     (9.01)   (-1.81)             (-12.0)               (20.1)      (3.09) 
 
04009.099009.0 DD +−                                                              (AIV.7) 




 R2     0.996    
Log-likelihood   74.84 
Regression F test F(6,8)  363.1 (0.000) 
AR 1-1 F (1,7)   1.230 (0.304)  
ARCH 1-1 F (1,6)   0.391 (0.555) 
Normality Chi^2(2)    1.712 (0.425) 
RESET F(1,7)   0.064 (0.807).    
 



















   
      Figure AIV.3: Actual and Fitted Values of the Unemployment Rate, 1990-2004.            
 
The estimated U equation fit well with the actual data for the period 1990-
2004. R2 value is almost one. And fitted values of the model closely track the actual 
data series (see Figure AIV.3). Further, (AIV.5) passes all the diagnostic tests too. As 
expected high Y and GC decreases U while high tax rate increases it.  The estimated 
coefficients are significantly different from zero. Recursive estimates of coefficients 
reveals that they are highly stable over time.  
We use this estimated equation to interpolate unemployment data for the 
period 1977-1989. Again, we assume that estimated coefficients are constant over 
time. Then using observed data for independent variables and constant coefficients we 
compute the unemployment rate for the years 1989 backwards. Actual and estimated 
values for unemployment rate are given in Table AIV.2. One can use a combination 
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 of these interpolated data and actual data in economic analyses. We use estimated data 
for the period 1978-1989 and actual figures for the period 1990-2004 in estimating an 
unemployment rate equation and a price determination (the Phillips curve) equation in 
Chapter 4. 
 
C. Trade-weighted Exchange Rate and World Income  
Trade-weighted Exchange Rate 
In exports and imports equations, exchange rate plays a vital role. Since trade 
involves with many countries, it is necessary to have a weighted average exchange 
rate rather than a single country exchange rate in modeling exports and imports. 
Therefore, we compute a trade-weighted exchange rate for Sri Lanka for the period 















                                                                              (AIV.8) 
where is the exchange rate between Sri Lanka rupee and US dollar (LKR per U.S. 
dollar),  is the ith trading-partner country’s currency per U.S. dollar and 
tER
itER , iω  is the 
















Imω                                                                                 (AIV.9) 
where is Sri Lanka’s exports to country i and Im is imports from country i to Sri 
Lanka. We limit n in (AIV.8) and (AIV.9) to 15. These 15 trading partner countries 
iEx
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 represent 74.09 percent of total external trade of Sri Lanka. The following table gives 
Sri Lanka’s 15 major trading partners and their respective weights; 
 
Table AIV.3 
Weights Assigned to Major Trading Partner Countries of Sri Lanka(a) 
                          Country     Weight   
US     0.2826 
UK     0.1215 
Japan     0.1015 
India     0.0763 
Hong Kong    0.0678 
Singapore    0.0645 
South Korea    0.0495 
Germany    0.0449 
Belgium    0.0367 
China     0.0297 
Thailand    0.0287 
Malaysia    0.0261 
Australia    0.0248 
France     0.0226 
                        Netherlands               0.0218 
Source: Author’s calculation. 
Note: (a) Weights are computed based on the trade statistics of the year 2000. We assume 
weights are constant over time. 
 
 
Based on these constant weights and exchange rates of each country’s 
currency per U.S. dollar, we compute a trade weighted exchange rate (in domestic 
currency) for Sri Lanka (see Table AIV.4). 
 
Trade-weighted World Income  
We estimate a trade-weighted world income variable to be used in estimating a 
demand function for Sri Lanka’s exports. The formula for trade-weighted world 










,                                                                                       (AIV.10) 
 238
  239
where Yi is the income of each country in U.S. dollars. We use the same set of 
countries with assigned weights that are used to compute trade-weighted exchange 
rate. Then using each country’s income (in constant US dollars) and these weights, 
figures for Yw for the period 1975-2004 are constructed. Table AIV.6 provides each 
country’s (given in Table AIV.5) real income and computed world income variable in 










 Table AIV.4 
Major Trade Partner Countries’ Currencies in U.S. Dollars and Computed Trade Weighted Exchange Rate for Sri Lanka in Domestic Currency (LKR) 
Year Sri 
Lanka 






Germany Belgium China Thailand Malaysia Australia France Nether-
lands 
TWER 
1975 7.01 1.00 0.45 296.79 8.38 4.94 2.37 484.00 2.46 36.78 1.86 20.38 2.39 0.76 4.29 2.53 1.62 
1976 8.41 1.00 0.56 296.56 8.96 4.90 2.47 484.00 2.52 38.61 1.94 20.40 2.54 0.82 4.80 2.64 1.87 
1977 8.87 1.00 0.57 268.51 8.74 4.66 2.44 484.00 2.32 35.84 1.86 20.40 2.46 0.90 4.91 2.45 2.01 
1978 15.61 1.00 0.52 210.44 8.19 4.68 2.27 484.00 2.01 31.49 1.68 20.34 2.32 0.87 4.51 2.16 3.77 
1979 15.57 1.00 0.47 219.14 8.13 5.00 2.17 484.00 1.83 29.32 1.55 20.42 2.19 0.89 4.25 2.01 3.84 
1980 16.53 1.00 0.43 226.74 7.86 4.98 2.14 607.43 1.82 29.24 1.50 20.48 2.18 0.88 4.23 1.99 4.09 
1981 19.25 1.00 0.50 220.54 8.66 5.59 2.11 681.03 2.26 37.13 1.70 21.82 2.30 0.87 5.43 2.50 4.43 
1982 20.81 1.00 0.57 249.08 9.46 6.07 2.14 731.08 2.43 45.69 1.89 23.00 2.34 0.99 6.57 2.67 4.47 
1983 23.53 1.00 0.66 237.51 10.10 7.27 2.11 775.75 2.55 51.13 1.98 23.00 2.32 1.11 7.62 2.85 4.82 
1984 25.44 1.00 0.75 237.52 11.36 7.82 2.13 805.98 2.85 57.78 2.32 23.64 2.34 1.14 8.74 3.21 4.93 
1985 27.16 1.00 0.78 238.54 12.37 7.79 2.20 870.02 2.94 59.38 2.94 27.16 2.48 1.43 8.99 3.32 5.07 
1986 28.02 1.00 0.68 168.52 12.61 7.80 2.18 881.45 2.17 44.67 3.45 26.30 2.58 1.50 6.93 2.45 5.66 
1987 29.44 1.00 0.61 144.64 12.96 7.80 2.11 822.57 1.80 37.33 3.72 25.72 2.52 1.43 6.01 2.03 6.29 
1988 31.81 1.00 0.56 128.15 13.92 7.81 2.01 731.47 1.76 36.77 3.72 25.29 2.62 1.28 5.96 1.98 7.00 
1989 36.05 1.00 0.61 137.96 16.23 7.80 1.95 671.46 1.88 39.40 3.77 25.70 2.71 1.26 6.38 2.12 7.67 
1990 40.06 1.00 0.56 144.79 17.50 7.79 1.81 707.76 1.62 33.42 4.78 25.59 2.70 1.28 5.45 1.82 8.65 
1991 41.37 1.00 0.57 134.71 22.74 7.77 1.73 733.35 1.66 34.15 5.32 25.52 2.75 1.28 5.64 1.87 8.76 
1992 43.83 1.00 0.57 126.65 25.92 7.74 1.63 780.65 1.56 32.15 5.51 25.40 2.55 1.36 5.29 1.76 9.32 
1993 48.32 1.00 0.67 111.20 30.49 7.74 1.62 802.67 1.65 34.60 5.76 25.32 2.57 1.47 5.66 1.86 9.97 
1994 49.42 1.00 0.65 102.21 31.37 7.73 1.53 803.45 1.62 33.46 8.62 25.15 2.62 1.37 5.55 1.82 10.24 
1995 51.25 1.00 0.63 94.06 32.43 7.74 1.42 771.27 1.43 29.48 8.35 24.92 2.50 1.35 4.99 1.61 11.00 
1996 55.27 1.00 0.64 108.78 35.43 7.73 1.41 804.45 1.50 30.96 8.31 25.34 2.52 1.28 5.12 1.69 11.51 
1997 58.99 1.00 0.61 120.99 36.31 7.74 1.48 951.29 1.73 35.77 8.29 31.36 2.81 1.35 5.84 1.95 11.73 
1998 64.45 1.00 0.60 130.90 41.26 7.75 1.67 1401.44 1.75 36.30 8.28 41.36 3.92 1.59 5.90 1.98 12.00 
1999 70.64 1.00 0.62 113.91 43.06 7.76 1.69 1188.82 0.93 0.93 8.28 37.81 3.80 1.55 0.93 0.93 16.72 
2000 77.01 1.00 0.66 107.76 44.94 7.79 1.72 1130.96 1.09 1.09 8.28 40.11 3.80 1.72 1.09 1.09 17.72 
2001 89.38 1.00 0.69 121.53 47.19 7.80 1.79 1290.99 1.12 1.12 8.28 44.43 3.80 1.93 1.12 1.12 19.75 
2002 95.66 1.00 0.67 125.39 48.61 7.80 1.79 1251.09 1.06 1.06 8.28 42.96 3.80 1.84 1.06 1.06 21.34 
2003 96.52 1.00 0.61 115.93 46.58 7.79 1.74 1191.61 0.89 0.89 8.28 41.48 3.80 1.54 0.89 0.89 22.73 
2004 101.19 1.00 0.55 108.19 45.32 7.79 1.69 1145.32 0.81 0.81 8.28 40.22 3.80 1.36 0.81 0.81 24.88 
Source: Author’s calculation based on data quoted from the International Financial Statistics CD-ROM of International Monetary Fund.
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 Table AIV.5 
Major Trade Partner Countries’ Income and Computed Trade-weighted World Income (U.S. Dollar Billions in 2000 Prices) 









1975 52.34 7.48 15.97 3.00 0.32 0.18 0.68 13.35 2.01 5.22 0.48 0.30 3.06 10.94 2.93 5.83 
1976 55.15 6.79 16.97 2.86 0.39 0.18 0.87 13.41 2.06 5.29 0.51 0.33 3.18 10.70 3.02 6.07 
1977 57.70 7.21 19.64 3.12 0.44 0.19 1.05 14.61 2.26 5.45 0.56 0.37 3.03 11.11 3.34 6.56 
1978 60.55 8.49 25.63 3.36 0.48 0.21 1.32 16.85 2.56 6.00 0.63 0.43 3.21 13.13 3.82 7.38 
1979 60.74 9.90 23.96 3.33 0.53 0.22 1.52 17.95 2.64 6.27 0.65 0.50 3.22 14.22 3.94 7.71 
1980 58.24 11.19 22.40 3.61 0.60 0.24 1.30 16.89 2.54 6.23 0.68 0.51 3.26 14.24 3.74 7.75 
1981 59.25 9.63 22.42 3.49 0.58 0.26 1.32 12.87 1.91 5.31 0.66 0.47 3.42 11.29 2.83 7.35 
1982 58.13 8.64 19.65 3.36 0.57 0.27 1.33 11.68 1.58 4.89 0.65 0.48 3.19 10.07 2.60 6.97 
1983 61.19 7.94 20.80 3.56 0.51 0.30 1.42 11.30 1.45 5.07 0.69 0.52 2.96 9.31 2.44 7.05 
1984 65.23 7.16 21.29 3.38 0.55 0.31 1.50 10.19 1.33 4.95 0.69 0.56 3.12 8.47 2.18 7.08 
1985 67.52 7.29 21.85 3.39 0.56 0.28 1.50 9.92 1.33 4.65 0.62 0.50 2.67 8.50 2.13 7.06 
1986 70.17 8.79 31.81 3.65 0.63 0.28 1.69 13.96 1.81 4.61 0.68 0.44 2.72 11.66 2.93 8.05 
1987 71.81 10.39 37.28 3.89 0.75 0.31 2.05 16.79 2.18 4.80 0.77 0.49 3.09 13.65 3.43 8.96 
1988 74.29 12.13 43.34 4.14 0.85 0.37 2.63 17.36 2.27 5.75 0.90 0.51 3.76 14.26 3.51 9.91 
1989 76.17 11.68 41.24 3.91 0.94 0.41 3.07 16.43 2.19 6.07 1.00 0.54 4.07 13.67 3.31 10.09 
1990 76.46 13.04 40.05 3.85 0.99 0.49 3.33 19.83 2.60 5.05 1.12 0.58 4.06 16.02 3.89 10.60 
1991 75.80 13.07 43.94 3.27 1.10 0.55 3.73 22.38 2.56 5.05 1.24 0.62 3.94 15.45 3.82 10.84 
1992 77.76 13.15 46.55 3.19 1.25 0.61 3.86 24.79 2.76 5.75 1.37 0.73 3.74 16.50 4.11 11.39 
1993 79.35 11.48 51.90 3.05 1.41 0.70 4.32 23.32 2.57 7.14 1.49 0.80 3.53 15.21 3.89 11.63 
1994 82.14 12.11 55.68 3.39 1.55 0.82 4.92 24.29 2.73 6.29 1.68 0.87 3.91 15.67 4.08 12.41 
1995 83.59 12.82 59.70 3.74 1.60 0.95 5.84 27.78 3.13 7.92 1.90 1.00 4.06 17.57 4.69 13.42 
1996 85.80 13.07 51.46 3.85 1.72 1.01 6.12 26.16 2.95 9.02 2.00 1.11 4.44 17.06 4.52 13.58 
1997 89.10 14.24 46.20 4.11 1.86 1.02 5.54 22.69 2.63 9.69 1.62 1.07 4.35 15.08 4.04 13.52 
1998 92.37 15.03 41.51 4.09 1.75 0.86 3.65 22.75 2.65 10.19 1.18 0.76 3.83 15.34 4.13 12.87 
1999 95.85 15.11 46.05 4.23 1.66 0.85 4.61 42.85 105.35 10.25 1.27 0.82 4.04 98.36 9.13 16.69 
2000 98.17 14.38 47.46 4.23 1.65 0.93 5.12 36.59 92.07 10.79 1.23 0.90 3.77 85.95 8.17 16.66 
2001 98.52 13.92 40.49 4.29 1.58 0.84 4.69 35.32 89.30 11.59 1.12 0.86 3.48 84.31 8.24 16.03 
2002 100.35 14.98 38.03 4.44 1.53 0.84 5.23 37.16 94.83 12.47 1.21 0.91 3.82 90.25 8.83 16.51 
2003 103.03 16.81 40.21 5.06 1.47 0.86 5.69 44.01 114.95 13.74 1.34 0.97 4.77 108.12 10.58 17.80 
2004 106.97 18.98 42.46 5.71 1.50 0.86 6.20 48.02 129.43 14.88 1.49 1.07 5.62 120.73 11.64 19.11 
Source: Author’s calculation based on data quoted from the International Financial Statistics CD-ROM of the IMF. 
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